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In 2006, the government's decision to formally embrace 'polisi jamii' or 'ulinzi 
shirikishi' (community or participatory police/policing) reinvigorated a fresh urge 
among scholars to study plural policing in Tanzania. As such, recent literature has 
paid remarkable attention to the state police, commercial security firms, community-
led security groups and party militias in Tanzania. Other scholars have covered some 
grounds on the role of, and interactions between state and non-state actors under the 
community policing schemes and the assemblage of security groups in extraction 
sites. The literature on plural law enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa has also grown 
exponentially, but rarely examines counterfactual cases and semi-autocratic states 
such as Tanzania. This thesis advances our understanding of plural policing in a 
postcolonial state context where statutory and constitutional bans on private security 
service providers formalised the notion that the state has a monopoly on the use of 
force. This thesis locates the bans in a broader context of plural policing and asks, 
why has the Tanzania state not sought to eliminate non-state policing when it is 
banned legally and constitutionally? This question allows the study to examine the 
mechanisms used by successive semi-autocratic governments in Tanzania to 
manipulate the security sector through the selective use of the legal and constitutional 
provisions. It concludes that security actors are as much political actors as the act of 
policing is concerned.  
 
This work, the first of its kind in Tanzania’s settings, builds on and departs from well-
known frameworks that view the act of policing in Africa as plural, multichoice, 
anchored, networked/nodal, assemblage, hybrid, multilateral, fragmented, and order-
making. It advocates for a new paradigm, namely ‘state-controlled’ plural policing to 
develop an overarching theme of the thesis, that is, politics shape, construct, 
manipulate, and determine the policing scene in Tanzania. Simply put, plural policing 
of Tanzania has been regulated by successive governments along political interests. 
The government has had absolute control over the distribution but not the production 
of security services and that non-state actors are indirect and effective means of state 
control of violence. Today, the government of Tanzania generates, controls and is part 
of the commercial security sector and is imbedded in community-based security 
groups in a domestic space. As such, the ban on private security service providers was 




tighten the control on coercive powers and organise security along the state political 
ideology. The government has been pragmatic in implementing the bans by constantly 
manipulating the Constitution and co-opt non-state actors into public policing. The 
presence of privately and communally organised security groups operating in the 
country within a plural security landscape proves that the bans have had little weight 
in practice.  
 
The contributions of this thesis to plural policing literature is manifold. Through a 
multifaced ‘state-controlled’ plural policing, I problematise and capture state-run 
commercial security companies and services in the definition of ‘private policing’; I 
lift a ‘vigilante’ tag on quasi-police groups like sungusungu; I show community 
policing as a policy that creates the nexus between public and private sectors, 
community and commercial, and global and local efforts; I point out and explain a 
complex set of laws and policies that embrace both state-centric and liberal 
approaches to policing (i.e. the entanglements of new and old laws and policies); I 
demonstrate the centrality of a semi-autocratic form of government, local politics, and 
geopolitics (not necessarily law) in organising security; and I explore the exact 
contours and intricate web of security actors from the precolonial to postcolonial 
periods. In reaching at the study’s conclusions, I use a ‘decolonising methodology’ 
and drew on archival research in Dodoma and Dar es Salaam to understand the 
debates around the 1977 ban and about hybrid policing in the country. I also surveyed 
comparative examples of ‘hybridity’ and ‘plurality’ in other parts of the country 
scattered in several historical, political and policing literature. This style of inquiry 
that incorporates legal dimensions in the analysis is not common in policing literature, 
and when used, studies tend to mention legal issues in the margins of their findings. 
Also, I have not married a particular normative stance in favour or against public or 
private security providers in exploring the ban and the ensuing hybrid forms of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a general overview of the study and relates the key legislation 
and constitutional provisions covering internal security within the country during the 
colonial and post-colonial periods. It starts by briefly describing the country profile 
and key historical and socio-political factors (e.g. trade and colonial rule) that have 
played a significant role in the security arrangements and related policies in Tanzania. 
It builds on the important historical events to situate the study within the postcolonial 
state context where nation-builders passed statutory and constitutional bans on 
privately-run armed and security service providers in a plural security landscape. The 
thesis uses the word ‘ban’ to mean legal or official prohibition of privately organised 
armed forces and security service providers (non-state actors). The last four parts of 
this chapter cover the research question, objective, contribution, methodology, 
definitions of key terms and concepts and organisation of the thesis.    
1.2 Tanzania: Country Profile and Key Historical Events   
The name Tanzania was adopted in 1964 after the Union of two former sovereign 
states namely the Republic of Tanganyika and the People's Republic of Zanzibar.1 As 
opposed to Tanganyika (now Mainland Tanzania), Zanzibar (also Tanzania Islands) 
retains a semi-autonomous status in the Union structure. Like other African states, the 
former Republics of Tanganyika and Zanzibar were the by-products of state-building 
projects in the colonial period. Tanzania is found within the African Great Lakes 
Region and shares her borders with Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi (South), 
Congo DRC, Burundi and Rwanda (West), Uganda and Kenya (North), and the Indian 
Ocean (East).2 It has the multitude of ethnic groups and high levels of linguistic and 
 
1 See, the Articles of the Union between the Republic of Tanganyika and the Peoples' Republic of 
Zanzibar, 1964. Cf. the preamble to the Great Britain. Tanganyika Republic Act 1962. 11 Eliz. 2, c. 1. 
London: HMSO; Para 2 of the Constitutional Government and Rule of Law Decree, No. 5 of 1964 
(Republic of Zanzibar); and United Republic (Declaration of Name) Act, No. 61 of 1964.   




religious diversity,3 the black Africans accounting for ninety-nine percent of the 
population.4  
Tanganyika formed part of German East Africa between 1885 and 1919 and fell under 
the British protection from 1919 to 1961 when it became an independent dominion 
within the Commonwealth with the Queen as the head of state.5 In 1962, it became a 
republic under the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) headed by President 
Julius Kambarage Nyerere. Zanzibar, on the other hand, has two main Islands namely 
Unguja and Pemba within the Indian Oceans. Zanzibar fell under the Portuguese 
control between 1498 and 1698,6 followed by the Arabs from Oman between 1698 
and 1890.7 However, the Portuguese and Arabs contact with the people of Zanzibar 
and the East African region through trade dates back to the 5th Century AD.8 In 1890, 
the British took control of Zanzibar as a protectorate territory and gave power back to 
the Arab minority in 1963 as a constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth.9 
This prompted a bloody revolution in 1964 led by the Umma Party and the Afro-
Shirazi Party (ASP) that deposed Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah and replaced him by 
President Abeid Amani Karume.10  
Tanzania became a de jure one-party state from 1965 to 1992, with TANU and ASP 
as the only political parties on either side of the Union.11 TANU and ASP merged in 
1977 to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (the Revolutionary Party) – CCM, which 
still rules the country to date.12 The Arusha Declaration of 1967 made Tanzania a 
socialist state whereby workers’ and peasants’ run the government and the major 
means of production are socially or collectively owned.13 However, since the Zanzibar 
 
3 NBS (2018) National population projections. Dar es Salaam, NBS, p. 55. 
4  Central Intelligence Agency (2018), Ibid. 
5 Section 1(1) of the Tanganyika Independence Act, 1961, 10 Eliz. 2, Cap. 1. 
6 Omulokoli, W.A.O. (2006) Portuguese presence and endeavours in East Africa. Africa Journal of 
Evangelical Theology, 25(2), 139-148. 
7 Mbogoni, L.E.Y. (2012) Aspects of colonial Tanzania history. Dar es Salaam, Mkuki & Nyota, pp. 3-
201. 
8 Al-Radi, S. (1990) Brief history of the East African coast. In: Powell, R. (ed.) The Architecture of 
Housing: Exploring Architecture in Islamic Cultures. Vol. 4. Geneva: Aga Khan Award for 
Architecture, p. 271. 
9 Section 1(1) of Great Britain. Zanzibar Act 1963. 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55. London: HMSO and Article 32 of 
the Constitution of the State of Zanzibar, 1963. 
10  Mbogoni (2012), Ibid.  
11 Article 3 of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965. 
12 Article 3 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (original) 




Declaration of 1991, it has moved more forthrightly in a capitalist direction.14 The 
country has been politically stable with one military expedition against the Ugandan 
Idi Amin regime in 1978 and 1979. Today, Tanzania is a semi-autocratic, secular, and 
socialist state that adheres to multi-party democracy,15 with both central and local 
administrations.16  Until 2019, Mainland Tanzania has had four written Constitutions, 
which include two union Constitutions. The current union Constitution (1977) and 
other statutes contain a ban on privately-run armed forces and security service 
providers dealt with at length in this thesis vis-à-vis the notion of hybrid forms of 
security arrangements.  
1.3 Research Context 
Since the turn of the 21st century, activities of privately and communally organised 
security groups17 have attracted renewed interest among scholars in Tanzania18 and 
across the globe.19 This is so because more and more governments, households, 
neighbourhoods, local businesses, and international organisations are turning to these 
groups for protection.20 Scholars refer to these alternative forms of security 
arrangements that remedy state default as non-state actors21 and private actors or 
 
14 Makulilo, V.B. (2012) Where is socialism in Tanzania? Elixir International Journal (Social Science), 
46, pp. 8170-8180. 
15 Cf. Articles 3 and 33 of the Tanzania Constitution (revised in 2010) 
16 Ibid. Articles 4 and 145. 
17 Community-led security groups include traditional security arrangements (e.g. sungusungu) and 
political parties’ security groups (e.g. CCM’s Green Guards and CHADEMA’s Red Brigades) while 
security companies cover state-owned security companies (e.g. SUMA JKT Guard Ltd) and private 
security companies (e.g. G4S KK Security and Ultimate Security – now part of GuardaWorld 
Corporation). 
18 Brennan, J.R. (2006) Youth, the TANU youth league and managed vigilantism in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, 1925-73. Journal of the International African Institute, 76(2), pp. 221-246; Cross, C. (2013) 
Community policing through local collective action in Tanzania: sungusungu to ulinzi shirikishi. PhD 
thesis, University of Sussex; and Shadrack, J. (2011) The private security industry in Tanzania: 
challenges, issues and regulation, LL.M Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam. 
19 Baker, B. (2008) Multi-choice policing in Africa. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Wood, J. & 
Dupont, B. (eds). (2006) Democracy, society and the governance of security. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; and Walker, N. & Loader, I. (2007) Civilizing security. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
20 Cross (2013), Ibid; Shivji, I.G. (1990) State coercion and freedom in Tanzania. National University 
of Lesotho, Institute of Southern African Studies; and Shadrack (2011), Ibid. 
21 It excludes insecurity actors such as criminal networks and local mercenaries. Cf. Ebo, A. (2007) 
Non-state actors, peacebuilding and security governance in West Africa: beyond commercialisation. 




private security actors22 or simply private policing.23 This study adopts the phrase 
non-state actors and private security service providers to describe armed and unarmed 
groups, firms and individuals such as pro-government militias, political party militias, 
security companies and community-based vigilante groups. These individuals and 
organisations are:  
(i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) 
not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, 
presidential guards, police, or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a 
certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, 
resources, and infrastructure. They may, however, be supported or 
instrumentalized by state actors either secretly or openly, as happens often 
with militias, paramilitaries, mercenaries, or private military companies… 
Despite close relationships with state actors, these groups can still be seen 
as non-state actors since they are not under full state control.24   
The use of the word ‘non-state’ or ‘private’ suggests the existence of ‘state’ or ‘public’ 
actors, and their co-existence creates a plural security landscape or simply 
‘plural/hybrid policing’.25  Despite their constant presence on streets and increasing 
role in community safety, private security service providers fall under the ‘banned’ 
(prohibited) organisations in Tanzania. Article 147(1) of the Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 provides, “…it is hereby prohibited for any 
person or any organisation or any group of persons except the Government to raise or 
maintain in Tanzania an armed force of any kind”. The Constitution restricts the term 
‘armed forces’ to the state’s defence and security forces (as opposed to non-state 
armed forces) namely Defence Force (Army), the Police Force, the Prisons Service, 
the National Service, and any other government security organs.26  
The government has not only enacted several laws to limit the right of association, 
but state officials have also historically interpreted and enforced those laws to give 
weight to the constitutional ban on private security service providers. These laws 
 
22 Bryden, A. and Caparini, M. (eds.) (2006) Private actors and security governance. Yearbook 4. 
Geneva, DCAF. 
23 Button, M. (2002) Private policing. Devon, UK, Willan Publishing.  
24 Hofmann, C. and Schneckener, U. (2011) Engaging non-state armed actors in state- and peace-
building: options and strategies. International Review of the Red Cross, 93(883), pp. 2 and 3.  
25 Baker, B. (2013) Hybridity in policing: the case of Ethiopia. Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, 45(3), pp. 296-313. 




include the Penal Code,27 Public Order Ordinance (now Act) of 195128 and Societies 
Ordinance (now Act) of 195429 that predate the 1977 Constitution and more recently 
repeated in the Political Parties (Amendment) Act of 2019.30 The Public Order 
Ordinance under Section 3 adds: 
If the members or adherents of any association of persons, whether incorporated 
or not, are – (a) organised or trained or equipped for the purpose of enabling 
them to be employed in usurping the functions of the police or of the armed 
forces of the United Republic; or (b) organised and trained or organised and 
equipped either for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or 
display of physical force in promoting any political object, or in such manner as 
to arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organised and either trained or 
equipped for that purpose, then any member or adherent of such association shall 
be guilty of an offence… 
Section 8 of the Societies Ordinance (now Act) emphasises: 
It shall be lawful for the President, in his absolute discretion, where he 
considers it to be essential in the public interest, by order to declare to be 
unlawful any society which in his opinion – (a) is being used for any purpose 
prejudicial to, or incompatible with, the maintenance of peace, order and good 
government. 
The Act defines a ‘society’ as any club, company, partnership, or association of ten 
or more persons whatever its nature or object. Further, Section 8E of the Political 
Parties (Amendment) Act reiterates: 
(1) A political party, a leader or a member shall not recruit, deploy or form a 
militia, paramilitary or security group of any kind or maintain an organisation 
intending to usurp the functions of the police force or any government 
security organ. (2) A political party shall not conduct, finance, coordinate or 
order to be conducted or coordinated, military style training or any kind of 
training on the use of force or the use of any kind of weapon to its members 
or any other person. 
 
27 Introduced on 28 September 1945. 
28 Ordinance No. 21 of 6th July 1951 (Cap. 304, now Cap. 385). 
29 Ordinance No. 11 of 1st June 1954 (Cap. 337, now Cap. 337). 





At different occasions, the High Court of Tanzania,31 Presidential Commission on 
Mono-party or Multi-party System (Nyalali Commission),32 Registrar of Political 
Parties,33 Electoral Commission,34 and the Police Force and Ministry of Home 
Affairs35 have interpreted the 1977 ban to include private security service providers.36 
It should be borne in mind, however, that the Republic Constitution of 196237 and 
Interim Constitution of 196538 allowed activities of non-state actors (irregular forces) 
under the authority of an Act of Parliament. The two Constitutions differed 
substantially with the Public Order Ordinance and Societies Ordinance about the role 
of private security service providers in the society.39 Partly, this was so because the 
two Ordinances were conceived during the colonial period. The 1962 and 1965 
Constitutions respectively provided that: 
No person shall raise or maintain any military, naval or air forces in Tanzania 
except under the authority of an Act of Parliament. 
 
31 See, Ngwegwe s/o Sangija & 3 Others v.  R., Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 1987, High Court of Tanzania 
at Mwanza, and Misperesi K. Maingu v. Hamisi Mtongori and 9 Others, Civil Case No. 16 of 1988, 
High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, reported in Maina, C.P. (1997) Human rights in Tanzania: selected 
cases and materials. Köln, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, pp. 515-525. 
32 LRCT (1994) Final report on designated legislation in the Nyalali commission report. Dar es Salaam, 
Government Printer, Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, pp. 134-137. 
33 Abdu, F. (2015) Parties' military wings banned. Daily News [online]. 17 June 2015. [Viewed on 12 
June 2017]. Available from:  <http://allafrica.com/stories/201506170265.html>. 
34 Ngarabali, J. and Nyakeke, B. (2015) NEC, police: no one will be allowed to guard votes Sunday. 
The Citizen Newspaper [online]. 19 October 2015. [Viewed on 17 June 2017]. Available from: 
<https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/NEC--police--No-one-will-be-allowed-to-guard-votes-
Sunday/1840406-2920194-format-xhtml-gs8sulz/index.html>.  Cf. the case of Amy P. Kibatala v. The 
Attorney General, the Director of Elections and National Electoral Commission, Miscellaneous Civil 
Cause No. 37 of 2015 (Full Bench, High Court of Tanzania); and LHRC and TACCEO (2016) Report 
on the 2015 general elections of united republic of Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, LHRC, pp. 39 and 40. 
35 Nkwame, M. (2012) Police ban political party 'armies'. Daily News [online]. 29 March 2012. 
[Accessed on 23 June 2017]. Available from:  <http://allafrica.com/stories/201203290032.html>, and 
Aljazeera News (2004) Tanzania bans paramilitary-style training. Aljazeera News [online]. 25 March 
2004. [Accessed on 14 February 2019]. Available from:  
<https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/03/200849125335325266.html>.  
36 Shivji (1990), Ibid. pp. 15-16, 18 & Shivji, I.G. (1991) Contradictory developments in the teaching 
and practice of human rights law in Tanzania. Journal of African Law, 35(1-2), pp. 121, 124; Kweka, 
D. (2015a) Party militias and election-related violence in Tanzania. Pambazuka News [online]. 25 
March 2015. [Accessed on 19 November 2018]. Available from:  
<https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/party-militias-and-election-related-violence-tanzania>; 
Kweka, D. (2015b) Imbonerakure militia: parallels between burundi and Tanzania. Pambazuka News 
[online]. 04 June 2015. [Accessed on 19 November 2018]. Available from:  
<https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/imbonerakure-militia-parallels-between-burundi-and-
tanzania>; Shadrack (2011), Ibid. pp. 39-46; and Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 52. 
37 Article 64. 
38 Article 80. 
39 Article 89 of the 1977 Constitution changed this position. Section 49 of the 5th Constitutional 
Amendment (Act No. 15 of 1984) moved Article 89 to Article 147. The Eighth Constitutional 




However, no Act of the parliament was enacted to establish or allow private security 
service providers. In comparison, Article 266(4) of the 2014 Draft Constitution 
attempted to bring the 1962 and 1965 positions back to life. It reads:  
It is hereby prohibited for any person to establish an institution, a company, 
community or organisation which is concerned with the National defence and security 
or an armed force, except in accordance with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
It proceeds under Article 274: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 266, Parliament may legislate for 
setting permit conditions in order to establish, control and manage other 
institutions that provide defence services. 
Pending the adoption of the 2014 Draft Constitution that allows private security 
services, the constitutional and statutory bans on private security service providers 
remain in full force and effect. The government usually circumvents the ban through 
militia statutes,40 company law41 and local government legislation42 contrary to 
Article 64 of the 1977 Constitution. Article 64(5) provides for the effect of 
disregarding any constitutional clause (e.g. Article 147) when legislating as follows:  
…in the event any other law conflicts with the provisions contained in this 
Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law, to the extent of 
the inconsistency with the Constitution, shall be void.  
The above-named legislation contravenes the Constitution in two ways. Firstly, 
Article 147 does not contain any exception to the general rule or an avenue for the 
existence of private security service providers. It is only the government that has the 
constitutional mandate to establish organisations for enforcement of law and order, 
thus the Constitution does not envisage delegation of the core state powers to private 
individuals and for-profit companies.43 Secondly, existing laws do not establish 
private security service providers as distinct providers of security services but only 
extends policing powers to them. In Judge Mwalusanya’s dictum, private security 
 
40 The Peoples Militia (Compensation for Death or Injuries) Act, 1973, Peoples Militia (Powers of 
Arrest) Act, 1975, and People’s Militia Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1989. 
41 Companies Act, 2002. 
42 See, Section 111(1)(2) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7 of 1982, and Section 
16(c)-(e) and 54(1)(2) of the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, No. 8 of 1982. Cf. Article 
146(2)(b) of the 1977 Constitution also allows the local authorities to enforce law and order. 
43 LRCT (1994), Ibid. See also the decision of the Supreme Court of Israel in the case of Human Rights 
Program v. the Minister of Finance (alias Academic Centre of Law and Business, Human Rights 




service providers operate in a vacuum, that is to say, they operate outside the 
framework of the law.44 The People’s Militia Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 
(1989), for instance, defines ‘people’s militia’ to include: 
An organised group of the people…operating with the authority of and under 
the aegis of the government and which is…participating in any…law 
enforcement exercise for the protection of the people…by whatever name 
known whether by wasalama, sungusungu or any other…  
Not all private security service providers are sungusungu or operate with the authority 
of and under the auspices of the government. Even if this was the case, they remain 
unlawful under the purview of Articles 64(5) and 147 of the 1977 Constitution as they 
are not the creations of the government or Act of the Parliament.45 Given the statutory 
and constitutional restrictions imposed on non-state policing, the government has 
manipulated the security sector to allow the state security agencies to ‘commercialise’ 
their services. For instance, Regulation F.2 of the Police Force Service Regulations46 
allows a police officer to provide his/her service to private individuals for payment. 
It reads as follows:  
Without prejudice to the generality of Regulation F.1 above a Police Officer 
who is engaged on duty at the request of any person who has agreed to pay the 
Police Force for the Police Officer's services, shall not be entitled to any 
payment for those services except as provided by these Regulations; and any 
payments made in pursuance of that agreement shall be made by that person to 
the Police Force. 
In addition, Sections 75 and 76 of the Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act47 allow 
the employment of police officers on special duty at the expense of private persons 
and the employment of additional police in special circumstances. Section 75(1) 
provides that:  
The Inspector-General may, subject to the directions of the Minister, on the 
application of any person and on being satisfied as to the necessity therefor, 
detail any number of police officers for special duty at any place in the 
United Republic and for such period as may be considered necessary. Such 
police officers shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be exclusively 
 
44 Ngwegwe s/o Sangija & 3 Others v.  R., Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 1987, High Court of Tanzania at 
Mwanza, and Misperesi K. Maingu v. Hamisi Mtongori and 9 Others, Civil Case No. 16 of 1988, High 
Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, both reported in Maina (1997), Ibid, pp. 515-525. 
45 LRCT (1994), Ibid. and Shivji (1990), Ibid. p. 15. 
46 G.N. No. 193 of 1995. 




under the orders of the officer in charge of police in such place and shall, 
unless the Minister otherwise directs, be employed at the expense of the 
person making the application: provided that any person on whose 
application police officers have been detailed for special duty at any place 
may require that such police officers shall be withdrawn and at the 
expiration of one month from the date of such notice or such less period as 
the Inspector-General may determine such person shall be relieved of any 
further expense in connection with the employment of such police officers. 
(2) Any amount recoverable as expenses from any person making such 
application under subsection (1) may be recovered by the Inspector-General 
as a debt, and when received shall be paid into the revenue of the United 
Republic. 
Section 76 adds that:  
Where the Inspector-General considers that it is in the interests of any person 
that the employment of additional police in any place is necessary for the 
safety of any public or private property, or that there is a reasonable 
apprehension of a breach of the peace, he may, subject to the directions of the 
Minister, station police officers for duty at any place for such period as he 
may consider necessary, and may require any person to pay all or part of the 
expenses incurred thereby, and such person shall thereupon cause payment to 
be made in such manner as the Inspector-General may direct: provided that 
any person who has been required to pay such expense as aforesaid may 
appeal against such requirement to the Minister whose decision thereon shall 
be final. 
A private party can also sign a security service agreement with the police and army 
under the Corporation Sole (Establishment) Act of 1974 and related regulations.48 
Nonetheless, there has been a resistance from both public and private sector that 
armed forces cannot sell to the public the service that is their core function under the 
legislation and Constitution. This is partly because The Police General Orders No. 
109 prohibits a police officer from undertaking “any private agency in any matter 
connected with the exercise of his public duties.”49 
Despite these legal dilemmas, private security service providers exist and operate as 
de facto state police and militias. Since 2006, the government’s effort has been to 
move away from state-centric model (illiberal model) to a more liberal approach to 
security namely community or participatory policing (polisi jamii/ulinzi shirikishi). 
The community policing (CP) approach brings together the state police, individuals, 
 
48 Cap. 119. See also, Police Corporation Sole (Police Force) Order, G.N. No. 66 of 2013 and Police 
Corporation Sole Board (Appointment) Order, GN. No. 67 of 2013. 




community and commercial security groups and development partners to enforce the 
everyday civil order. Among other things, private citizens, local and international 
organisations provide resources to and share information with the police and 
participate in a joint patrol with the police officers or operate independently in 
enforcing state laws in their communities. These hybrid forms of security 
arrangements started in the late 1980s but became more structured, complex, and 
interwoven in the free-market world in the mid-2000s. Nonetheless, the CP scheme 
presents a situation whereby the government enforces a policy rather than law. In 
Tanzania, a policy differs from a law, in that, the government is expected to formulate 
a policy or strategy, then enact a law based on the policy statements, i.e., law comes 
from a policy.50 Hence, I show in this study that the Tanzanian case is more complex, 
dynamic, and marred by politics, thus improving our understanding of policing in 
Africa as discussed below.51  
1.4 Aim, Question and Contributions 
This thesis advances our understanding of plural policing in a postcolonial state 
context where the nation-builders banned non-state actors in both the state 
Constitution and statutes. It makes an original contribution to the debate about plural 
policing in developing countries, especially Tanzania. This thesis locates the bans in 
a broader context of plural policing and asks, why has the Tanzania state not sought 
to eliminate non-state policing when it is banned legally and constitutionally?  This 
question allowed the study to investigate the mechanisms used by successive semi-
autocratic governments in Tanzania to manipulate the security sector through the 
selective use of the legal and constitutional provisions. Besides, this thesis offers 
insights into policing in Tanzania in terms of its diversity, complexity, and 
development from pre-colonial to independence periods .  
I develop and use ‘state-controlled plural policing’52 as an analytical framework and 
make one theoretical claim about hybrid security and the bans that underpin the thesis. 
 
50 We have had instances where a law is enacted without a policy. See, Majamba, H.I. (2018) The 
paradox of the legislative drafting process in Tanzania. Statute Law Review, 39(2), pp. 171–183.  
51 The study defines the terms policing, security, and plural policing in chapter two. 
52 In a way, it is also a ‘party-controlled’ plural policing because of the party-state politics or the 
historical ties between the state and the party as well as the political influence of the party in 




I claim that the intention of the government at all time has not been to produce security 
through non-state actors but rather to manipulate, regulate, and discipline them along 
political interests. The government has had absolute control over the distribution but 
not the production of security services and that non-state actors are indirect and 
effective means of state control of violence. Today, the government of Tanzania 
generates, controls and is part of the commercial security sector and is imbedded in 
community-based security groups in a domestic space. As such, the ban on private 
security service providers was not a turning point in real security policies rather it has 
allowed the government to tighten the control on coercive powers and organise 
security along the state political ideology. The government has been pragmatic in 
implementing the bans by constantly manipulating the Constitution and co-opt non-
state actors into public policing. The presence of privately and communally organised 
security groups operating in the country within a plural security landscape proves that 
the bans have had little weight in practice. As shown in the third chapter, the Germans 
were the only rulers in Tanzanian history who tried to establish a 'monopoly of 
violence' both in theory and practice because they launched a series of military 
campaigns against and defeated all privately organized security groups in the country.  
The contribution of this thesis to plural policing literature is manifold. It builds on and 
departs from well-known frameworks that view the act of policing in Africa as plural, 
multichoice, anchored, networked/nodal, assemblage, hybrid, multilateral, 
fragmented, and order-making to advocate for a new paradigm, namely ‘state-
controlled’ plural policing. In particular, the study problematises and captures state-
run commercial security companies and services in the definition of ‘private policing’ 
and lift a ‘vigilante’ tag on quasi-police groups like sungusungu; it shows CP as a 
policy that create the nexus between public and private sectors, community and 
commercial, and global and local efforts; it points out and explains a complex set of 
laws and policies that embrace both state-centric and liberal approaches to policing 
(i.e. the entanglements of new and old laws and policies); it demonstrates the 
centrality of a semi-autocratic form of government and geopolitics in organising 
security; and it explores the exact contours and intricate web of security actors from 
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precolonial to postcolonial periods. These key findings connect to the underlying 
theme of the study, which was to highlight the centrality of politics in organising 
security networks and the contradiction of the presence of diverse non-state actors 
despite the statutory and constitutional ban on private security service providers. I 
have used a qualitative research approach and employed documentary review as data 
collection and analysis methods to arrive at the main conclusions of this study as 
discussed below. 
1.5 Methodology 
I employed a qualitative methodological approach that drew upon archival or 
historical and documentary data sources to describe and explain a research 
phenomenon. I concentrated on a six months’ archival fieldwork in Dodoma and Dar 
es Salaam to understand the debates around the 1977 ban and about hybrid policing 
in the country. I chose Dar es Salaam because it is a business city, centre of urban 
politics, and almost all public and private archives and libraries have head offices in 
the city while Dodoma is the country’s capital city. The on-going exercise of 
relocating the government offices from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma involves moving 
public records to Dodoma. I retrieved historical documents on German rule and 
British colonies, dependencies, and the Commonwealth of Nations from online 
archives to supplement archival materials from Tanzania. In particular, I reviewed 
documents such as Constitutions, statutes and ordinances, bills, by-laws/regulations, 
decrees/proclamations, Orders in Council, guidelines, Hansards and transcripts, 
manuscripts, reports and statistics, speeches, government notices, cabinet papers, 
policy papers, party guidelines, pamphlets/Magazines, manifestos and declarations, 
press releases, case laws, and media reports.  
I collected archival records from governmental and non-governmental institutions. 
The government institutions included Bunge (Parliament) Archives and Library 
(Dodoma), East Africana Collection (University of Dar es Salaam) and the National 
Bureau of Statistics (digital library). On the other hand, the non-governmental 
institutions were Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Dar es Salaam), CCM Library 
(Dodoma), Legal and Human Rights Centre (digital library), TWAWEZA (digital 
library), Congress’s World Digital Library, Internet Archive, AP Digital Archive, 




Library. In a way, I adopted a ‘decolonising methodology’, thus prioritised or gave 
preference to publications from local organisations and scholars who understand 
better the Tanzanian historical process and context. Some of these scholars were party 
and government leaders who have played a great role in shaping government 
policies.53 According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni,54 a “decolonising methodology entails 
unmasking its role and purpose in research. It also about rebelling against it; shifting 
the identity of its object so as to re-position those who have been objects of research 
into questioners, critics, theorists, knowers, and communicators. And, finally, it 
means recasting research into what Europe has done to humanity and nature rather 
than following Europe as a teacher to the rest of the world.”  
After data collection, I organised, compiled, coded, and interpreted it to establish 
major and minor themes or ideas to build on two interrelated concepts namely private 
and plural policing. Thus, both archival and documentary sources offered insights 
about the phenomenon and provided a conceptual density to enrich my study. I 
complemented this primary search with comparative examples of ‘hybridity’ and 
‘plurality’ in other parts of the country scattered in several historical, political, and 
policing literature. I have combined legal and criminological aspects to probe the 
Tanzanian plural policing case. This style of inquiry that incorporates legal 
dimensions in the analysis is not common in policing literature, and when used, 
studies tend to mention legal issues in the margins of their findings. I have not married 
a particular normative stance in favour or against public or private security providers 
in exploring the ban and the ensuing hybrid forms of security arrangements. Besides 
a wealth of secondary sources, this study is based on insights I gathered from the late 
1980s to date. Being a Tanzanian myself, I have seen, experienced, taken part in and 
hired some of policing groups discussed in the study at hand. 
 
53 E.g. Sir Horace Byatt (British Governor of Tanganyika), J.K. Nyerere (Prime Minister and President 
of Tanganyika/Tanzania, and Chairman of TANU & CCM), Pius Msekwa (Ex-Clerk and Speaker of 
the National Assembly, Chairman of Various Presidential Commissions, and Vice-Chairman of CCM) 
and Philip Telford Georges (Chief Justice of Tanzania).  Others include Brig. Gen. Hashim I. Mbita 
(Executive Secretary of African Liberation Committee), R.M. Kawawa (Prime Minister and Vice-
President), Justice J.L. Mwalusanya (High Court Judge), and Oscar Kambona (Minister of Defence, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Home Affairs, and Chairman of OAU Liberation Committee). 
54 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2017) Decolonising research methodology must include undoing its dirty 






Regarding ethical issues, my project did not require ethical scrutiny because it uses 
historical records and previously existing datasets that do not contain individual-level 
information.55 However, since I conducted my fieldwork in Tanzania, I was very 
much aware of the research guidelines issued by the Tanzania Commission of Science 
and Technology and the Statistics Act of 2015 (revised in 2018). Among other things, 
the rules require a researcher to seek and obtain a permit to access, keep, use, and 
disseminate information. Each organisation that I visited had research procedures 
such as writing a letter to access information. The next part defines key terms and 
concepts used in the thesis. 
1.6 Definitions of Key Terms and Concepts 
The key terms and concepts of the study are police, policing, plural policing and semi-
autocratic state.  
(a) Police  
The word ‘police’ means a specific group of personnel or a government department 
charged with the preservation of public order, the promotion of public safety, the 
prevention and detection of crime56 and other negotiable social service functions in a 
particular territory.57 Police organisations are diverse in size, variously funded and 
trained, carry and use arms and stand in the executive branch of government.58 They 
customarily comprise uniformed or plain-clothes sworn police officers, community 
support officers,59 auxiliary police officers60 and judicial police officers in some 
jurisdictions who work alone or in partnerships.  
(b) Policing  
 
55 Warwick Law School (2020) Research ethics [online]. Last revised on 14 January 2020. [Viewed on 
19 February 2020]. Available from:  <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/ethics/>. 
56 Garner, B.A. (ed.) (2009) Black's law dictionary. 9th ed. Eagan, MN, West/Thomson Reuters, p. 1276; 
Rogers, C. (2017) Plural Policing: Theory and Practice. Bristol, Bristol University Press, p. 3; and 
Manning, P.K. (2003) Policing Contingencies. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 20, 33-52, 
and 238. 
57 Igbinovia, P.E. (1981) The pattern of policing in Africa: the French and British connections. Police 
Journal, 54(2), pp. 127-135. 
58 Manning (2003), Ibid. pp. 43-48.   
59 Talbot, T. (2013) Plural Policing: The multifaceted world of Irish state "policing” authorities. 
Masters Dissertation, Dublin Institute of Technology, p. 14. 




Policing is one of the mechanisms that the government and its people use to protect 
themselves from crimes.61 Previously, the term policing connoted ‘peace’ or ‘peace-
making’, thus policemen/women became ‘peace officers’.62 This study uses the term 
‘policing’ to mean: 
Organized forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule or law 
enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of 
investigation and associated information-brokering---which may involve a 
conscious exercise of coercive power---undertaken by individuals or 
organizations, where such activities are viewed by them and/or others as a 
central or key defining part of their purpose.63 
A policing activity remains a diverse spectrum of the preventive, deterrent, and 
investigative works carried out by a variety of actors.64 It is an intentional and 
organised activity and service provided by statutory and non-statutory bodies that 
seek to guarantee safety.65 As a result, some studies use the term ‘security’ instead of 
‘policing’ and give it a wide meaning to include security networks,66 crime control 
and the general state of being free from threat.67 This thesis uses the term policing 
interchangeably with the word security.  
There are public and private dimensions to the act of policing. The public policing 
combines all state security agencies68 while private policing69 is a mixture of formal 
and informal, and voluntary and involuntary non-state actors that authorise and 
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Research Focus, 3(1), p. 1; and Manning (2003), Ibid. pp. 17, 38 and 40. 
63 Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (1998) Private security and public policing. Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 
18 and 19. Cf. Crawford, A., et al. (2005) Plural policing: the mixed economy of visible patrols in 
England and Wales, Bristol, Policy Press, p. 4. 
64 The UNODC (2011) Handbook on police accountability, oversight and integrity. Criminal Justice 
Handbook Series, New York, UN, p. 5, and Schwartz, M. (2015) Policing and (in)security in fragile 
and conflict affected settings [online]. GCCS. [Accessed on 11 May 2019]. Available from: 
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provide security services.70 This study places for-profit security services provided by 
corporations sole (state-run body corporates) into the ‘private’ category because of 
the interests served. The form that each policing organisation takes, whether state or 
non-state depends on many aspects such as the existing security problems, laws, 
geographical locations - rural or urban, and socio-economic and political status of the 
area concerned.71 
 
(c) Plural Policing  
We live in an age where a complex network of public and private organisations and 
actors deliver public security services in the public, semi-public and private 
domains.72 Most jurisdictions in Africa rely on a variety of law-enforcers despite 
having security policies based on public monopolies.73 This situation only means that 
there is a convergence of private and public actors in policing activities. While the 
state is slowly withdrawing from front-line policing, the non-state actors emerge in 
different forms to fill the void.74 Bottom-up arrangements that co-exist with a more 
formalised top-down security system are routinely providing security.75 This implies 
that the hypothetical line that has traditionally divided the public functions from 
private ones is fading.76 Consequently, policing studies have developed several 
concepts to explain these forms of institutional plurality and hybridity. The most 
common concepts are ‘plural’, ‘multi-choice’, ‘nodal’, ‘network’, ‘assemblage’, 
‘hybrid’, ‘multilateral’, ‘fragmented’, ‘order-making’, and ‘police extended family’.77  
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This thesis uses the notion of ‘plural’, thus plural policing (also hybrid policing) to 
explain the Tanzanian case. Some authors focus on the ‘plural’ aspect more than the 
policing feature and the nature of actors who undertake policing activity.78 Plurality 
refers not just to the multiplicity of security providers, but also, the variety of laws, 
practices, functions, clients and sponsors of security. Plural policing is common in 
countries where state authority is weak.79 Therefore, plural policing means a shift 
away from a state-centred policing framework to accommodate non-state security 
actors.80 It involves configuration of policing activity as a private, public and quasi-
public (social good) and somewhat subject to market forces.81    
(d) Semi-autocratic government 
A semi-autocratic government embodies both democratic and authoritarian features, 
that is to say, it neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, thus falls into the grey 
zone between democracy and totalitarianism.82 It may centralise power to local 
government authorities (LGAs), national assembly and judicial body or embrace 
multiparty politics, but the ultimate state powers revolves around one powerful party 
and leader (imperial presidency).83 This form of governance is sometimes known as 
‘hybrid’ or ‘semi-democratic’ or ‘semi-authoritarian’ or ‘electoral authoritarian’ 
regime.84 A semi-autocratic regime holds regular multiparty elections for public 
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office holders that violate minimum democratic values to conceal and perpetuate 
autocracy.85 The next part provides the organisation of the thesis.  
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis has seven chapters. The second chapter analyses prior literature on plural 
policing framed in a postcolonial state context. The chapter shed some light on key 
conceptual issues in that literature and highlights the main problems in the current 
state of knowledge. The chapter begins by briefly explaining common models (state-
centric and liberal) in the governance of security and develops from there to give a 
detailed analysis of the policing literature on Africa in general and Tanzania in 
particular, and how it contributes to and differs from the study at hand. I have selected 
works published from 1990 to date, which make Tanzania or neighbouring states 
(Kenya and Uganda) and some Anglophone countries (South Africa, Sierra Leone, 
and Nigeria) as their focal areas. The style of analysis followed is to look at one 
literature at a time, and where necessary, comparing it with other studies in the series. 
At the concluding part, the chapter provides a summary of research gaps and my 
reflections on the analysis.  
The third chapter provides a historical account of policing groups and law in terms of 
change and continuity in the precolonial to the early postcolonial periods. It reveals a 
degree of political motivation during those periods in relation to the modern time. It 
notes that the common form of security arrangements in the precolonial period 
included armed escorts, armed retainers, raiding troops, royal guards, and personal 
bodyguards. Tribal and clan chiefs, military leaders, warlords, traders, and 
commoners controlled early forms of security arrangements because there were 
hardly identifiable states, as we know them today, separating the public from private 
policing. Conversely, nation-states, governments, centralised security apparatuses 
(police, prison, and army) and codified laws were common features of the colonial 
era, thus a clear distinction between public and private actors developed. Other 
government institutions included native police and colonial agents. On the other hand, 
chartered companies, shooting clubs (rifle associations), in-house security 
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departments, party militias and neighbourhood watch groups pioneered the private 
security sector, which had political leanings. The last two parts of the chapter 
examined how the ‘mandate’ (later ‘trust’) territory status affected not only the 
creation of a strong police force in the country but also policy reforms in the ‘colony’ 
and ‘post-colony’. Therefore, the efforts to control the means of violence by the 
autocrats started in the precolonial era, but such efforts were refined and 
institutionalised through state policies in the colony. These spectres of colonial 
security arrangements, political manipulation, and policies continues to haunt the 
post-colony today.  
In the fourth chapter, I build on the colonial bans imposed on community-led security 
groups via the Public Order Ordinance and the Societies Ordinance to discuss the 
1977 ban. I uncover the reasons for banning non-state actors in the 1977 Constitution 
and not in the Republic (1962) and Interim (1965) Constitutions, respectively. In the 
first part of the chapter, I look at the state-specific factors for the adoption of a less 
strict stand towards non-state actors in the Republic and Interim Constitutions. In the 
second part, I lay down a foundation for understanding the role of the union of the 
formerly sovereign states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and single-party autocrats in 
formulating national security policies. I also look at the party’s control of law and 
order through, and sometimes outside, the government machinery. In the third part, I 
build on the first two parts to explain the government statement in the constituent 
assembly for the 1977 ban and related socio-political context. The last part of the 
chapter shows the implication of and connects the context for the ban of non-state 
actors to the question of plural policing.  I argue that the Tanzanian government’s 
security policy was as much about political necessities such as counterinsurgency, 
decolonisation, and secession movements. 
The fifth chapter examines the country’s special circumstances that have contributed 
to the failure in upholding the bans, thus hybrid policing. It identifies three complex 
and overlapping reasons, namely legacy issues (rural-urban divide and regime 
policing), internal agency or risk factors (ujamaa ideology and Kagera war) and 
external contingency aspects (neoliberal reforms). I show in this chapter that the 
traditional ways of life predating the modern nation-state, the colonial legacy of 




pressures, and neoliberal reforms are ultimate causes of pluralisation. The proximate 
cause for the departure from the state-centric policy to plural policing lies completely 
within the party guidelines and the Constitution itself, framed in the socialist path of 
development. The government has loosely interpreted the Constitution and party 
guidelines to accommodate and engage the very actors it sought to ban in policing the 
public space. Lastly, the chapter looks at the transformation of policing vis-à-vis the 
politics of security and draws on the lessons learnt from the Tanzanian plural policing 
case in the 1980s. The chapter concludes that it would be politically risky for the 
government not to accommodate the grassroots into state policing. 
The sixth chapter draws on different theoretical and empirical aspects together to 
answer the research question. As such, I look at the current typology of policing 
groups and the meanings they generate to security. The first part of this chapter 
classifies and analyses policing groups both state and non-state in terms of their 
composition, functions, interactions, and client base. The last two parts examine the 
interactions and linkages between the state and non-state actors in the domestic space 
as well as how these developments inform the plural policing literature. The chapter 
concludes that although organisations that sponsor and perform the act of policing 
may emerge independent of the state, they are ultimately ‘statised’ through a wide 
range of politically motivated mechanisms such as co-optation, replication, 
sponsorship, patronage, and presidential pardons to create a ‘state-controlled’ security 
landscape. The last chapter highlights and brings together the main issues presented 











Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis of the literature on plural policing framed in a 
postcolonial state context. It sheds light on key conceptual and theoretical issues in 
that literature and highlights the main problems in the current state of knowledge. I 
have selected works published from 1990 to date,86 which make Tanzania or 
neighbouring states (Kenya and Uganda) and some Anglophone countries (South 
Africa, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria) as their focal areas. The style of analysis followed 
is to look at one literature at a time, and where necessary, comparing it with other 
studies in the series. The chapter begins by briefly explaining common models in the 
governance of security, namely state-centric and liberal views of policing, which are 
referred to more often throughout the study because of their link to the ban and the 
notion of hybrid policing. The state-centric and liberal approach to policing translate 
into various patterns of plural policing in the form of multichoice policing, nodal 
governance, anchored pluralism, order-making and the global security assemblages.87 
The chapter develops further to give a detailed analysis of the policing literature on 
Africa in general and Tanzania in particular, and how it sheds some light on the study 
at hand. At the concluding part, the chapter provides a summary of research gap and 
my reflections on the analysis.   
2.2 State-centred and Liberal Approaches to Policing 
The state-centred and liberal approaches to policing are the common security models 
that explain the governance of security and capture the interaction between public and 
private actors.88  In this study, the ban on private security service providers is linked 
to the state-centric theory while the hybrid forms of security arrangements represent 
a shift to a more liberal state. To begin with, the state-centred model is a traditional 
and realist security paradigm based on the Hobbesian notion of the social contract89 
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and Weber’s monopoly thesis90 whereby the state is the referent object of security. 
According to them, individuals in a civil society should relinquish their inherent 
power to defend themselves to the government,91 which in turn, claims a monopoly 
of the legitimate use of violence in a territory.92 In Hobbes and Weber’s views, 
defence, security, and maintenance of prisons are traditional functions of any 
government, thus precluded from the private domain.93 For them the provision of 
security should be a responsibility of the government and related institutions.94  
In a state-centred context, non-state actors are subordinate to state actors that enjoy a 
pivotal place in security matters95 as they have the constitutional and statutory 
mandate to provide security, guarantee the safety of the people and secure 
properties.96 Therefore, the realists are sceptical about the involvement of non-state 
actors in the production, distribution, allocation, and regulation of security.97 To them, 
policing is a public good, inherently governmental function, and central to the 
 
common coercive power/sovereign. [Gaskin, J.C.A. (ed.) (1998) Thomas Hobbes: leviathan. New 
York, Oxford University Press, pp. 114 and 118]. 
90 To Marx Weber, the government of the state is the one that effectively and completely controls the 
instruments of physical force. See, Weber, M. (1946) Politics as a vocation. Chap. IV. In: Gerth, H. and 
Wright, C.W. (eds. and trans.). Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 
78. 
91 Krahmann, E. (2010) States, citizens and the privatisation of security. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 21-25.  
92 Rosky, C.J. (2004) Force, Inc.: the privatization of punishment, policing, and military force in liberal 
states. Connecticut Law Review, 36, pp. 881-890. 
93 See, Avant, D. (2005) The market for force: the consequences of privatizing security. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press; Chesterman, S. and Fisher, A. (eds.) (2009) Private security, public order: 
the outsourcing of public services and its limits. Oxford, Oxford University Press; Freeman, J. and 
Minow, M. (eds.) (2009) Government by contract: outsourcing and American democracy. 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press; Roche, J. (2010) Does privatized security undermine the 
sovereign powers of the state? a view from France. Res Militaris, 1(1), pp. 1-10. You are not quoting 
Webber or Hobbes, so you need to make clear that the above are the interpretations of the quoted 
authors, not H&W...  
94 Lar (2018), Ibid. p. 1.  
95 Talbot (2013), Ibid; and Omari, A.H. (2002) Civil-military relations in Tanzania. In: Williams, R. et 
al. (eds.) Ourselves to know: civil-military relations and defence transformation in Southern Africa. 
Pretoria, ISS, pp. 89-106. 
96 Lar (2018), Ibid. 
97 Enion, M.R. (2009) Constitutional limits on private policing and the state's allocation of force. Duke 
Law Journal, 59(3), p. 523, Terpstra (2017), Ibid. pp. 68-69; and Verkuil, P.R. (2007) Outsourcing 
sovereignty: why privatization of government functions threatens democracy and what we can do about 




question of sovereignty.98 Likosky99 sums up the underlying fear about plural policing 
in the following words: 
We contract out not only government functions but also the government’s 
monopolistic power over legitimate violence. What results is a splintering of 
sovereign power and thus an unsurprising accountability deficit.   
The state needs to exercise a monopoly over violence and jealously safeguard and 
protect its authority against any form of governance that takes place either directly 
through, or in the shadow of, physical coercion.100 The state-centric ideas are still 
relevant today because the governments frame and construe national security policies 
and police reforms based on the state-centred view of governance.101 In Tanzania, 
despite historical evidence of the hybrid forms of security arrangements, the 
government has always positioned itself as the sole provider and authoriser of security 
outcomes.102 Mazrui103 suggests that the security policy in Tanzania is a result of fears 
over instability and suspicion of security forces outside the party’s control. Hence, 
understanding the state-centred approach is crucial in any attempt to explain the 
Tanzanian case where, in theory, the national security policies ban non-state actors 
and treat policing as a public good.104  
As opposed to a state-centric view of the state, in liberal thinking, an individual citizen 
is autonomous, sovereign, and distinct from the state. As a result, some scholars 
advocate for a neoliberal approach to policing and call for a shift of responsibility 
from the government to the private sector.105 The government becomes a non-unitary 
actor, a meddler, an idiot, a partisan and a cultural monolith, thus incapable of 
producing, organising, allocating and distributing the public good of security.106 To 
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them, a private individual or corporation can as well organise, produce and distribute 
security.107 The neoliberal thesis goes further to propose a total replacement of the 
government agencies with private ones or to keep their involvement in people’s lives 
to a minimum.108 However, this line of argument does not explain the role of politics 
and governments in poor countries that struggle to fund state policing and whose 
public institutions are by-products of the colonial administration. Given these 
countries’ socio-political setup, it may be risky and tricky to distribute equal policing 
powers across a wide range of actors or dispose of the government’s role in the 
production of the public good of security.109 The neoliberal idea does not provide the 
tools to understand why developing countries continue to hold to their stronger 
orientation towards the public provision of security services.110 On the other hand, the 
governments in the developed countries have stronger private institutions that predate 
public ones and they are more autonomous and less subject to outside influence and 
government interference.111 Because of budget constraints and lack of political will, 
the policing models advocated by the liberals are somehow not workable in countries 
with weak state institutions and less attractive to public investments.  
Within the liberal school, some minimalist scholars maintain a neutral position 
between the state and non-state actors. It is a ‘left-realist view’ that seeks practical 
solutions from democratised local control of the police and active involvement of the 
communities in addressing insecurities.112 Among other things, the minimalist state 
approach embraces nodal, anchored pluralism, multi-choice policing, order-making 
and assemblage perspectives to accommodate both public and private actors as 
indispensable players in the delivery of security.113 The nodal approach, for example, 
involves a complex network of hybrid arrangements and practices in which different 
mentalities of governance, as well as very different sets of institutional arrangements, 
coexist.114 Scholars in this group believe in a society which the state is just one 
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provider (node) among many.115 As a result, state, market and community groups 
work together in equal partnership within networks.116 On contrary, the idea of 
anchored pluralism maintains that although the networked policing may thrive, the 
state and related institutions such as the police retain the overall importance and 
effectively acts as the lead node.117 The hybridity of actors is important, for it 
generates a cluster of linkages between the civil society, the government and 
transnational institutions that increase adaptability, acceptability and compensates the 
government incapacity.118 With the hybridity of actors, the distinction between public 
and private domains disappears and security becomes a ‘semi-public’ or a ‘crowded’ 
good rather than a ‘public’ or a ‘social’ good.119 In a country where the public 
authority is seen as unfit and civilian policing groups coexist with the state police 
(informal order-making), it is proper to consider a relational approach to policing 
because of the links between politics and policing.120 As such, the order-making 
approach considers the political contestations in analysing security networks, which 
consolidate their position, gain supremacy and impose their agenda and practices. As 
a result, the distinction between public and private or state and non-state or legal and 
illegal actors makes no difference because these forms of order-making relate to how 
the state is organised.121 Whether legal or illegal, these variety of state and non-state 
producers and distributors of security services provide a complex set of choices for 
the people to meet their daily security needs or what Baker122 calls ‘multi-choice’ 
policing. In some instances, plural policing takes the form of ‘global assemblages’ 
whereby a collection of local and global or commercial and non-commercial or state 
and non-state producers and providers of security accompanied by old and new 
technologies and mentalities concentrate in one production area such a mining site, 
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industrial zone and shopping centre.123 In what follows, I review some of the most 
relevant academic works on the different paradigms and frameworks of policing in 
Africa and Tanzania in particular. 
2.3 Policing literature  
2.3.1 Selected Works on the Rest of Africa 
The existing literature advances five key points that allude the phenomenon of plural 
policing to policing models such as order-making, multichoice, nodal governance, 
security assemblage and anchored pluralism. The first point that the literature makes 
is that policing is part of social interaction and a means of governing that involves 
creating institutions, systems and policy shaped by socio-economic and political 
interests of the people. This is due to the history of state formation, development of 
public security institutions and wider political and social past of the country. 
Secondly, the literature informs us that plural policing involves a move away from 
the police but not from state policing for it is still within the influence and control of 
the government. The literature is also divided about the legality of non-state actors. 
Some scholars see private security providers as usurpers of judicial and police powers 
and human rights violators while others regard them as an indication of security sector 
reforms and related dynamics. Thirdly, policing literature reveals that policing 
activity is fragmented across the public and private (state and non-state), the 
communal and commercial and the local and global. There are, however, some signs 
of entanglements between state and non-state actors on the one hand and between 
community and commercial security groups on the other. The fourth point is that state 
security agencies have a strong influence on non-state actors but not the other way 
around. Policing activity is concerned with developing a working relationship and 
coexistence in a plural society rather than partnership. Lastly, the literature reveals 
that the security sector reform programmes schemes are western-driven and support 
the state-centric view of the state, as such, they fail to capture the hybrid forms of 
security arrangements in Africa.   
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Let us now discuss the literature that links the question of plural policing to the 
fragmentation of policing and entanglements between the state, community, and 
commercial security arrangements in Africa. Lar124 shows that policing is a form of 
socialisation and a means of governing, situated within a plural landscape shaped by 
socio-economic and political interests. To him, a history of state formation, 
development of public security institutions and wider political and social past have 
influenced practices of policing groups. He claims that a hybrid context of security 
provisioning comprises a plurality of actors and practices. The aspect of ‘plurality’ 
describes the actors engaged in policing practices, while ‘hybridity’ captures what 
plurality creates, that is, policing that combines state and non-state practices. Lar 
reveals further that policing practices are not always within the bounds of legal 
frameworks. Hence, there is a need to establish processes of monitoring and 
supervision to ensure that non-state actors operate within the law and respect human 
rights. This may involve identification, registration, and regulation of community-led 
policing groups through traditional rulers, local governments, local police and civil 
society organisations. To him, the involvement of the police is necessary because the 
government through the police force reserves the right to prohibit vigilante practices. 
I think, the involvement of the police, community, civil society, and local authorities 
in the governance of security does not always bring the desired results. This is so 
because even the police, who ought to set high moral standards, engage in human 
rights violations and corrupt practices more often than not.125 There are wide reports 
of community-led security actors also violating people’s rights, demanding and 
accepting bribes, colluding with criminals, obstructing justice, and harassing state law 
enforcers.126 Despite these weaknesses, non-state actors are vital to community safety, 
especially in liaising with the local police to reduce crime and violence in conflict-
prone countries like Nigeria.  
More on the involvement of security networks in the community safety, Hills127 
provides differing perceptions and the role of the state and non-state actors in handling 
security and justice in Kano (Nigeria). In contrast to other parts of Nigeria, the city of 
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Kano is relatively stable and has ‘diverse definitions and actors influencing the 
provision of security and justice’.128 She suggests that political and technical skills of 
senior police officers, use of locally appropriate forms of policing and informal 
liaison, rather than a formal scheme of mixed policing, are important aspects in 
securing peace and order in a plural society. As opposed to Lar, Hills suggests that 
the provision of security services by non-state actors has not influenced public 
policing. This is so because the role of non-state actors is clear and other state security 
agencies reinforce the core position of the public police. Thus, a policing activity is 
concerned with developing a working relationship and coexistence in a plural society 
rather than partnership and conflict prevention. In this way, the police can exploit the 
ability of security networks and authorities to deal with conflicting interests and 
ensure efficient policing activity. Unlike other states in Nigeria, the basis for Kano’s 
security arrangement is in its socio-political organisation and choices as well as the 
city’s place within the federal structure. The Nigerian case is relevant to this study 
because the security and the justice systems are closely connected in terms of actors 
involved and functions performed. As such, the police force set up or liaise with non-
state actors or act as their patrons and regulators. This form of entanglements may be 
state-led or donor-driven through security sector reform programmes.  
It is important for African countries to reform state-centric policy in their quest to 
harness the potential of private security providers. In this regard, Marks and others129 
look at the paradox of policing and police reform in Durban (South Africa). They 
suggest that if the government acknowledges the role of non-state actors, coordinate 
and regulate their practices, they can supplement deficits in the formal security 
arrangement. Further, private actors can strengthen the democratic character of 
security provision and improves the public's ratings of government performance. 
They challenge the state-centric view and emphasise the role of non-state actors in the 
provision of safety and regulation and mobilisation of resources. To them, African 
governments need to recognise hybrid political orders as a way of understanding 
policing realities and finding solutions to security dilemmas. In South Africa, for 
example, although formal and informal institutions routinely perform security 
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functions, the government favours a state-centric approach by reinventing itself as a 
developmental state that plans, intervenes and authorises security outcomes.130 The 
international donor community has also fallen into this trap, thus supporting the 
government’s interventions and plans that frame police reform within western models 
of democratisation through CP schemes.131  
The CP scheme overlooks part of the landscape in which a range of actors plays a 
significant role in securing local communities. To combat crimes, they propose the 
need to abandon western-driven CP scheme and state-centric model, thus adopt a 
minimal approach to policing. This allows the government to maintain small police 
force and effective participation of the people and non-state actors in the governance 
of security. As opposed to the state-centric model, a minimal approach to the state 
police does not advocate for a neo-liberal agenda or a simple shifting of responsibility 
from the state to the private realm. It recognises the need for involvement of the low-
income people who are likely to suffer more from crimes in the governance of 
security. This is so because of a punitive nature of state police interventions which 
also fail to align with the local needs and sense of justice. This vision is attainable 
through internal and external funded local safety organs that co-ordinate policing 
activity and encourage collaboration between state and non-state actors. Nonetheless, 
as noted earlier, a wider community’s involvement does not always guarantee security 
for everyone.  
Like Marks and others, Wisler and Onwudiwe132 blame Africa’s illiberal state-
builders for the current patterns of CP scheme. The authors question the ideological 
discourse that confines CP in Africa to the Western model of security governance that 
tends to prohibit informal policing.133 They distinguish the western ideology of CP 
from popular and bottom-up forms of informal policing widely practised by 
communities in Africa. To them, such CP schemes represent top-down and unilateral 
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actions of the state police or the government promoting self-rule while informal 
policing is a people-centred security arrangement at the grassroots. They suggest that 
the Western-backed CP programme has proven a failure in countries like South Africa 
turning the state to more directly repressive approach. Informal policing has 
succeeded in Tanzania and China ‘where the linkages between informal and the 
formal are institutionalised’.134 This is partly so because people in Africa are more 
likely to use traditional and customary systems rather than the formal ones in 
protecting themselves and resolving disputes.135 The reasons behind the variations of 
CP patterns depend on the ‘type of state, policing repertoires and the framing activity 
of police managers and social movements.’136 Regarding the on-going trend of 
importing Western policing models to Africa, they call for more research based on 
dissimilar cases of CP to provide detailed historical accounts of successful transitions 
from one type of security arrangement to the other.  
To detach policing from the state-centric approach to liberal models, Bagayoko and 
others137 use the analytic model of hybridity to examine the realities and the prospects 
of governing security in Africa.138 They look at hybrid security institutions and the 
way they are created, institutionalised and readjusted. They also analyse the hybrid 
security system, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion and the way lawmakers can 
create popular, broad-based, and effective security arrangements. Thus, as opposed to 
the security sector reforms that continue to focus on the police and reinforce state-
centred policing models, they understand that states in Africa have intermediaries and 
series of networks and polities who provide public goods and function effectively as 
a second government that run the state in a postcolonial period.139 The underlying 
reality is that a vast array of different actors, both formal and informal or state and 
non-state, compete for security and exercise public authority.140  
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As against Lar,141 Marks and others,142 and Wisler and Onwudiwe’s findings,143 
Bagayoko and others claim that non-state actors, informal or traditional institutions 
do not serve every community member and do not always meet everyone’s 
expectations. Some members of the community especially the weak and vulnerable 
ones are excluded from the traditional security system, which is somewhat disputed 
for its social biases and power hierarchies. They conclude that there is a need to build 
and promote local but inclusive systems of public authority and security governance 
in Africa that do not embrace or reinforce the non-democratic tendencies inherent in 
some informal structures. This is important because the African states and their 
security agencies tend to be virtually informal while the civil society is weak or 
divided and the distinction between state and non-state actors is fluid and, in some 
instances, non-existent.   
The western-driven security schemes and traditional security system are not always 
good or bad. In some cases, the security schemes incorporate local security 
arrangements and bridge the gap between commercial and community-led security 
groups as well as public and private sectors. Therefore, whether public or private, 
policing is an ‘order-making’ activity (authoritative act to be obeyed) whereby formal, 
informal or illegal security actors not only identify and define ‘threats’ to a society 
but also maintain order and articulates the ‘do's and don'ts’.144 Policing entails a set 
of practices, functions and who actually performs them on a daily basis rather than 
‘who is in a de jure position to do so’.145 In this respect, Diphoorn and Kyed146 
examine the case of Durban (South Africa) and Swaziland (now eSwatini) to show 
how logic and practice of commercial and community-led security groups merge and 
interact across socio-spatial boundaries. In contrast to state-centric approach, they use 
the plural and relational approaches to show that government’s withdrawal through 
neo-liberal reforms in Africa have watered-down the welfare state’s notion that 
security is a free good. They claim that the government is no longer a significant 
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provider and authoriser of policing activity in Africa. Further, they maintain that 
security is something you pay for if you can, or try to get by engaging in self-help 
policing, thus deepening ‘urban inequality and class-spatial segregation.’147 The rich 
urban suburbs and big businesses hire private security companies (PSCs) for 
protection while the poor neighbourhoods and slums are ‘left to fend for themselves 
or resort to under-resourced and untrained civilian policing groups.’148 
There are also signs of the urban poor accessing subsidised commercial security 
services or some businesses paying community-led security groups to protect their 
properties. Therefore, the need for policing and security governance studies in Africa 
to expand the plural perspective to include the entanglement between PSCs and 
community-based security groups. These entanglements within the private realm are 
worth exploring because each security group continues to maintain its distinctive 
features and relevance in a competitive security landscape. As such, it creates a 
possibility of security actors to swap activities, PSCs becoming community actors 
while community-based security groups becoming commercial security actors. In a 
way, Diphoorn and Kyed dismiss strict socio-spatial segregation in the provision of 
security (a state of socio-spatial exclusion and isolation among social groups)149 as 
irrelevant because commercial and community-based security services are 
increasingly available to both affluent and low-income urban zones. The PSCs are 
now available to low-income earners, thus becoming harder to differentiate between 
community-led security groups and the PSCs in the formal collective arrangement. 
Massive urbanisation, rural-urban migration, unemployment, rising fear of crime, 
social differences and community mistrust contribute to the entanglement of the PSCs 
and community-based security groups. All these processes and logics occur within a 
state, thus shaped by the public institutions, practices and policies, on the one hand, 
and state and non-state actors, on the other.     
Concerning the basis of both state-centric and liberal approaches to policing, Baker150 
draws from historical and contemporary differences between state and non-state 
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actors to explore the complexity and delicate nature of hybrid policing in Uganda and 
Sierra Leone.151 He focuses on the extent of policing bodies, the degree of government 
control over such policing agencies and the circumstances that prompt individuals, 
civil society, businesses and even governments to opt for non-state over state 
agencies. He establishes that in Uganda and Sierra Leone like in other African states, 
there are ‘overlapping policing agencies that are formal and informal, legal and 
illegal, effective and inept, fair and partisan, restrained and brutal.’152 Thus, policing 
activity is authorised by various actors both legal and illegal who have similar or 
conflicting socio-economic and political interests such as individuals, residential 
communities, corporate bodies and governments.   
Baker dismisses the notion that policing activity is a public good as security has never 
been a reality to commoners except for a few elites living in capital cities, and rightly 
so. Policing has usually been a private good for many people and non-state actors 
have for so long been supplementing the state security agencies. This situation is 
contributed by years of authoritarian regimes in Africa that ‘provoked alienation from 
the state police and the development of informal legal orders that by-passed it.’153 In 
a way, Baker’s view contradicts those of Diphoorn and Kyed who claims that 
commercial and community-led security services are increasingly available to both 
low and high-income earners. However, by linking authoritarian regime to 
pluralisation, Baker ignores the fact that in fragile states like Uganda and Sierra 
Leone, it is normal for the government to ‘securitise’ some threats and direct the 
available resources to address them rather than focusing on public policing.  
Baker submits further that the governance of policing remains a contested ground in 
which various security networks bargain and negotiate with one another about the 
nature of the order to be established and how to realise protection. He, therefore, 
proposes a ‘multi-choice’ approach to reflect a complex set of choice that people must 
make as they seek to negotiate ways of protection from crime and abuse on the daily 
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basis to meet various security needs from multiple providers. Multi-choice approach 
involves a move away from the police but not from state policing for it is still within 
the influence and control of the state. The multi-choice policing may lead to unequal 
provision, exclusion of outsiders from accessing security services, use of violence 
with minimum constraints and supervision, inadequate or lack of accountability, 
facilitation of illegal activity (more policing groups may mean more crime), failure of 
the government to exercise territorial sovereignty and control of violence. However, 
the existence of many providers creates an opportunity for collaboration. Thus, the 
need for a single policy that makes the most of available multiple actors, that is, 
integrate, regulate, mobilise, and empower all those willing and able to preserve law 
and order. The next part reviews literature on the Tanzanian case.    
2.3.2 Literature on Tanzania 
Several policing scholars have focused on Tanzania to examine the legal implication 
of institutional hybridity,154 the role of community-led security groups in combating 
crimes and injustice,155 governance of security in poor urban neighbourhoods,156 the 
assembly of security actors in mining sites157 and benefits and costs derived from 
hybrid policing.158 The contribution of non-state actors to security has received mixed 
reviews among scholars in Tanzania. Some scholars like Shivji159 are sceptical about 
the role of non-state actors to community protection and rule of law. He views non-
state actors as extra-legal coercion, thus illegal under state laws and violators of the 
rights to life and liberty. By extra-legal coercion, he means the use of force by security 
groups that are not part of the state structures but sanctioned by the highest organs or 
officials of the government or the party.160 He claims that the state’s resort to and 
backing of extra-legal coercion explains the lack of the rights-consciousness at 
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various levels of governance. Like Baker,161 he adds that the lack of the rights-
consciousness in security governance relates to the authoritarian and neo-colonial 
character of the political economy. He also highlights some signs for change from 
extra-legal to an intra-legal state in Tanzania.162 In an intra-legal state, officials 
exercise public powers like policing by following the law, while in the extra-legal 
state, it is not necessarily that statutory institutions are the ones that enjoy public 
powers and within the confines of the law. Shivji is right about the lack of a legal 
framework to govern non-state security actors in Tanzania. However, his assessment 
is too legalistic, based on the state-centric view and human rights. He fails to capture 
the plural nature of policing and the influence of uncodified laws and institutions in 
Africa. Also, his work partly focuses on the interpretation and application of the ban 
on private security providers rather than understanding why the government included 
the ban under the Constitution. Despite legal and human rights concerns about 
activities of private security service providers in Tanzania, the literature in recent 
years has focused more on the proliferation of security actors and how businesses rely 
on a collection of security actors that provide the perfect complement to each other. 
Abrahamsen and Williams163 call the use of several security providers that differ in 
terms of shape and size in one or more locations as security assemblage.     
Within the assemblage framework, Abrahamsen and Williams164 investigate security 
arrangements at the African Barrick Gold’s (ABG) mine at North Mara, Tanzania. 
They treat ABG’s approach to the protection of foreign investments and facilitation 
of resource extraction as part of the evolving culture of ‘global security assemblages’ 
in the Global South.165 They use the notion of security assemblage to discuss the 
current security landscape at North Mara Gold Mine and surrounding villages. Mining 
firms operating in complex fragile environments tend to assemble and rely on several 
actors in addressing security challenges such as trespassing especially local people 
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and artisanal miners, excessive use of force by state police and unnecessary loss of 
lives. To them, “global security assemblages are boundary fields in that they are 
neither private, nor public, neither local, nor global but mark analytical spaces that lie 
between these common distinctions”. Therefore, like plural and multi-choice policing, 
discussed earlier, the assemblage perspective focuses on the plurality of actors and 
forms of power and resources available to them and the way they coexist and 
cooperate in one or more locations to produce security. It does not take away the 
centrality of the state or frame non-state security actors in opposition to the 
government and the public policing. They show that security provisioning in an 
assemblage context incorporates the state police, PSCs, in-house security department, 
community-based policing groups (CPGs), local authority leaders, development and 
human rights NGOs and security walls and CCTV cameras. Thus, it creates a complex 
network of local and global or public and private actors, practices, norms and values, 
agendas, knowledge, technologies, interests, and competitions. This happens in 
conflictual and unequal environments in remote areas transformed into global sites 
for resource extractions where profit motives crush with the demands for local 
development.   
As opposed to extraction sites, where mining companies assemble, structure, train and 
control security providers, security in human settlement is increasingly and variably 
dependent upon a range of actors. In recent years, the government and development 
partners have staged efforts to provide security services to the people through 
assemblage of state, commercial and community security groups under one banner of 
CP programme. The involvement of non-state actors in policing frees public 
resources, allows the police to focus on serious crimes and improves residents’ 
perceptions of local security. Cross,166 for example, recognises the diversity of actors 
involved in policing the domestic space.167 While she does not advocate for any 
particular security arrangement, she offers insights about the implications of hybrid 
policing in the country. She explains these outcomes in the form of historical 
trajectories of security arrangements, the politics of local development and the 
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purposes and ability of the public police to collaborate with the grassroots institutions. 
Her study helps us to understand the CP programmes in terms of how it operates, 
whether it has improved local security or promoted insecurity, and who benefits and 
from what. She suggests that the government and non-state actors have a very special 
but complex relationship because the CP scheme has borrowed heavily from the 
community-based security arrangements.  
She claims that although CP is widely credited for improving local safety, the 
government has failed to sustain its voluntary and responsive nature to policing. This 
is so because of the advantages and disadvantages related to the politics of local 
participation in development activities and grassroots institutions. The costs and 
benefits of participating in CP remain unequally distributed among the main 
beneficiaries. As opposed to Lar,168 Cross suggests that wider community 
participation in policing does not necessarily improve security, it may as well offset 
the benefits and add the costs of organising security to the poor communities. The 
police force tends to focus more on cost-effective crime prevention schemes at the 
expenses of democratic governance of security. A lack of transparency and 
accountability subjects the CP scheme to personal preferences and enables local 
leaders to pursue their agenda at the expense of the community. The issue of 
participation is politicised and susceptible to inter-party contestations, thus losing its 
popular appeal to the people.  
The ways that hybrid forms of security arrangements emerge and relate to one another 
has been an area of academic contention. These debates have intensified in recent 
years after the introduction of the CP scheme, which has subsumed private security 
service providers. As such, the term CP has become synonymous to the whole idea of 
plural policing and entanglements between security providers. Walwa,169 for example, 
rejects Cross’s view that CP in Tanzania is an extension of sungusungu from rural 
settings to urban areas. According to Walwa, although sungusungu system may have 
influenced CP, members of CP schemes operate within the local authority structures, 
use reasonable force during arrests, hand suspects over to the police and do not punish 
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offenders like sungusungu.170 On another hand, it is possible to interpret Cross’ 
findings differently to show that the Tanzanian CP scheme is a strategy that closes the 
gap between state and non-state actors as well as between community-led and profit-
driven security actors. In contrast to a state-centric approach, Walwa171 uses the nodal 
governance perspective to look at the efficacy of CPGs namely neighbourhood watch 
and CP adopted by many poor suburbs in Dar es Salaam. He points out that security 
provision is no longer an exclusive domain of the government as CPGs work together 
with the public police in relatively low-income neighbourhoods to find solutions to 
rising security challenges.172 He claims that formal and informal bodies as well as 
voluntary groups provide security in cities by combining and negotiating in the plural 
security landscape. Unlike the police who tend to show up after a crime has been 
committed and people injured, CPGs are decisive, close to the people and respond to 
security needs on time.  
As opposed to other community-led security schemes in Nigeria and South Africa, 
Walwa shows that CPGs in Tanzania are ‘home-grown approach to security 
management’ that helps to address the issue of crimes and violent extremism, youth 
unemployment and strengthen social cohesion.173 After the security sector reform in 
2006, all non-state actors under the CP scheme in Tanzania operate within the local 
government structures such as ward police and local authorities, thus reduce 
operational conflicts with state policing. As such, it is increasingly becoming 
compulsory to establish, participate and contribute funds to these policing schemes, 
hence CPGs losing their ‘people-centred’ and ‘voluntary’ attributes.  
Building on Walwa’s paper,174 Killian and Pastory175 contribute to the discussion 
about CPGs in Tanzania. As opposed to other policing studies in Africa which depict 
CPGs as identical security arrangements, they go beyond a mere characterisation of 
security groups to explore the roles played by men and women as members, leaders, 
and users of CPGs. They conclude that despite women being the main financial 
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contributors, informers and users of these institutions, men dominate CPGs’ 
leadership and membership. The young males, on the other hand, are members of the 
CPGs and perpetrators of violent crimes like robbery. Killian and Pastory’s findings 
echo Bagayoko and others,176 in that, some CPGs are embedded in power hierarchies 
and social biases about certain community members. Like Walwa,177 the authors 
acknowledge that CPGs do not operate in a vacuum, they interact with and regulated 
by the grassroots institutions of governance, thus the need to study them in relation to 
the lowest tiers of the local authority. The authors explain that although Tanzania is 
relatively a peaceful country, it has the necessary elements that may trigger 
insecurities such as multiparty politics, highest ethnic diversity, religious tensions, 
extremism, high poverty levels, and youth unemployment.  
Therefore, people establish and rely on their mechanisms because of the ‘real or 
perceived’ fear of crimes based on trust, respect, and social norms. Even so, the 
government and political parties are always keen to generate and tap into community-
based institutions for political gains. As a result, Brennan178 considers the male youths 
who are more active in security networks as a social category and security institution. 
He shows how the male youths, through the state and the party forums such as the 
youth league and national service in Tanzania, became a powerful tool to challenge 
the state security actors despite a long history of state manipulation for political gains. 
He suggests that the youth groups are ‘enormous, semi-autonomous police and 
intelligence-gathering force’ that take a leading role in political intelligence, violence, 
vigilantism and other forms of quasi-policing and quasi-military activities.179 This 
thesis partly builds on Brennan’s work to look at the governance of security by single-
party autocrats and fractious multiparty politics. The next part provides a summary of 
research gap and my reflections on the analysis.  
2.4 Conclusion  
There is a consensus among policing scholars that the governance of security in Africa 
is plural and is not something that the government institutions can and should do on 
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their own.180 As such, very few studies today see the involvement of non-state actors 
in policing activity as violating state sovereignty or as a threat to political 
authorities.181   
Overall, there are five takeaways from the reviewed literature that the study at hand 
builds upon. First, policing is part of social interaction and a means of governing that 
involves creating institutions, systems and policy shaped by the history of the country. 
Second, the African countries favour a state-centric approach to policing that tends to 
restrict activities of non-state actors albeit assuming the role of the ‘second 
government’ and providing security to both human settlements and businesses. Third, 
the literature is divided about the legality of non-state actors. Some scholars see 
private security providers as usurpers of judicial and police powers and human rights 
violators while others regard them as an indication of security sector reforms and 
related dynamics. Fourth, there are signs of entanglements between state and non-
state actors on the one hand and between community and commercial security groups 
on the other. Lastly, state security agencies have a strong influence on non-state actors 
but not the other way around. On the other hand, the work at hand problematises and 
improves the definitions of the term ‘private policing’ by adding state-owned 
commercial firms to the analysis and lift the tag ‘vigilante’ that has most often clouded 
the discussion of community-led security groups in Africa. I consider the context and 
effect of politics and state policy and ideology on plural policing both historically and 
in present times and add the entanglements of old and new state policies to the 
analysis. I add that the police are partisan and fail to align with the local needs and 
sense of justice, thus proliferation of private security service providers. I show that 
security sector reform programmes are now synonymous to plural policing, which 
pool together and co-opt non-state actors in state policing. I conclude that both public 
and private security providers are part of, subordinate to and operate within the state 
shaped by politics.  
Although the existing works inform us about plural policing in Africa, most of them 
focus on countries disrupted by civil unrests and racial tensions182 as opposed to 
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relatively political stable countries like Tanzania. Further, existing studies do not tell 
us the precolonial and colonial dynamics of hybrid policing vis-a-vis the ban on 
private security service providers in the colonial statutes. These studies tend to have 
indirect information about Tanzania and give a special mention to sungusungu group, 
which is just one among many alternative security arrangements available in the 
country.183 Thus, it does not cover the centrality of a semi-autocratic form of 
government, local politics, and geopolitics in organising security. Other studies 
address the issue of the efficacy of community-led policing groups in low-income 
urban neighbourhoods,184 an assemblage of security actors in gold mines,185 the legal 
implication of institutional hybridity186 and benefits and costs derived from 
community policing.187 While some studies tend to look at the policing group in 
isolation,188 others are difficult to categorise given the broad range of topics they 
cover.189  
Further, despite the abundant research on policing, there are many conflicting 
explanations regarding the nature and contours of hybrid policing. Some studies have 
fallen into the common trap of associating the state-centric model and a policy shift 
to liberal approach in Tanzania with authoritarianism, inter-state war and neoliberal 
reforms.190 As such, they completely avoid the endemic problems of political 
interests, insecurity, dynamics of independence movements, counterinsurgency 
operations, geopolitics and nation-building efforts in laying a groundwork for the bans 
as well as plural policing landscapes. It is not just other state security forces like the 
army that reinforces the core position of the police as Hills suggests,191 but also 
militias, youth league and national service corps. Overall, the prior literature does not 
answer the question, why has the Tanzania state not sought to eliminate non-state 
policing when it is banned legally and constitutionally? The next chapter provides a 
 
183 Wisler and Onwudiwe (2008), Ibid. 
184 Walwa (2017), Ibid. 
185 Abrahamsen and Williams (2017), Ibid.  
186 Shivji (1990), Ibid.   
187 Cross (2016), Ibid.  
188 Bukurura (1996), Ibid; Abrahams (1987), Ibid; Fleisher (2000), Ibid; and Mkutu (ed.) (2017), Ibid. 
189 Maina (1997), Ibid; Kijo-Bisimba and Maina (2005), Ibid. 
190 See, Shivji (1990), Ibid; and Cross (2013), Ibid. 




historical overview of security groups and laws in terms of continuity and change 






















Chapter 3: Historical Antecedents of Non-state Actors and State Laws  
3.1 Introduction  
The chapter seeks to provide a historical account of policing groups and policy in the 
precolonial to the early postcolonial periods. It reveals a degree of political motivation 
during those periods in relation to the modern time. It notes that the common form of 
security arrangements in the precolonial period included armed escorts, armed 
retainers, raiding troops, royal guards, and personal bodyguards. Tribal and clan 
chiefs, military leaders, warlords, traders, and commoners controlled these early 
forms of security arrangements because there were hardly identifiable states, as we 
know them today, separating the public from private policing. Conversely, nation-
states, governments, centralised security apparatuses (police, prison, and army) and 
codified laws were common features of the colonial era, thus a clear distinction 
between public and private actors developed. Other government institutions included 
native police (chiefly policing) and colonial agents [jumbe or tarishi (messenger), 
akida (village or town headman) and liwali (mayor)]. On the other hand, chartered 
companies, shooting clubs (rifle associations), in-house security departments, party 
militias, and neighbourhood watch groups pioneered the private security sector. The 
last two parts examines how the ‘mandate’ (later ‘trust’) territory status192 prevented 
not only the creation of a strong police force in the country but also contributed to 
poor security policies that disregarded the plural security landscape in the ‘colony’ 
and ‘post-colony’.193 This chapter claims that the efforts to control the means of 
violence by the ruling elite (autocrats) and politicising it started in the precolonial era 
but such efforts were refined and institutionalised through state policy in the colonial 
epoch and transplanted into the ‘post-colony’, achieving a clear separation between 
state and non-state security actors.   
3.2 Dynamics of the Precolonial Security Arrangements   
The earliest forms of self-protection may have begun at a time when small family and 
neighbourhood groups banded together for mutual protection against rival families 
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and marauding wild animals.194 The security arrangements were simple and need-
based, that is, the heads of families selected the strongest men in their households to 
stand guard with other men from different families at night on a rotational basis.195 
The emergence of more organised and sophisticated security arrangements in the 
precolonial societies depended on three factors, namely nature of a political 
organisation, trade and immigration. The early efforts to politicise security started 
with the formation of political organisations in the form of clan, tribe and chiefdom, 
which allowed few individuals to struggle for power, create simple central authority 
and forge alliances or defect to establish personal armed bands. The control and 
involvement in long-distance trade, on the other hand, enabled traders and commoners 
to accumulate properties, thus detaching themselves from communal security 
arrangements to create armed retainers. Like in a contemporary state, immigration 
and settlement were also common features among the precolonial societies, 
accompanied by wars of conquest and subjugation, secession, transfer of weaponry 
and military technologies. This enabled individuals to emerge and challenge tribal 
chiefs and clan heads to establish alternative security arrangements.  
Precolonial societies were in a constant state of transformation and did not have an 
equal level of development.196 While political authorities and security institutions 
evolved over a period depending on the security needs of each community, their 
maturity differed from one society to the other.197 Among the Ha, Hehe, Bena, Sangu, 
Shambaa (Sambaa), Fipa, Zigua, Haya, Pare, Sukuma, Nyamwezi, and Zinza people, 
the political change involved the shift from the gerontocratic rule (based on age, 
wisdom and spiritual powers) to chiefs and military leaders.198 Community leaders 
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became individuals who could organise an active defence against common threats and 
enforcing societal norms and tenets.199 This increased the scale and efficiency of 
political organisations. Hence, communal villages that once relied on collective 
efforts changed into simple political units depending on tribal armies, armed escorts, 
raiding troops, warlords, mercenaries, and personal bodyguards for protection. Even 
so, it was until the Arab and Ngoni settled in Tanzania that security arrangements took 
a more complex political form due to trade, insecurity, creation of semi-public 
institutions and transfer of technology.  
The Arabs from Oman came to Tanzania as traders around the 5th and 6th centuries 
AD but established permanent settlements and political entities in the 18th century.200 
They controlled the East African long-distance trade from the Indian Ocean to the 
interiors.201 These polities and trading activities influenced security arrangements in 
two ways. First, each trading group maintained a small but well-armed security unit 
to protect trade caravans and possessions against armed bandits in the mainland and 
pirates in the Indian Ocean.202 Second, the emergence of new security threats, such as 
slave raiding and plundering emerged during the caravan trade that forced families 
and communal villages to merge and cluster under powerful individuals for self-
protection.203 Also, commoners and traders who gained access to wealth and guns 
from Arab traders established personal armed bands. The Arabs settlement and 
control of Zanzibar and Tanganyika coastal strip built on the early contact between 
the local people and Arabs through trade.204  
For political reasons, Sultan Seyyid Said moved his capital from Muscat Omani to 
Zanzibar in 1840. The Omani Sultanate controlled Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, Kilwa, 
Tanga, Bagamoyo, Lindi, and Mtwara.205 The Sultan established and asserted his 
authority over local people through coercive institutions (royal guards, gaol, and 
sharia court and law) and forging alliances through interracial marriages. These 
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coercive institutions and related laws were the first ‘foreign’ mechanisms used to 
achieve political manipulation in a more coordinated manner. Therefore, we can trace 
the earliest but ‘rough’ distinction between public and private security arrangements 
from this period. The Sultan appointed bureaucrats who had both administrative and 
coercive powers (mostly Arabs), sponsored local collaborators, and introduced 
official titles and ranks (liwali, akida and jumbe).206 Jumbe or tarishi (messenger), 
akida (village or town headman) and liwali (mayor) assisted the Sultan to uphold the 
law and to rule over small communities. As we shall see later, they continued to act 
as administrators and law enforcers during the German and British colonial rules. At 
the time when the Arabs were settling in Tanzania, the Ngoni people were also fleeing 
from the Mfecane War in South Africa (1815-1840).207 The Ngoni moved northward 
and settled in Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, and Tanzania.  
The Ngoni immigrants had a standing army and superior techniques that changed the 
way security was organised among the precolonial societies. To ensure an effective 
political control of security, the Ngoni people conquered and annexed weak tribes, 
conscripted them into the army, defended acquired territories (contained rebellions) 
and enforced tribal codes.208 Consequently, the fear of Ngoni’s conquest influenced 
small communities to cluster together for defence in stockade villages, forge security 
alliances and copying Ngoni’s military techniques and weapons to form standing 
armies.209 The people in Southern, Central and Western Tanzania, for example, 
established new chiefdoms and involved more in the caravan trade and slave raiding 
because the raiders could easily sell prisoners of war into slavery.210 Traders and 
commoners, on the other hand, built their security units around slaves while other 
trading groups and chiefs hired Ngoni warriors as mercenaries and personal 
bodyguards to challenge tribal authorities and venture on the lucrative war of 
conquest.211 In North-western Tanganyika, among the Ha and Haya people, security 
arrangements took the form of Clientship like in the Ancient Rome whereby an 
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individual or free client acknowledged his dependence on, and could attain security 
under a wealthy person/patron or body politic.212 Hence, armed bands emerged among 
the Ha, Hehe, Bena, Sangu, Fipa, Nyamwezi and Zinza tribes in the 19th century 
because of trade and immigration.213  The next part examines the breakdown of social 
order and the formation of security networks in the precolonial era. 
3.3 Plural Security Landscape in the Precolonial Time  
It is noteworthy to mention that before 1885, the distinction between public and 
private actors was hard to make. There was a diverse network of actors and power 
without a centre, working within a contested security landscape. Partly, this was so 
because of the communal way of life and a lack of a government as we know it today. 
As Torrance214 suggests, “the bargaining powers of the masses was strong relative to 
the elites…and the standards of living between chiefs and their subjects were not that 
different”. The structure of the traditional rulership was such that political power and 
its control resided not in the chiefly authority but the village assembly and council of 
elders. The two organs could depose a chief any time and at will.215 With the 
settlement of the Sultan of Omani in Zanzibar and the rise of small chiefdoms, a rough 
line separating local rulers and their institutions on the one hand, and traders and 
commoners on the other, started to appear.216 In my view, the latter institutions 
assumed the role of private security actors in their earliest form because of the advent 
of the body politic (city-states) that claimed a ‘monopoly on the use of violence’ along 
the Indian Ocean. 
As noted earlier, the long-distance trade and immigration brought new politically 
motivated entities and related security threats, such as pillage and cattle and slave 
raiding. Among the Pare people in Northern Tanzania, for example, villagers were 
afraid to attend to their normal duties and women could only go to markets if they had 
armed escort from their husbands or a near relative.217 This breakdown of law and 
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order came to be known as ‘kibonda’.218 In response, Chief Mranga formed security 
units by transforming clan initiation rites into an elaborate clan institution with 
coercive powers.219 In South-western Tanzania, tribal chiefs created small groups of 
armed men and royal guards to defend their chiefdoms, enforce customary laws and 
annex weak states.220 The chief of Nkansi, for example, created a squad of elite troops 
called “ruga ruga” or “isaasa” (“executioner’s axe” or “falcon”) while the Chief of 
Ufipa and Chief Ghendewa of Ugweno, had an army of elite warriors and personal 
bodyguards protecting them.221 Other small chiefdoms created palaces surrounded by 
defensive walls that became a symbol of power and autonomy. The Nyiha people in 
Mbeya region lived in heavily fortified and palisaded villages (stockades and deep 
ditches) for protection against raiders222 while Chief Mkwawa built a stone wall and 
fort (lipuli) at Kalenga in Uhehe chiefdom.223  
The chiefly authority did not go unchallenged both within and outside the chiefdoms. 
Hence, to meet their political needs and to ensure the survival of their chieftains, the 
chiefs shaped security policies and transformed small groups of personal bodyguards 
into loyal tribal armies.224 This change allowed a chief to become more powerful than 
anyone else in the chiefdom in terms of political and military powers as well as wealth. 
However, the subsistence economy could not support standing armies and 
specialisation,225 thus the chiefs engaged more in the long-distance trade and used the 
army to conquer and raid vulnerable communities for slaves and cattle or asking for 
tributes in the form of ivory or slaves.226 Because of political necessity, Chief Semboja 
and Chief Shimbo, for example, formed the Teita warriors supported by tributes 
called ‘mbiru’227 while Chief Mirambo created a small group of warriors to gain 
control of the Chiefdoms surrounding his Uyowa Chiefdom.228 The chiefs and traders 
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used the acquired wealth to buy weapons, support the army and maintain law and 
order. Contrary to Stapleton’s229 claim that precolonial societies did not maintain 
professional full-time and paid law enforcers, Roberts230 shows that Chief Mirambo 
gave cattle to his soldiers as payment in kind for their services to the chiefdom and 
exempted them from crop cultivation. Mirambo also charged Arab caravans some 
tolls and raided cattle to give to his soldiers.231 Like Roberts, Iliffe232 shows that in 
Usambara Chiefdom, men were free to engage in security activities and politics since 
banana cultivation required less labour. Although there were elements of 
specialisation in terms of having identifiable royal guards and soldiers, everyone was 
duty-bound to maintain customary law and order within the chiefdom. 
Further, the chiefs relied on their subordinates (sub-chiefs) who ruled certain parts of 
the chiefdoms and vassal clans to uphold law and order. For political reasons, the sub-
chiefs took an oath of allegiance to the chiefs and commanded a very limited number 
of warriors. In Hehe Chiefdom, for example, subordinate rulers (mzangila/vanzagila) 
kept law and order and assembled young men or soldiers (vigendo) for war.233 Chief 
Ndagara of Karagwe, on the other hand, allowed each Hinda princes to maintain a 
small army that protected the chiefdom at times of disturbance and gave them cattle 
in return.234 In Fipa Chiefdom, the chief placed strategic border villages under the 
control of military governors known as “alaasi”, responsible for frontier security.235 
In Uyuwi Chiefdom, Chief Mirambo had border guards (agents) to maintain order in 
each conquered land while headmen who maintained a group of armed followers 
assisted Chief Isike in Unyanyembe chiefdom.236 It is also recorded that Kimweri ye 
Nyumbai in the Shambaa Chiefdom maintained great internal order and peace using 
his subordinates.237 The use of subordinates to maintain law and order, however, did 
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not prevent commoners and traders from forming private armies and controlling 
violence.  
Some of the emerging chiefs had no military power or had scarce resources to 
maintain their authorities over a vast area. This allowed commoners and traders to 
form politically motivated armed bands and challenge hereditary chiefs. During the 
period of economic and political crises, traders seized the opportunity to form raiding 
troops and amass wealth.238 To regain political independence, Bwana Heri, a Zigua 
trader, for example, created a private army by selling slaves to Arab traders that he 
later used to fight against the Germans.239 Msiri, a Nyamwezi trader, used private 
mercenaries to establish the Ukimbu chiefdom in the 1860s240 while Kuti, a Galla 
trader, established himself by force and created the Ipito Chiefdom.241 Among the 
Luguru people, Kisabengo (a Zigua trader) amassed power and made himself a leader 
of a group of runaway slaves near the coastal area to become the first ruler of Uluguru 
in the 1850s.242 Apart from traders, commoners also took advantage of the breakdown 
of customs and loyalties to acquire firearms from Arab traders to form armed bands 
and groups of bandits.243 Kimalaunga, for example, had armed retainers who 
terrorised defenceless villages near Lake Rukwa244 while Nyungu-ya-Mawe of 
Unyamwezi built a private army245 known as ‘ruga ruga’ or ‘valuga-luga’246 modelled 
on Chief Mirambo’s army.247 Lieutenants (mutwale/vatwale) commanded the ruga 
ruga and responsible for self-protection, attacking and plundering trade caravans.248  
Some chiefs like Kimweri ye Nyumbai of Usambara Chiefdom created a monopoly 
on trade to ward off political rivalries and to prevent their subordinates from accessing 
weapons and wealth.249 This strategy failed because some subordinate rulers, vassal 
chiefs and commoners amassed wealth and formed security groups. This allowed 
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them to defect from old chiefdoms and form new ones (e.g. Chief Kilangabana, near 
Mikumi and Chief Mgunda of Kutu among the Nyamwezi people)250 or to depose 
incumbent chiefs and assume office (e.g. Nyungu-ya-Mawe attacked and defeated 
Kiwele,251 Ipito and Nkokolo Chiefdoms).252 Some deposed chiefs (e.g. Mnwa Sele in 
Unyamwezi) assembled groups of gunmen and continued to attack their deposers and 
trade caravans253 while others resorted to supernatural powers as a political necessity 
to form security groups and establish chiefdoms.254 Villagers considered witchcraft 
as a serious crime and security threat, thus they excommunicated, banished or killed 
witches and sorcerers.255 The fear of sorcery allowed individuals with supernatural 
powers or capable of performing rituals and detecting witches to become law 
enforcers and ascend to the throne. Chief Mashombo of Mshewa/Mbaga, for example, 
devised a technique known as ndemwa and used it in ordinary law cases and in 
detecting sorcerers.256 Instead of punishing them, Mashombo employed them in his 
private army of mercenaries and witches that he used to raid and rule with impunity.257 
Ndemwa was an important means of social control and encouraged people to hand 
over suspects to the diviners rather than taking the law into their hands.258 Another 
example is the mshitu ritual functionaries among the Shambaa (sambaa) people of 
North-eastern Tanzania.259  
Precolonial chiefdoms controlled trade, maintained tribal armies and demanded 
tributes and military volunteers from each homestead in exchange for protection.260 
In other instances, subordinate chiefs, commoners, and traders created gangs of armed 
slaves or conscripted prisoners of war into personal security groups and used them to 
attack and depose tribal chiefs, establish outposts of armed retainers and levying 
tributes to the conquered tribes and trade caravans.261 These new security 
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arrangements were politically motivated and mainly affected areas invaded by Ngoni 
people and along trade routes controlled by Arab settlers.262 In my view, the private 
armed bands controlled by traders and commoners were private security actors at a 
nascent stage while security units maintained by the Sultan and tribal chiefs or clan 
heads represented semi-public institutions. These early forms of hybrid security 
arrangements focussed on protecting the society against external threats (wild 
animals, cattle, slave raiding and annexation) rather than internal ones (crimes), thus 
the blurring of the border between defence and security functions. As discussed 
below, the colonial rulers centralised political powers and transformed these early 
security arrangements to serve their interests.  
3.4 Security Arrangements in the Colonial Period 
The state as we know it today and its attendant institutions came into being during the 
colonial period.263 The distinction between private and public actors and the line 
between defence and security functions became more pronounced. All security 
arrangements outside the government structure or public space became private ones. 
Commercial entities relied on state policing and maintained formal private security 
units to protect their trading interests and properties while the local communities 
depended on informal institutions for protection. Non-state actors, which took the 
form of imperial chartered companies, rifle or shooting clubs, in-house security 
departments, mercenaries and warlords, colonial agents (detribalised natives) and 
vigilante groups, were highly statised and politicised. The chartered companies, in-
house security personnel and shooting clubs enjoyed a state-like status that 
transformed them into some sort of semi-state security actors. The public security 
actors included the police force, prison, military, and tribal police (chiefly policing). 
As the next two parts show, the German and British governments operated security 
on a purely political agenda.   
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3.4.1 The German Colonial Rule   
The key strategies for maintaining political powers and economy included policing 
through a chartered company, a strong military presence, direct rule (governorship) 
and use of local collaborators.264 As such, the German East Africa Trading Company 
(Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft - DOAG) was the first recognisable law 
enforcer in Tanganyika.265 Carl Peters and his friends formed DOAG in 1884 and 
received a royal charter (political symbol) in 1885 to establish German colonies in 
East Africa.266 The DOAG could raise, maintain and use force and govern overseas 
territories on behalf of the German Empire.267 Ortiz268 claims that forces maintained 
by the overseas trading companies constitute the closest historical antecedent to PSCs 
in an embryonic form. Although the DOAG had a short spell (1884-1891), it left the 
mark in the creation of and politicising private security actors and the exercise of force 
by a body corporate in its own right.269  
The German government bought the DOAG, and sent a governor to take direct control 
of the colony270 and to establish the first public force (Schutztruppe or Wissmanntrup) 
in 1891.271 As both political and security strategy, the German soldiers (askaris) were 
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mostly Sudanese, Egyptians (Nubians), Turks, Somalis and Zulu.272 Germany 
recruited a few local people who joined the public force from the ‘martial tribes’ 
(Nyamwezi, Hehe and Yao).273 This was the beginning of the colonial policy of using 
strangers to maintain order among strangers. The askaris protected the colonial 
administration centres (bomas/bomani), governed the interiors and enforced prison 
sentences, laws (Gasetz), imperial edicts (Reichskanzler Verordnungen) and 
instructions from the Chancellor (Anweisungen).274 The regime tasked the existing 
network of traditional structures with policing the local people in respective villages 
and districts.275  
It is not clear whether the Germans established a formal police force in Tanganyika. 
Some literature contends that the Germans did not have a police force; rather they 
used the army and local administrators (liwali, jumbes and akidas) to do both policing 
and defence works.276 For easy control of security along political interests, the 
Germans negotiated with the Sultan and Omani aristocrats who became officers of 
the colonial government.277 The Arabs provided each major coastal town with a liwali 
and the hinterland with subordinate administrators (akidas).278 The liwali, an Arab 
administrator of a district’s headquarters, collected taxes, administered justice and 
punishments and were in-charge of colonial armed forces at a district level.279 The 
akidas administered local urban population assisted by jumbes or jumbenschaft 
(village headmen) in townships.280 Other sources claim that there was a police force 
(polizeitruppe and landespolizei) established on 1st March 1892.281 Von Herff 
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suggests,282 “…the creation and growth of a separate civilian police force from 1905 
to 1914 virtually eliminated police and administrative tasks from the aegis of the 
Schutztruppe granting it the opportunity to become a specialised military force.” The 
main task of the police was to maintain law and order and to collect taxes.283 During 
a famine period whereby criminal groups stole livestock and grain, the colonial 
government responded by sending a force of police to restore order.284  
Since politics drove security arrangements and related policies, the public force 
protected the regime rather than the citizens, with more concentration of law enforcers 
in administrative centres and white residences.285 The regime defined residential 
zones for Europeans, Asians and Africans.286 The German’s Bauordnung (building 
regulations) of 1891 and 1913 respectively, for example, divided Dar es Salaam 
(formerly Mzizima) into three zones along racial lines of Europeans (zone I: 
government), Asians (zone II: commercial), and African (zone III: the niegervierteil 
- native village or bazaar).287 While the duty of DOAG and askaris was to maintain 
law and order in European settlements and investments and to protect the regime from 
native resistance,288 the existing network of district and village authorities (akida, 
jumbe and liwali) policed the indigenous population.289  
Apart from the short-lived rule of DOAG in Tanganyika that maintained private 
forces, the governor encouraged the European population in the colony to organise 
their security groups. The Europeans responded by forming civilian shooting clubs or 
companies (schutzenkompagnie), which were accorded military reserves or 
volunteers’ status to maintain the government’s influence in such arrangements.290 
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Therefore, not only these security clubs maintained law and order in production areas, 
but also fought alongside the German army during World War I. Moreover, the 
colonial state used vigilante groups like ruga ruga in the form of mercenaries and 
warlords to control the native population. Local collaborators such as Chief Merere 
II of Sangu chiefdom supplied the Germans with warriors to attack enemy tribes.291 
The Germans also used local collaborators and warlords (German agents) who had 
private armies to maintain law and order among the Wanyanturu people in North-
central and other interior parts of Tanganyika.292  
It is because of this close relationship between the regime and policing, the local 
people’s perceptions of the state security agencies appears “to have been similar to 
that of an occupying force,”293 thus giving birth to the earliest forms of anti-colonial 
movements in Tanzania.294 Rumaliza, for example, a great trader at Ujiji in Kigoma 
teamed up with Chief Isike to fight the Germans. Other traders and local chiefs who 
fought the Germans included Marealle, Isike, Mkwawa, Abushiri bin Salim, and 
Bwana Heri.295 The Maji Maji rebellion (1905-1907)296 also evidenced the existence 
of opposition by non-state actors and the failure of the Germans to control violence 
in the colony.297 Since the colonial troops were few and mostly unavailable to the 
indigenous population, the local people depended on community-based security 
groups to control crimes.298 These arrangements were private and could only exist if 
they did not pose a security threat to the colonial economy. Overall, the Germans are 
the only rulers in Tanzanian history who have tried to establish a 'monopoly of 
violence' both in theory and practice because they defeated and coercively co-opted 
all privately organized security groups in the country. The Germans created a state 
and law ‘properly so called’ and maintained order through a chartered company, the 
army, mercenaries, and colonial agents (jumbe, akida, and liwali) as political entities. 
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The chartered company had access to the means of violence just like a sovereign state, 
thus becoming a predecessor to modern-day PSCs. The German rule ended after 
World War I and Tanganyika became a British-administered territory under the 
League of Nations Mandate as discussed in the next part.299 
3.4.2 The British Colonial Rule   
Britain acquired Tanganyika through military campaigns against the Germans.300 The 
country became part of British East Africa and the League of Nations mandate in 
1920, later a United Nations trust territory between 1946 and 1961. During World 
War I, the British allied forces, the Royal Navy and Infantry governed the conquered 
part of the country as an occupying power.301 The British also formed an ad hoc 
civilian police force in 1916, made up by a Major, 31 South African mounted rifles 
and supplemented by local volunteers.302 This task force carried out police duties in 
strategic areas and European settlements during the war. After the war, the British 
introduced two fundamental changes in public policing, implemented along political 
agenda at the time, i.e. racial divisions and residential zones. First, they established 
the Tanganyika Police Force and Prison Service in 1919303 as a third political branch 
of the colonial administration.304 Second, they introduced the indirect rule system 
exercised through local chiefs and Council of Elders305 who worked with 
intermediaries or detribalised/Europeanised natives306 (liwali, akida, and jumbe).307 
The combination of these two changes not only defined and shaped the structure and 
functions of the police force along political interests but also sustained alternative 
security arrangements throughout the British rule. 
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To ensure political allegiance, the Tanganyika Police Force did not resemble the 
Metropolitan Police Service (Kin or Anglo-Saxon police system/London model) but 
the gendarmerie system (Continental Europe/French model).308 Initially, the British 
used the French model to build the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in 1836309 and 
reproduced it in all British colonies in Africa:  
…to help pacify the country during colonial conquest, to patrol cities and 
commercial ventures, to enforce forced labour and taxation policies, and to 
deal, peripherally, with crimes of which individuals, especially the well-to-do 
and colonialists, were victims.’310  
The London model represented a “force exercised indirectly by the people, from 
below, upwards” in comparison to the militarised French police with barracks that 
represented a force exercised, by authority, from above, downwards.311 Further, the 
London model was democratic and civilian aimed at preventing and detecting crimes 
and keeping law and order.312 The British created the police force out of military and 
para-military units (askari) inherited from the Germany period.313 To ensure that the 
regime was well represented and served in the force, the Europeans and Asians 
occupied the upper and middle ranks respectively while Africans filled the lower roles 
of police constables.314 Like the Germans, the British recruited local police officers 
from the local ethnic groups known as martial race315 and other British colonies.316 
Further, to ensure political control of security in the colony, the principle that 
governed policing in the territory was “policing strangers by strangers”,317 thus 
creating mistrust, disunity, and animosity between the police and native population.318  
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The police presence in the native neighbourhoods and peri-urban areas was negligible 
and only there to sustain the regime and to service the economy.319 In particular, the 
European population and investments enjoyed special treatments under the colonial 
policing system because of exclusionary (racial) zoning and rural-urban divides.320 
The Europeans had separate residential areas from Asians and Africans with full-time 
police protection.321 Killingray322 explains that: 
Africa was only thinly policed by the colonial government. Colonial 
government had an interest in protecting European lives and property in 
towns and commercial centres and providing a measure of control over the 
key parts of the economic infrastructure. Thus, many territories had different 
branches of the police: town police employed by municipalities and often 
largely concerned with regulating African movements within the town, and 
other police units charged with specific duties involving the escort of officials 
and specie [money], or supervising the railways, mines and waterways.  
The regime left the urban informal settlements and the villages, which had no 
significant economic value, to the control of the native authorities.323 Police admitted 
in the 1959 Annual Report that although the force was supposed to maintain civil 
order all over the territory, it was ‘largely restricted by its size to the capital and other 
urban areas.’324 The state was organised differently in rural areas from urban ones 
creating what Mamdani calls a ‘bifurcated state’, that is to say, a state containing ‘two 
forms of power under a single hegemonic authority.’325 The British divided the urban 
population into zones and ruled it directly from the designated administrative centres. 
The Europeans (officials and non-officials) occupied Zone I for residential and 
administrative purposes (‘Uzunguni’).326 Asians (Indians and Arabs) and few 
Europeans occupied Zone II (‘Uhindini’) for commerce and trade, residential and 
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manufacturing while Zone III (‘Uswahilini’) was reserved for the native squatters and 
townships.327  
Dar es Salaam, for example, became ‘mji wa rangi tatu’ (a town of three colours) 
because of its social or racial groups coalesce and geography.328 The colonial police 
did not have enough personnel and resources, hence directed the available resources 
to secure their economic interests and to control the urban population (racial profiling 
and selective policing) that was becoming too political.329 To put this into perspective, 
in 1935, Zone I with a population of fewer than 1,400 people had 34 police officers 
patrolling it at night while Zone II with about 9,000 people had 28 patrol officers. 
About 17 police officers patrolled Zone III with more than 20,000 inhabitants,330 thus 
vulnerable to crimes.331 Therefore, Zone I332 was relatively better policed while Zones 
II and III had an insignificant police presence,333 creating a hostile relationship and 
mistrust between the local people and the police.334  
Despite enjoying state policing, the European population also had access to state-
sponsored private security units. The mining companies, large plantation, major 
transport networks, tourism firms, processing plants, factories, and vast retail stores 
maintained in-house security departments.335 Like the Germans whose security 
policies and arrangements were politically motivated, the British sponsored the 
establishment of private defence associations in the form of shooting and rifle clubs 
among miners, sailors and marines to hold out any security threat in their areas before 
the government could send reinforcement troops.336 The British also established the 
Auxiliary Police to serve special production areas (mines, power plants and factories) 
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and continued to retain the service of retired police officers, soldiers, prison officers, 
and cattle guards as police reserve to serve political interests in the colony.337 Like 
the state police, these private security units mainly protected European (private) 
properties and enforced racial segregation laws. Deflem claims,338 “…many private 
police forces were established by colonial companies, which again shows how law 
enforcement and commercial imperialism were inextricably linked”. However, 
politically motivated policy of pluralism withered as time went on and the 
independence movement gathered steam.   
The British understood that their rule rested on the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
local collaborators in rural and peri-urban areas.339 The regime, through the indirect 
system, introduced the native authorities, i.e. chiefly authority in 1924 and elders’ 
council in 1934, thus reviving the gerontocratic authority in the local communities.340 
For political reasons and to ensure minimal local resistance, the British transformed 
the native authorities into a local extension of the colonial rule and relied upon them 
to perform a variety of policing tasks at the grassroots. Local chiefs and elders 
maintained law and order in their localities through the tribal police341 who responded 
to crime, collected tax and enforced the judgements of native courts.342 This move 
also signalled the revival and co-option of community-based security institutions that 
existed in the precolonial epoch such as ruga ruga regiment among the Nyamwezi 
people.343 Nevertheless, the British policing structures and practices presented several 
challenges that gave birth to vigilante groups in the colonial state. The regime hardly 
policed the less militant population, and the villagers had to teach their children what 
a police officer looks like.344 The relative absence of police in the native settlements 
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encouraged various groups to develop identifiable solutions to crimes345 and social 
inequality.346 
The chiefly policing created hostile relations between the native population and chiefs 
(regarded as white men’s dogs).347 Since politics drove security, hereditary chiefs and 
other local ‘delegatees’ were mere puppets and unaccountable to the indigenous 
population, thus offered little assistance in maintaining law and order.348 This was so 
because the colonial regime reinvented and shaped the chiefly authority and tribal 
police units to meet colonial politics and related needs that could not necessarily 
reflect traditional institutions and values.349 The British also failed to identify Africans 
who had enough legitimacy and willing to carry out unpopular imperial orders.350 On 
the other hand, the introduction of the council of elders who were like a gerontocratic 
rule in precolonial societies as a way of controlling the urban youths proved a failure. 
This was so because the urban youths were the most dissatisfied group in the colonial 
period and no longer respecting chiefly authority and elders.351 This was partly due to 
unemployment and lack of a voice in both colonial and native institutions (elders’ 
council and chiefly authority).352 To make their voices heard and to challenge the 
colonial order, the educated youths and labourers formed and joined pressure groups, 
such as tribal organisations, vigilantes, trade unions and nationalist parties.353 In urban 
areas, these unions marked the gradual shift of social order from the colonial and 
native institutions to pressure groups’ discipline and vigilantes.354  
The nationalist parties, in particular, introduced the youth wings to their hierarchies 
in the 1950s.355 The parties recruited, manipulated, and deployed the youths as 
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coercive units in their struggles for political powers and self-governance.356 The 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) established the TANU Youth League 
(TYL) in 1956.357 The main tasks of the TYL were to enforce TANU discipline in 
public areas, frustrate other political groups and perform policing work.358 In 
Brennan’s359 words; 
From its base in Dar es Salaam, Youth League policing quickly became 
territorial. In the Tanga, Northern, and Southern Provinces by late 1960, TYL 
had taken to usurping police powers by enforcing 'either real or imaginary 
territorial laws by organizing night patrols of towns and roads, topping and 
sometimes arresting ordinary Tanganyikans for alleged offences, drilling like 
soldiers with imitation rifles, searching motor cars for illegal commodities, 
and holding illegal courts'. The colonial state anxiously identified TYL 
supporters as vigilante. 
The practice of establishing youth wings as political and security groups was common 
to other nationalist parties and associations such as the African National Congress that 
clashed with TYL followers on several occasions.360 Zanzibar experienced a similar 
situation like Tanganyika, whereby the Zanzibar Nationalist Party had a youth league 
known as Youths’ Own Union, while Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) established the ASP 
Youth League in 1959.361 In rural areas, the vigilante groups in the form of 
neighbourhood watch groups or moots started to develop. Among the Sukuma and 
Nyamwezi people, for example, the basumba batale (great youths or neighbourhood 
leaders) and mchapi groups emerged to assume generational roles.362 The leaders of 
a nationalist movement manipulated the ‘basumba batale’ to challenge the chiefly 
authority by setting up alternative courts and security arrangements. These politically 
motivated policing groups made searches and arrests, tried and punished criminals, 
adulterers and witches.363 They also supported TANU’s independence movement, 
forced some chiefs to abdicate and punished villagers who failed to attend political 
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rallies and village assemblies.364  To sum up the foregoing discussion, the British 
government enacted laws and established the police force, auxiliary police, prison 
service, army (King's African Rifles) and native police (chiefly policing). It also 
allowed ‘white’ settlers and investors to form rifle associations and in-house security 
units in their settlement and production areas. On the other hand, the native population 
created party militias and neighbourhood watch groups parallel to the state and chiefly 
policing. In the last two parts, I examine how the ‘mandate’ (later ‘trust’) territory 
status prevented not only the creation of a strong police force in the country but also 
contributed to poor security policies that disregarded the plural security landscape in 
the ‘colony’ and ‘post-colony’. 
3.5 Pathways to Weak Government Institutions    
According to Neal,365 the colonial policies and institutions were by-products of an 
interaction between two separate but interdependent centres of colonial rule, i.e. the 
European capitals (metropolitans) and their African conquests (colonial states). In the 
project of state creation, the colonial regime destroyed the existing ethno-political 
communities and organisational structures and integrated them into the wider system 
of international capital.366 In Ezrow and Frantz words,367 the colonial rule “wreaked 
havoc on the process of state formation that was taking place in many developing 
countries and the process of nation-building or creating a national identity”. For 
political motives, the colonial regimes forced communities, which once lived 
independently of each other, to live together in a political organisation known as a 
‘state’.368 It also politicised and integrated traditional institutions (jadi) into an ‘alien’ 
apparatus of administration and repression (indirect rule), thus change of power 
relations and authority.369 
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The colonial regime created a condition of fragility that made it nearly impossible for 
the ‘post-colony’ to reinvent itself and break free from the paths set by its predecessor 
government and assert the rationality of state institutions.370 The state institutions 
remained weak, inaccessible to the large part of the population and unable to provide 
basic security services to the people.371 The existence of weak institutions in 
Tanganyika, for example, is partly associated with the politics of the World War I and 
the change of colonial powers from the Germans to the British.372 During the war, 
Tanganyika became a battleground in the East African region, thus the destruction of 
institutional arrangements and facilities and the death of well-trained security officers 
in the colony.373 After the war, the British introduced superficial reforms, not aimed 
at building strong institutions and personnel that would endure beyond colonial 
rule.374 The colony had a considerable number of non-native police officers that 
undermined the regime’s efforts to prepare the native to assume office after 
independence. Many European and Asian officials left in 1962, making it harder to 
fill the gap left behind with ill-trained and inexperienced local officers.375 Local 
officers discriminated against the remaining non-native officials, which forced the 
government to replace them with black Africans.376 The presence of foreign officials 
also made it harder for the local people to accept the government’s institutions, 
perceived as ‘alien’ and only there to serve the interest of the European population. 
Osghae claims,377 “…this gave rise to the endemic legitimacy crisis that marooned 
the colonial state and its postcolonial successor”.  
Unlike the Germans who built and depended on formal institutions to govern (direct 
rule), the British did not invest much in state institutions; rather they co-opted and 
relied on traditional authorities (indirect rule) to serve political interests in a colony.378 
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The British rulers did not prepare the native population for self-government nor did 
they intend to develop or invest in strong institutions and personnel to take over after 
independence.379 The indirect rule destroyed a real sense of belonging due to 
competition for, or divided allegiance among citizens and created a culture of relying 
on traditional institutions to meet justice and security needs at the expense of public 
institutions.380 Wa Mtua381 claims that: 
Most of these new citizens lacked any instinctual or nationalistic bond to the 
colonial state. The failure of the successor post-colonial state points to the 
continued inability of the "unnatural" and forced the state to inspire loyalty and 
distinct national identities.  
The colonial regime designed public institutions in such a way that they facilitated 
the extraction of resources to Europe rather than to foster local development.382 The 
regime handled ruthlessly any form of civil disobedience and legitimised itself 
through securing order and ‘civilising’ the local people.383 Violent opposition to 
colonial oppression resulted in strengthening coercive institutions and the law.384 This 
also implies that Tanganyika inherited weak institutions because it had very few 
incidences of civil disobedience or large-scale tribal violence385 and attained her 
independence through peaceful means. Moreover, Tanganyika was not a settler 
colony but a mandate territory (later a trustee). As a mandate territory, Tanganyika 
attracted a small number of settlers, thus little institutional development. This was so 
because European settlements “affected early institutions; and early institutions 
persisted and formed the basis of current institution”.386 The British did not need to 
develop and invest heavily in a colony, which they were mere custodians, i.e. they 
governed Tanganyika on behalf of the League of Nations (later the United Nations) 
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and expected to surrender power to the local people at some point. Therefore, the 
British did not establish a proper functioning bureaucracy but relied on chiefly 
authority and elders.  
Further, the regime invested less in strong institutions because several British colonies 
surrounded Tanganyika. It was possible to deploy troops from other colonies, such as 
Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, Malawi, and Zambia to respond to any public disorder in 
Tanganyika. The British had few police officers and invested less in public security 
because of cross-border policing and the need to protect the regime rather than the 
populace.387 As such, it was impossible to sustain cross-border policing after the 
country attained her independence earlier than other British colonies in the region. 
Post-independence, the government did not immediately adopt a proper national 
security policy to control the armed forces and ensure public safety.388 The first 
political move of the single-party autocrats was to abolish native authorities as they 
felt that the government enjoyed popular support and the army will always remain 
loyal to the state.389 They believed that the state of Tanganyika had no enemies and 
that the international community supported the country’s development agendas.390 
Some government officials even called for the disbandment of the armed forces and 
place the defence of the country in the hands of the United Nations to show that 
Tanganyika was indeed a peaceful nation.391  
Tanganyika had the smallest police force in the world in the 1960s compared to its 
population and size. In 1964, for instance, very few police officers were available to 
resist the mutineers and looting that broke out in Dar es Salaam and Tabora.392 About 
300 police were in Zanzibar to help the revolutionary government to restore order.393 
Bienen394 suggests that there was no opposition from the state or other organised 
groups to suppress one thousand riflemen. The government had to rely on British and 
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Nigerian troops to suppress mutineers, restore order, and maintain law.395 The army 
mutiny changed how the government perceived defence and security policies.396 It 
invested more in rebuilding the military rather than the police partly because of the 
geopolitics, i.e. Cold War tension and imminent danger of external aggression.397 The 
government partly left the delivery of basic security services of the rural population 
to the party, which endorsed and indoctrinated policing groups and organised security 
independently or alongside state machinery to counterbalance the power of the armed 
forces.398 One of the political strategies the government used to control violence in 
both the ‘colony’ and ‘post-colony’ was to adopt and reform security policies in a 
path-dependent way as discussed below.  
3.6 The Paradox of Policy Reforms and Legacies  
The colonial government was the supreme body within the colony in defining and 
conferring legality. The colonial policy on private policing focused on spurring the 
colonial agents (settlers, missionaries and state officials) in the colony to create 
formidable security groups to serve the regime in case of emergency.399 The rifle 
clubs, for example, were capable of repelling or holding off civil disorder in 
production or white settlement areas until the government is ready to send 
reinforcements.400 This was especially true in the first decade of colonial rule and 
during and immediately after World War I and II. Shaidi suggests,401 “…colonial 
brutality was not only exercised by the state itself but by all its agents from the settlers 
to the missionaries”. The state was not concerned with policing by colonial agents 
because the public force was overstretched, and the agents belonged to the ruling 
class, which had much to lose in case of civil disorder.  
To ensure that politics drove security, the British regime, for example, attempted to 
concentrate coercive powers in public hands, impose strict control over security and 
private capabilities and restrict its direct connection to the local people. In short, the 
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government was not in favour of security groups run by the local people, other than 
chiefs, because of the threat they posed to the survival of the colonial order.402 Further, 
for political reasons, the regime prohibited the local people, who were at all-time seen 
as a potential threat to the colonial order and economy, from not only forming armed 
and unarmed groups but also usurping police powers. The enactment of the Public 
Order Ordinance (POO) and the Societies Ordinance (SO) intensified the crackdown 
of ‘non-white’ armed and unarmed groups, especially the pro-independence groups 
that picked up in the 1950s.403 The POO aimed at banning organisations capable of 
usurping the functions of the armed forces.404 It allowed the Governor to prohibit 
members of any organisation from wearing uniforms, distinctive dress or emblem in 
public places to usurp powers of the armed forces or employ them for the use or 
display of physical force.405 It also made it illegal to possess weapons in public places 
and to give or receive training to usurp police functions or related activities.406  
Apart from the POO, the SO empowered the Governor to declare any society or 
association unlawful, if used for any purpose prejudicial to the maintenance of peace 
and order.407 Among other things, the SO adopted a very strict interpretation of the 
word ‘society’ to include an association or group of ten or more persons regardless of 
whether it is registered or not.408 Before the enactment of the POO and SO, the regime 
used the Penal Code409 and the Emergency Powers Order in Council (1937-1961)410 
to control social groups likely to create disorder. These laws empowered the Governor 
to make regulations for securing the public safety, the defence of the territory and 
maintenance of public order.411 As a political necessity, the British reversed to a more 
centralised policy that outlawed ‘non-white’ security groups. In some instances, 
however, the government tolerated ‘non-white’ actors if they shared common 
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interests with the rulers or operated in areas that the government had no political and 
economic interests. The aim was to ensure that the government retained a maximum 
political control of the means of violence in a colony.  
Despite the above stringent measures against the native groups, the local people could 
legitimately wield coercive powers through three avenues controlled by politicians 
and political appointees. The first avenue was through the deputising process whereby 
the Inspector-General or the Superintendent in charge of police or the Provisional and 
District Commissioners could extend policing powers to any civilian to become a 
special police officer for specific time and locality.412 Today, the President, District 
and the Regional Commissioners can exercise the power to deputise civilians.413 The 
second avenue was by serving the local chiefs as tribal messengers (native authority 
police) under customary law.414 The government abolished the chiefly authority415 
and customary criminal law416 immediately after independence. The third avenue was 
through penal laws such as the Penal Code (1945), the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(1945) and the Stock Theft Ordinance (1960) that recognised the right to self-defence 
and defence of property.417 These statutes are still intact today with similar effect.418 
An individual exercising police power under the first two options above became a 
quasi-police officer. The same goes for colonial agents, shooting clubs, and in-house 
security departments. The last option creates a universal and inalienable right for one 
to protect his life and property or that of his neighbour, thus does not need any 
common law or statutory recognition. Nonetheless, civilians could only exercise 
coercive powers in their ‘individual’ capacity rather than as a ‘joint’ force.  
The state in the postcolonial period inherited a delicate form of power relations 
between the government and the civil society. The change of security policy intended 
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to address emergent security challenges in the post-colony. The policies adopted 
against security service providers revolved around past reforms (POO and SO), even 
though prior events (anti-colonial movements) could not fit the prevailing 
circumstances (the Cold War and geopolitics). The endemic problem of public 
policing in Tanzania today is partly associated with the tendency of the government 
retaining or copying colonial policies and looking for solutions from Britain without 
due regard to the local context. The practice of importing policies began in the 
colonial period after the adoption of the Tanganyika Order in Council in 1920, which 
at the time was equivalent to the modern state Constitution.419 The Order in Council 
allowed the regime to use statutes of general application in England,420 hence the laws 
of the colony comprised the enactments of the colonial government and received 
English laws (received laws). Such law must be in force in England before the 22nd 
of July 1920 and must fit the local circumstances for it to apply in the colony.421 For 
political motives, the regime did not meet the two conditions in importing the POO 
and SO. The POO was in pari materia with the English Public Order Act of 1936,422 
thus very much influenced by the events and policy changes in England after 22 of 
July 1920.423 While the UK government adopted the 1936 Act to control fascist 
political organisations such as the British Union of Fascists,424 the POO targeted 
nationalist movements and non-state actors. On the other hand, the regime modelled 
the SO on British Hong Kong’s Societies Ordinance of 1890, which presumed all 
social organisations to be unlawful until registered by the government.425 The POO 
and SO are in force today supported by Article 147 of the 1977 Constitution and 
section 8E of the Political Parties (Amendment) Act of 2019.426 
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Moreover, the English Bill of Rights of 1688 inspired the drafters of Article 64 of the 
Republic Constitution (1962) and Article 80 of the Interim Constitution (1965).427 
The English Bill of Rights provided, “the raising or keeping a standing army within 
the Kingdom in time of peace unless it be with consent of Parliament is against law”.  
Under the 1962 and 1965 Constitutions, the government could maintain a standing 
army while private individuals would need the approval of the parliament to do so. 
On the other hand, the 1977 Constitution adopts the position taken by the English 
Militia Act of 1661428 whereby the King of England had a sole right to raise and 
command a standing army to defend the kingdom and its dominions. The drafters of 
the 1977 Constitution might as well have borrowed a leaf from the POO and SO that 
prohibit individuals, organizations, and group of persons from controlling violence. 
In either case, the government resuscitated both legislative and political measures that 
nationalist parties opposed in the 1950s, even though the police could not uphold law 
and order without enlisting the support of non-state actors. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter described key historical trends in precolonial and colonial policing 
structure and policies and related continuities and changes. It showed that Tanzania 
has had plural security landscape before and during the colonial rule. In the 
precolonial era, it was hard to draw a line between public and private actors because 
there was no state, as we know it today. The security arrangements took the form of 
armed retainers, personal bodyguards, royal guards, and standing armies. The chapter 
showed further that the Germans maintained order through a chartered company, the 
army, mercenaries, and local agents. The chartered company had access to the means 
of violence just like a sovereign state, thus becoming a predecessor to modern-day 
PSCs. The Germans are the only rulers in Tanzanian history who have tried to 
establish a 'monopoly of violence' both in theory and practice because they launched 
a series of military campaigns against, and coercively co-opted all privately organised 
security groups in the country. The British established the police force and auxiliary 
police, among other institutions, and allowed Europeans to form rifle clubs and in-
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house security units, which had political leanings. The native population created party 
militias and neighbourhood watch groups parallel to the state and chiefly policing. 
Therefore, the government was part of, and controlled violence through native chiefs, 
chartered companies, private shooting clubs (rifle associations), army, police force 
and local agents (jumbe, akidas, and liwali). All the above security arrangements and 
policies were mechanisms used to achieve political manipulation that continue to 
haunt Tanzania today. The next chapter explains the ban imposed on non-state actors 
in the 1977 Constitution as a precursor to the consolidation of state powers along 

















Chapter 4: Explanation of the 1977 Ban on Non-State Actors 
4.1 Introduction 
Drawing on archival records and secondary sources, and legislation and policies, this 
chapter seeks to explain why the government banned non-state actors in the 1977 
Constitution (also known as the Permanent Constitution)429 and not in the 1962 and 
1965 Constitutions, also known as the Republic and Interim Constitutions, 
respectively.430 The first part looks at the state-specific factors for the adoption of a 
less strict stand towards non-state actors in the Republic and Interim Constitutions. 
The second part lays down a foundation for understanding the role of the union of the 
formerly sovereign states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the single-party autocrats 
in formulating security policies. It also looks at the party’s control of law and order 
through, and sometimes outside, the government machinery. The third part builds on 
the first two parts to explain the government statement in the constituent assembly for 
the 1977 ban (hereinafter the ban) and related socio-political context. The last part of 
the chapter shows the implication of and connects the context for the ban of non-state 
actors to the question of plural policing. I argue in this chapter that the Tanzanian 
government’s security policy was as much about political necessities such as 
counterinsurgency, decolonisation and secession movements. Therefore, the contexts 
for the ban have had a multifaced effect on the national security and created what I 
call ‘state-controlled’ plural policing. 
4.2 A Glimpse of Plural Policing in the Republic and Interim Constitutions 
The political necessity for the new government was to be seen as different from the 
colonialists and to harness the support of local actors to assist the weak police service. 
As such, at independence (1961), it was not sensible for the ‘new’ government to 
enforce the Public Order Ordinance (POO) and the Societies Ordinance (SO) against 
non-state actors because most of them operated under the party (TANU), which had 
relied on them before in demanding for political freedom. Also, the government had 
no alternative policy on privately and communally organised security groups. The 
main challenge that faced the government was how to maintain the state authority 
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without mirroring the colonial regime and awakening anti-government sentiments.431 
The party, in the 1971 Guidelines,432 admitted, “…the truth is that we have not only 
inherited a colonial government structure but have also adopted colonial working 
habits and leadership methods”.433  
At independence, people commanded more coercive power through non-state actors 
and highly united behind the party, thus expected the ‘new’ government to distance 
itself from colonial practices and give more autonomy to privately and communally 
organised groups.434 As such, the party trained, indoctrinated and controlled militias 
and used them to check upon activities of the regular public armed forces.435 Thus, 
the debates in the national assembly in the 1960s focused on how best the government 
could manipulate and use non-state actors in complementing the police force.436 This 
was so because the inherited colonial police force was highly disorganised, 
overstretched, ineffective, unprofessional, mistrusted and despised by the people.437 
Also, towards the end of colonial rule, nationalist parties had parallel coercive 
institutions that rivalled the public police, thus it was politically impossible to ban 
them immediately after independence.438 Similarly, the ‘new’ government was 
expected to act differently from its colonial predecessor towards non-state actors and 
finding solutions for the jobless and uneducated young population deployed as 
vanguards of the party during the struggle for independence.439  
The government needed time to work on a feasible plan to disband, discipline, or train 
and recruit them into existing armed forces without causing public disorder.440 
Pending the completion of the security sector reform task, the state was compelled to 
recognise and use the services of non-state actors. Therefore, as opposed to the 
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Independence Constitution (1961)441 that did not address the role and limitation of 
non-state actors in policing, Article 64 of the Republic Constitution442 made one 
concession. It allowed the Parliament to make laws that enabled private individuals, 
companies, and communities to establish non-state actors. This clause also provided 
an avenue for the government to make laws,443 train and engage privately and 
communally organised groups in the provision of security.444 With the requirement of 
the parliamentary approval through legislation, the government retained substantial 
control over security groups that might have planned to work with internal or external 
threats. This was so because to establish a security group one needed an Act of the 
Parliament to that effect. Apart from moving Article 64 of the Republic Constitution 
to Article 80 of the Interim Constitution, its content remained intact. Consequently, 
the constituent assembly did not discuss Article 80 of the Interim Constitution because 
it was virtually a copy of Article 64 of the Republic Constitution. The constituent 
assembly focused on more pressing issues brought about by the union of Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar and the introduction of a party-state system, which came to define 
national security policies.445       
4.3 The Union, Party and Security  
Since its inception, the Union and its structure have been the main source of political 
debates and dissidence in the country.446 The main point of contention was whether 
the Articles of the Union447 creates a unitary or a federal state. In a strict sense, 
Tanzania is not a unitary territory because Zanzibar448 is a semi-autonomous state 
within the Union. The fact that Tanzania is a union of two former sovereign countries 
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and the Constitution labels it as such does not in itself make it a unitary territory.449 
The unitary element (centralisation of power) can, however, be seen in the respective 
governments of Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania rather than in the Union 
government. The current structure of the Union exhibits quasi-federal traditions, that 
is to say, it is not a full-fledged federation because it does not comprise three or more 
states.450 In De Smith’s words,451 “Tanzania is a part-federation, since Zanzibar has 
exclusive fields of competence both in theory and in practice; but, for political reasons 
the term 'federal' does not appear in the Constitution inasmuch as it implies a degree 
of disunity as well as diversity”. 
The essence of this arrangement was to avoid Mainland Tanzania ‘swallowing up’ 
Zanzibar or shouldering the burden of running three governments.452 Consequently, 
the union government has a double role, that is, it oversees union matters of the two 
states and non-union matters for Mainland Tanzania.453 This is so because Mainland 
Tanzania is not a semi-autonomous territory in the two-government structure, thus the 
Union Government also operates as a de jure government for Mainland Tanzania.454 
The effect of this arrangement is that the laws and institutions of Tanganyika, which 
had existed before the creation of the state of Tanzania, became laws and institutions 
of the Union.455 Similarly, the union Constitutions (Interim and Permanent) have been 
supreme laws of Mainland Tanzania while Zanzibar continues to have a separate 
Constitution.  
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Regarding security issues, the Articles of the Union vested security matters in the 
Union Government.456 This means that Mainland Tanzania (union government) need 
to approve any form of security arrangement and policy in Zanzibar.457 For political 
reasons, in the first two decades of the Union, Zanzibar had more police officers from 
Mainland Tanzania than Zanzibar itself.458 As a result, people in Zanzibar felt that the 
union had turned their state into a ‘colony’ of Mainland Tanzania.459 People who were 
against the Union faulted Karume,460 the President of the post-revolution Zanzibar, 
for the forfeiture of sovereignty and making Zanzibar a police state.461 As we shall 
see in the next part, the Zanzibar question and other geopolitical issues shaped the 
debate about security policies in Tanzania. 
Apart from the semi-federal structure of the union, Tanzania was a de jure ‘party-
state’ between 1965 and 1992,462 thereby blurring state and the party functions.463 As 
the sole state-party or with an overwhelming majority in the national assembly, the 
party engineered 1962, 1965 and 1977 constitutional changes.464 While a constitution 
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464 TANU (Tanganyika) and ASP (Zanzibar). See, Section 2 of the Constitutional Assembly Act (No. 
66 of 1962), the Constituent Assembly, Hansard, 22nd November 1962, p. 68, the Constituent Assembly, 
Hansard, 17th Meeting, 8th June – 5th July 1965, pp. 214, 1658-1690, the Interim Constitution Decree 
(G.N. No. 246 of 1964), and the Constituent Assembly, Hansard, 25th April 1977. Cf. Shivji (1998), 




of the party formed part of the Interim Constitution as the first schedule,465 the 
Permanent Constitution subjected the government to the party as the superior guiding 
force of the society.466 This phenomenon was known as ‘chama kushika hatamu’ 
(party supremacy),467 whereby the party was “declared supreme to the government 
which is reduced to being an administrative wing of the Party”.468 President 
Nyerere469 stressed: 
It is not the Party which is the instrument of the Government. It is the 
Government which is the instrument through which the Party tries to 
implement the wishes of the people and serves their interests. And the Party 
has therefore to determine the basic principles on which the Government 
should act; it has to determine the policies its Government will follow.  
The President of the union was not only the Head of the State, Government and 
Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces470 but also part of the Parliament471 and 
party leader by default.472 The parliament consisted of the President who assented 
bills into law on one hand, and the National Assembly, which debated on and 
endorsed government proposals, on the other.473 Members of the National Assembly 
were also ex officio members of National Conference (NC) of the party.474 The party 
convened NC once every five years and it was responsible for endorsing the decisions 
 
465 Article 3(4) of the Interim Constitution. The case of Thabit Ngaka v. The Regional Fisheries Officer 
[1973] LRT 24 reiterated that the 1st Schedule was an integral part of the constitution, thus justiciable.  
466 Articles 2(2), 32) and 3(1)-(4) of the 1977 Constitution. Cf. Article 3(3) of the Interim Constitution, 
and Section 3 of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act, No. 8/1975. 
467 Section 3 of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act, No. 8/1975. See also, Hotuba 
ya Waziri Mkuu na Makamu wa Pili wa Rais, Ndugu R.M. Kawawa mnamo Tarehe 03/06/1975 (Chama 
kushika Hatamu) akiwasilisha Bungeni Muswada wa Kubadili Katiba ya Muda, and Nyerere, J.K. 
(1973) The party must speak for the people. In: Nyerere, J.K., Freedom and development. Dar es 
Salaam, Oxford University Press, p. 30.  Cf. TANU Guidelines of 1971. Msekwa, P. (1974) Towards 
party supremacy. M.A. in Political Science, Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam. 
468 Georges, P.T. (1973) The courts in the Tanzania one party state. In: James, R.W. and Kassam, F.M. 
(Eds.) Law and its administration in a one-party state: selected speeches of Telford Georges. Dar es 
Salaam, EALB, p. 30 (Footnote 5a). Cf. TANU Guidelines (1971), p. 4 (paras 11-13). 
469 Nyerere (1973), Ibid. p. 33. Cf. TANU Guidelines (1971), p. 4 (paras 11-13). 
470 Article 3 of the Republic Constitution, Article 6 of the Interim Constitution, and Article 5 of the 
1977 Constitution.  
471 Article 20 of the Republic Constitution, Article 23 of the Interim Constitution, and Article 22 of the 
1977 Constitution. See also, Articles 62(1) and 107(1) of the 1977 Constitution (R.E. 2010). Cf. De 
Smith (1977), Ibid. p. 29.  
472 See, TANU (first schedule to the Union Constitution) and CCM Constitutions.  
473 The National Assembly had almost half of its members unelected (i.e. Ex officio members and 
Presidential appointees). Cf. Kjekshus, H. (1974) Parliament in a one-party state: the Bunge of 
Tanzania, 1965-70. Journal of Modem African Studies, 12(1), pp. 19-33. 
474 The 1979 amendments to both the state and the party’s constitutions declared members of the 
National Assembly as members of NC of the party. See also, TANU Constitution 1965 (as amended 




of the National Executive Committee (NEC) and Central Committee (CC) of the 
party.475 The NEC476 and CC dealt with matters of national importance and issued 
directives to the government and party machinery for implementation.477 Political 
appointees such as the Regional and District Commissioners, who are party cadres, 
headed all government functions in their respective localities including the Regional 
and District Defence and Security Committees.478  
 
To ensure maximum political control of the security sector, police stations or posts 
and army barracks became party branches, polling stations, and had representations 
in decision-making organs (national assembly) and party forums.479 The public 
officials automatically became party members and politicised480 while top security 
officers became executive and administrative personnel of the party. The Inspector-
General of Police (IGP) and the Chief of Defence Forces, for example, became 
principal political commissars responsible for the ideological vigour of the armed 
forces.481 Therefore, both government and party institutions, as well as private 
individuals linked to the party with or without the sanction of the government, 
enforced law and order along political interests.482 The government enforced the law 
through formal institutions, such as the police force and auxiliary police while the 
party organised and co-opted informal security arrangements (militias483 and 
vigilantes). The party adopted a ‘co-option policy’, in the sense that, it recognised and 
 
475 By 1967 NEC “had replaced the National Assembly as the paramount representative political 
institution in Tanzania”. See, Pratt, C. (1976), Ibid. p. 210. 
476 The NEC enjoyed the same powers and privileges as the National Assembly, e.g. call witnesses and 
papers.  
477 Cf. Article IV of TANU Constitution (Annexed to the Interim Constitution); and paras 8 and 40-42 
of the Report of the presidential commission on the establishment of a democratic one-party state 
(1965), pp. 2, 16-17, 27. 
478 The Regions and Regional Commissioners Act, No. 2/1962 and the Area Commissioners Act, No. 
18/1962 (repealed and replaced by the Regional Administration Act, No. 19/1997, see, sections 5, 14-
15). Cf. Constitutions of TANU and CCM.  
479 See, Georges (1973), Ibid. p. 55 and 58, Footnote 8. Omari (2002), Ibid. p. 94. 
480 Makulilo, A.B. and Gherghina, S. (2014) The roots, development and challenges of autonomy claims 
in Tanzania. In: Levente, S., et al., (eds.) Autonomy arrangements around the world: a collection of 
well and lesser known cases. ISPMN, p. 216; and Mazrui (1968), Ibid. p. 274. See, R.M. Kawawa’s 
(the then Prime Minister) Press Conference on 31 August 1964 (reported in the Tanganyika Standard 
Newspaper of 01 September 1964). 
481 Barany (2014), Ibid. p. 610, and Okema, M. (2006) Police chief more political than the politicians. 
The East African, 06 March 2008. 
482 See a detailed discussion in Shivji (1990), Ibid.  
483 Though in party documents were referred to as militias, these were essentially informal and 





embraced any grassroots initiatives that aimed at supporting the government’s efforts 
in addressing security concerns.484 An organisation was considered private not 
because it was established and run by private individuals but because it was outside 
of the government and party control. Paragraph 27 of the 1971 Guidelines provided 
that:  
The registration of the militia and the army must be scrutinised very carefully 
and supervised by the party. Ensuring co-operation between the army and 
militia, and providing for political education to both, must be a prime 
responsibility of the party.  
 
To ensure a ‘state or party’ controlled security sector, the 1971 Guidelines called upon 
the party “to establish a sub-committee of the Central Committee to look into defence 
and security,”485 thus the party established a specific organ known as the National 
Defence and Security Commission (NDSC). The main task of NDSC was to provide 
guidance to the government and the people and to strategize and supervise all 
activities relating to national defence and security.486 The NDSC comprised members 
from the state armed forces, political leaders, civil society, and party officials. At a 
grassroots level, the party was represented by the ten-cell leaders (wajumbe wa 
nyumba kumi) who worked with law enforcers to identify security threats and organise 
defence and security in their areas.487 Accordingly, the party-state system affected not 
only the armed forces but also the existence of civic organisations. Shivji concludes, 
“…politics were monopolised as the civil society was statised… extreme 
concentration and centralisation of power were formally consecrated in the permanent 
constitution”.488  The Permanent Constitution and the merger of TANU and ASP in 
1977 to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party or CCM) cemented a 
‘state-controlled plural policing’ and reduced further the autonomy of Zanzibar in the 
matters of security.489 As discussed below, the party-state system, political ideology 
 
484 See detailed discussion in Cross (2014), ibid. 
485 Paragraph 27 of the TANU Guidelines (1971), p. 8. 
486 TANU and CCM Constitutions (as amended from time to time). 
487 Ingle, C.R. (1972) “The Ten-House Cell System in Tanzania: A Consideration of an Emerging 
Village Institution”, Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 6:2, pp. 215. Cross (2014), Ibid. pp. 522 and 
534.  
488 Shivji, I.G. (2012) Nationalism and pan-Africanism: decisive moments in Nyerere's intellectual and 
political thought. Review of African Political Economy, 39(131), p. 110.  




and geopolitics gave birth to a total ban of privately and communally organised 
security groups in the 1977 Constitution - at least in theory.   
4.4 Geopolitics and Security - The 1977 Ban on Non-state Actors 
The 1977 Constitutional change altered the 1965 position by imposing a total ban on 
individuals and institutions to establish security groups. To meet political necessity, 
the Constitution gave the union government an exclusive power to establish armed 
organisations and control of violence. This was achieved by removing an exception 
to the general rule that appeared under Article 80 of the 1965 Constitution (formerly 
Article 64 of the 1962 Constitution). The constituent assembly and party meetings did 
not discuss Article 89 (now Article 147) of the Constitution 1977.490 The justification 
for imposing a total ban on private security service providers is found in the then 
Prime Minister’s (Edward Moringe Sokoine) address to the constituent assembly on 
25th April 1977. Sokoine observed: 
Nd. Spika, Ibara ya 89 nayo imeandikwa kwa ufafanuzi zaidi kuliko 
ilivyokuwa katika Katiba ya Muda. Ibara hii sasa inaeleza wazi kwamba ni 
Serikali peke yake iliyo na madaraka ya kuunda ama kuweka aina yoyote ya 
majeshi nchini. Maelezo ya Katiba ya Muda yangeweza kueleweka kwamba 
mtu binafsi naye ana haki ya kuunda ama kuweka Jeshi iwapo Bunge litakuwa 
limepitisha sheria kama hiyo. Hivyo sivyo ilivyo.491 [Comrade/Hon. Speaker, 
Article 89 has also been more elaborative compared to the way it appeared in 
the Interim Constitution. The provision now states clearly that only the 
government can establish or introduce armed forces of any kind. The 
impression given in the Interim Constitution was that even a private 
individual has the right to establish or introduce an armed force if the 
Parliament makes a law to that effect. That is not the case]. 
To understand the socio-legal context of the ban, we need to examine the party’s 
publications in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the ‘security politics’ behind it. 
The ‘Azimio la Arusha’ (Arusha Declaration) of 1967,492 ‘Mwongozo wa TANU’ 
 
490 Maybe because of the secretive nature of the socialist state at the time, there were no discussions 
regarding defence and security matters. 
491 Constituent Assembly, Hansard, 25th April 1977.  
492 The official document that provided for the state’s policies of socialism and self-reliance. The TANU 
Guidelines (1971) quoted, with approval, the Arusha Declaration’s policy statement on defence and 
security (TANU Guidelines, pp. 7 and 8). The Arusha Declaration was revoked by the Zanzibar 
Declaration (Maamuzi ya Zanzibar) of 1991 (as reflected in President Mwinyi’s Speech at Diamond 
Jubilee Hall, Dar es Salaam, 25/02/1991). Nyerere, J.K. (1974) Uamzi wa busara (the rational choice). 




(Party’s Guidelines) of 1971 and 1981493 and speeches of party leaders are the most 
important political documents with explanatory force and upon which the justification 
for the ban on non-state policing could be discerned. The party issued the 1971 
Guidelines in response to the military coup in the Republic of Uganda494 and 
Portugal’s invasion of the Republic of Guinea in 1971.495 In preparing the nation for 
external threats, the Guidelines approvingly quoted and expanded on the Arusha 
Declaration: 
Katika upande wa ulinzi wa Taifa, wananchi wawe macho na vibaraka 
waliomo nchini ambao wanaweza kutumiwa na maadui wa nje wenye nia 
mbaya ya kuliangamiza Taifa inapolazimika kufanya hivyo.496 [Regarding 
national defence, it is necessary for the people to be on guard against internal 
stooges who could be used by external enemies who aim to destroy us. The 
people should always be ready to defend their nation when they are called 
upon to do so]. 
The security strategies set out in the Arusha Declaration imply that the government 
knew that it required grassroots support in organising security, but it also knew that 
the ban could enable it to bring such local endeavours under political control. Since 
homeland security was a political necessity of the time, the Guidelines called for 
combating internal and external reactionaries and went on to set out the party’s 
policies and strategies on defence and security. One of the security issues stipulated 
in the Guidelines that required urgent and decisive measures was the frequent attempts 
made by the former colonial powers to invade their former colonies in Africa or 
interfere in their internal affairs.497 It added that Tanzania was in a constant 
confrontation with the British and Portuguese colonialists and minority regimes in 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Mozambique, and South Africa. The Guidelines 
warned further that for historical, geographical and political reasons, imperialist 
countries might be ready either to attack the country directly or use local counter-
 
493 Cf. Nyerere (1974), Ibid. pp. 35-37. Nyerere (1971), Ibid. pp. 280-282. 
494 The 1971 Guidelines labelled Idi Amin Dada has a puppet of Western governments used to 
overthrow President Milton Obote to halt the spread of socialism in the East African Sub-region. Obote 
wanted to emulate Tanzania’s Arusha Declaration, styled as “the Common Man’s Charter” of October 
1969. See, Obote, A.M. (1970) The common man's charter with appendices. Entebbe, Government 
Printer, and Otunnu, O. (2017) Crisis of legitimacy and political violence in Uganda, 1890 to 1979. 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 195-204. 
495 The Guidelines claimed, “…since that year (1960) many legitimate African governments have been 
forcefully toppled and new governments established”. 
496 Arusha Declaration, p. 30. See also, TANU Guidelines (1971), para 24, pp. 7 and 8.   




revolutionaries to overthrow the legitimate government and replace it with internal 
stooges like Idi Amin in the Republic of Uganda and supported by local 
bourgeoisie.498 The party had a duty:  
…to spell out the aims of the Tanzanian and the African revolution, and to 
identify the enemies of this revolution, in order to set out policies and strategies 
which will enable us to safeguard, consolidate and further our revolution.499  
Therefore, even the act of policing had to be politicised to defend the Zanzibar 
revolution and the union against reactionaries. In the context of the 1971 Guidelines, 
the government introduced the ban to curb internal stooges likely to manipulate and 
use security groups as springboards in destabilising the country. Indeed, the security 
threat referred to in the 1977 Guidelines was not an empty shell. Tanzania was a 
hotbed for decolonisation movements and a home to millions of political refugees 
fleeing persecution, colonial oppression, and civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa.500 
Tanzania hosted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)’s African Liberation 
Committee (ALC)501 in Dar es Salaam between 1963 and 1994.502 The ALC provided 
training, logistic support, funding, publicity, funding, and diplomatic and media 
campaigns to all anti-colonial groups recognised by OAU.503 Tanzania’s 
involvements in OAU and ALC activities rendered the country in diplomatic rows 
with Portugal and Britain.504 In 1965, for example, Tanzania broke diplomatic ties 
 
498 TANU Guidelines (1971), pp. 1 and 3 (paras 3-9). 
499 Ibid, p. 1 (para 1).  
500 Pratt (1976), Ibid. pp. 134-136. See, Nyerere, J.K. (1967) Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs. 
Speech to the TANU Bi-Annual National Conference on Tanzania Foreign Policy at Mwanza, 16th 
October 1967. Cf. Nyerere, J.K. (1970) Non-Alignment in the 1970s. Speech given on 13th April 1970 
at the preparatory meeting of non-aligned countries in Dar es Salaam. 13-17 April 1970. See also, 
Nyerere, J.K. (1978) Tanzania rejects western domination of Africa. Statement to foreign envoys 
accredited to Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, the State House, 8th June 1978, and Nyerere, J.K. (1972) After 
the Pearce Commission. Printpak Tanzania Limited, Dar es Salaam, 3rd June 1972. 
501 OAU was replaced by the African Unity (AU) on 26 May 2001.   
502 Nyerere, J.K. (1964) OAU Emergency Meeting of Foreign Ministers. 12th February 1964. In: 
Nyerere, J.K. Freedom and Unity, pp. 288-290. See also, Nyerere, J.K. (1964) The speech of the 
president of the united republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar during the African head of states summit 
in Dar es Salaam. 20 July 1964. Kambona, O. (1963) Colonialism and the African liberation committee. 
African Studies Bulletin, 6(3), p. 2; Mbita, H.I. (2016) Tanzania: a Pan-Africanist freedom fighter 
[online]. [Accessed on 18 May 2018]. Available from:  
<http://www.firstmagazine.com/DownloadSpecialistPublicationDetail.383.ashx>.   
503 Sahnoun, M. (2009) Nyerere, the organization of African unity and liberation. Pambazuka News. 13 
October 2009. [Accessed on 06 July 2018]. Available from:  <https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-
africanism/nyerere-organization-african-unity-and-liberation>. 
504 Nyerere, J.K. (1965) The Honour of Africa. Address to the National Assembly, 14th December 1965. 
See also, Nyerere, J.K. (1966) Rhodesia in the Context of Southern Africa, April 1966. In: Nyerere, 




with Britain and supported the OAU’s resolution that opposed a unilateral declaration 
of independence by a minority white government in Zimbabwe.505 In retaliation, 
Britain decided to freeze financial aids, loans and withdrew all British experts from 
Tanzania.506 On this issue, Gitelson507 comments:  
Tanzania was also the only country within geographic proximity to Southern 
Rhodesia which broke relations [with Britain]. All the others which severed 
ties were far enough away not to fear military or economic reprisals. 
 
As ALC’s headquarters, Tanzania harboured, trained and armed freedom fighters 
from South Africa (PAC and ANC), Mozambique (FRELIMO), Angola (MPLA), 
Zimbabwe (ZAPU and ZAPU), Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and Namibia 
(SWAPO).508 For similar anti-colonial activities in Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-
Bissau), Portugal attacked the Republic of Guinea in 1971.509 Tanzania feared its 
involvement in Portugal colonies of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and 
Angola could bring her in trouble as well. The 1977 Guidelines claimed:  
Kwasababu hizo hizo mabeberu hawa wanaweza siku moja wakathubutu 
kuishambulia Tanzania.510 [For similar reasons, the imperialists may attempt 
to attack Tanzania one day]. 
 
Therefore, the decision to ban non-state actors was part of wider political and security 
reforms that included compulsory national service for the youth, the introduction of 
people’s militia511 and provision of civic education and military training to 
civilians.512 This move would have been important because the minority governments 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa tended to infiltrate and fund insurgencies and using 
 
University Press, Dar es Salaam, pp. 143-156. Nyerere, J.K. (1971) South Africa and the 
Commonwealth. Speech at the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, January 1971. Nyerere, J.K. 
(1966) Rhodesia: the case for action. Speech at OAU Sessions, Addis Ababa, November 1966. See 
also, the Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles [22 January 1971], Gitelson, S.A. (1974) 
Why do small states break diplomatic relations with outside powers? Lessons from the African 
experience. International Studies Quarterly, 18(4), pp. 472-474. Pratt (1976), Ibid. pp. 147-151. Cf. 
Nyerere (1971), Ibid. pp. 325-327. Nyerere also closed the Portuguese Consulate-General's office in 
Tanganyika. 
505 Mwakikagile, G. (2008) The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: product of the cold war? New 
Africa Press, pp. 73-75.   
506 Ibid.  
507 Gitelson (1974), Ibid. p. 474.  
508 Mbita, Ibid. See also, CIA (1971) Chinese communist economic and military aid to Tanzania: a case 
study. CIA Intelligence Memorandum. Secret ER IM 71-137, July 1971, p. 4, para 9-10, and CIA (1965) 
Tanzania taking the left turn. Special Report, Secret OCI No. 0290/65A, 21 May 1965, pp. 2-4. 
509 1971 Guidelines, para 1-10, pp. 1-3. 
510 Ibid. Para 8, p. 3.   
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mercenaries in neighbouring countries as a way of weakening them.513 Further, 
Tanzania had an uphill task of protecting its borders from insurgencies in 
neighbouring countries likely to have a negative spill over effect on internal security. 
On this issue matter, Mbughuni514 maintains:  
There were also security concerns at the borders with Congo and Mozambique; 
there was looming violence in the Congo that threatened to destabilize the region 
and there were concerns in the border between Tanganyika and Mozambique 
because FRELIMO had just launched their first military campaign against the 
Portuguese. 
 
Apart from the danger posed by the decolonisation movement, the political situation 
in the African Great Lakes Region515 in the 1960s and 1970s was volatile. Signs of 
insecurities in the region included the overthrow of Patrice Lumumba516 and the 
ensuing Congo crisis (1960-1965),517 a potential coup (1965) and failed coups (1971) 
in Kenya,518 political turmoil in Uganda (1964-1979)519 and Burundi coup attempt in 
1965 and 1972 Genocide.520 Tanzania became home to millions of refugees and 
asylum-seekers fleeing persecution, colonial oppression and civil wars.521 This added 
more security concerns due to the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
 
513 Nyerere, J.K. (1997) Address to South African parliament. Cape Town. 16 October 1997. Cf. 
Ballesteros, E.B. (1993) Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 
rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination. Special Rapporteur. 
Submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, 8 January 1993, pp. 26-38. Cf. Mwakikagile, G. (2018) 
The African liberation struggle: reflections. New African Press, Dar es Salaam, pp. 151-152. 
514 Mbughuni, A.C. (2015) Did Malcolm X have passion for Tanzania? [Accessed on 10 May 2018]. 
Available from: <http://azariambughuni.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/did-malcolm-x-have-passion-for-
tanzania.html>. (Mbughuni is a Professor in History at the Spelman College, USA). 
515 Congo DR, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. 
516 First leader of independent Congo DR (Zaire). 
517 Civil war and secession movements. Belgium and USA sent their troops into Congo to protect their 
political and economic interests. See, Kent, J. (2017) The neo-colonialism of decolonisation: Katanga 
secession 
and the bringing of the cold war to the Congo. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 45(1), 
pp. 95-103. Cf. De Witte, L. (2017) The suppression of the Congo rebellions and the rise of Mobutu, 
1963–5. International History Review, 39(1), pp. 107-112. 
518 Nyerere (1964), Ibid. p. 287. Cf. Cullen, P. (2016) Operation binnacle: British plans for military 
intervention against a 1965 coup in Kenya. International History Review (December), pp. 1-5.  
519 Otunnu (2017), Ibid. pp. 175, 200 and 237. See also, Hancock, I.R. (1966) The Uganda crisis, 1966. 
Australian Outlook, 20(3), pp. 263-264, and Mamdani, M. (1975) Class struggles in Uganda. Review 
of African Political Economy, 2(4), pp. 43-54. 
520 Ndimurwimo, L.A. and Mbao, M.L.M. (2015) Rethinking violence, reconciliation and 
reconstruction in Burundi. PER/PELJ, 18(4), pp. 855-857, 869-871.  
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and an increase in unlawful military and political activities in refugee camps.522 Also, 
Tanzania had territorial disputes with Malawi (over Lake Nyasa)523 and Uganda (over 
Kagera region). The latter dispute culminated into the Uganda–Tanzania War in 1978-
1979.524 These few examples offer to prove how the political situation in the region 
was volatile and how this situation contributed to the banning of non-state actors.  
 
Within Tanzania herself, there were several signs of insecurities posed by political 
dissidents (including a series of foiled coup attempts) and the Cold War. The foiled 
coup attempts in 1969 involved army officers, senior politicians and civilians.525 The 
1964 Zanzibar revolution and the 1964 Tanganyika Rifle (army) mutiny, leading to 
the disbandment of the army and establishment of the new one, preceded the 1969 
coup attempt.526 The 1969 coup plotters sought to enlist the support of soldiers 
disbanded in 1964 and South African ANC and PAC guerrilla fighters hosted in 
Tanzania.527 Sellström claims that: 
…the PAC leader Potlako Leballo accused the ANC leadership of involvement 
in a coup attempt by the former Tanzanian Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona. 
This resulted in 1970 in a surprise closure of the ANC camps in the country 
and in the expulsion of the ANC cadres…528 
 
It follows, therefore, the government might have imposed a ban on private security 
service providers as a political necessity to effectively neutralise and control guerrilla 
fighters and refugee groups from war-torn countries. This is so because it was easy to 
transform foreign armed and unarmed groups into mercenaries. Paralleling the pan-
 
522 For a detailed discussion, see Mogire, E. (2011) Victims as security threats: refugee impact on host 
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disputes in Africa. London, Routledge, pp. 159, 206-217. 
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1970); and Gray Likungu Mattaka and others v. the republic (1971). Journal of African Law, 15:3, pp. 
278-321. 
526 Nyerere (1964), Ibid. pp. 286-290, and Baynham, M. (1990) The East African mutinies of 1964. 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 8/9(2), p. 153. 
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African liberation movement and regional politics was the Cold War. The Union of 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar came with more pressing issues, i.e. diplomatic and security 
challenges. It is widely believed that the Americans were behind the union between 
the two countries529 because they feared that an untamed Zanzibar might become 
another Cuba in Africa or East Africa’s Guinea.530 Because of the political turmoil 
and extremism in Zanzibar,531 the Americans were not the only one who harboured 
such fear. President Nyerere once claimed, “If I could tow that Island [Zanzibar] out 
in the middle of the Indian Ocean, I’d do it….it is very vulnerable to outside influence. 
I fear it will be a big headache to me”.532 The union also brought secession sentiments 
in Zanzibar and diplomatic tension between Tanzania and West Germany. West 
Germany was not in favour of the union due to the state of Zanzibar’s recognition of 
East Germany that had an embassy in the Isles.533 After the union, Tanzania succeeded 
to the diplomatic recognition of East Germany originally extended by Zanzibar but 
demoted it to a consulate (trade mission) based in Zanzibar.534 The Hallstein Doctrine 
prevented West Germany from maintaining diplomatic relations with any country that 
 
529 Pratt (1976), Ibid. pp. 138-9. See also, Wilson, A. (2007) Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu: politician, 
scholar and revolutionary. Journal of Pan African Studies, 1(9), p. 12-13, Shivji (2008), Ibid. pp. 72-
76. Mbunda, R. (2014) The union and the Zanzibar statehood question. African Review, 41(1), p. 142; 
and Ramadhani, L. (2011) Identity politics and complexities of conflict resolution in Zanzibar. IBIS 
Discussion Paper No. 2, University College Dublin. [Accessed on 16 May 2018]. Available from:  
<http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/L_Ramadhani.pdf>, p. 9. Cf. CIA (1972) Tanzania: Anatomy of the 
Union. Special Report, Secret No. 609 – 0363/72/A, 31 March 1972, pp. 2-3.  
530 Sanders, E. (2014) Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union in the midst of the cold war: internal 
and international factors. African Review, 41(1), pp. 37-44, Sanders, E. (2018) Role of local, foreign 
actors in the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union. The Citizen Newspaper [online]. 26 April 2018. [Accessed 
on 27 May 2018]. Available from:  <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Role-of-local--foreign-actors-
in-the/1840340-4531660-g4jc5e/index.html>. Cf. Mwakikagile (2008), pp. 64-73, Haroub (2009), Loc. 
cit., and Msekwa, P. (2017) The ugly aftermath of the Zanzibar revolution: the cold war challenges. 
Daily News [online]. 26th January 2017. [Viewed on 19 February 2019]. Available from: 
<https://dailynews.co.tz/news/the-ugly-aftermath-of-the-zanzibar-revolution-the-cold-war-
challenges.aspx>. For further discussion, see Wilson, A. (1989) US foreign policy and revolution: the 
creation of Tanzania. London, Pluto Press.   
531 Mbunda (2014), Ibid. p. 142. 
532 Ghai, Y. (2013) Zanzibar in Tanzania: from sovereignty to autonomy. In: Ghai, Y. and Woodman, 
S. (eds.) Practising self-government: a comparative study of autonomous regions. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 8, p. 260 (Footnote 7). 
533 Mwakikagile (2008), Ibid. pp. 74-75. 
534 Gray, W.G. (2003) Germany's cold war: the global campaign to isolate East Germany, 1949-1969. 




associated with East Germany.535 Msekwa sums up the cause and outcome of this 
diplomatic tension as follows:536 
…West Germany asked President Nyerere to close the East German Embassy 
in Zanzibar and threatened that failure to do so would force West Germany to 
withdraw its military aid to Tanzania. President Nyerere refused to succumb to 
such threats; and West German’s military aid was accordingly withdrawn. 
Whereupon President Nyerere summoned the West German Ambassador and 
told him to “take the rest of your aid as well. Tanzania will not accept aid with 
strings attached”.537 
 
Since Tanzania was emerging from the 1964 army munity, the withdrawal of West 
Germany’s aids affected the country’s effort in rebuilding the army, thus leaving the 
country susceptible to internal and external aggression. This was so because West 
Germany suspended her aids a few months after Nyerere had cut diplomatic and 
economic ties with Britain in 1965, the country’s main foreign donor. In the same 
year (1965), the US-Tanzania relations declined after Tanzania accused the US of 
plotting to assassinate President Nyerere and subverting the government.538 Tanzania 
made two important policy shifts due to her strained relations with the West and the 
looming danger of internal strife or external aggression. First, the government sought 
military and economic aids from the Eastern Bloc (USSR, China, Cuba, and East 
Germany, see Photo 1 below) to compensate for her budget deficit. Second, Nyerere 
introduced Ujamaa policy (socialism and self-reliance)539 as a de jure political and 
economic ideology in 1967. The country’s close ties with the Eastern Bloc did not go 
well with the Western Bloc (West Germany, Britain, and the USA) who wanted to 
keep the African Great Lake Region free from the influence of socialism. It is widely 
documented that the Western powers were behind the military coup in Uganda (1971) 
as a way of stopping Dr Milton Obote from emulating Nyerere’s ujamaa policy.540 
The coup in Uganda prompted TANU to come up with the 1971 Guidelines that laid 
 
535 Msekwa (2017), Ibid. Cf. Nyerere, J.K. (1965) Background paper on the East/West German Problem 
in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Office of the President, 17 March 1965. See also, Pratt (1976), Ibid. pp.140-
142, and Tordoff (1965), Ibid. p. 356. 
536 See, Footnote 3. 
537 Msekwa (2017), Ibid.  
538 Tanzania recalled her US ambassador and expelled two US Embassy officials. The US retaliated by 
expelling a Tanzanian councillor from Washington D.C. See, Tordoff (1965), Ibid, pp., 357-359; Pratt 
(1976), Ibid. p. 145; CIA (1965), Ibid. p. 4; Mwakikagile (2008), pp. 73-74; and Msekwa (2017), Ibid. 
Cf. Nyerere (1980), Ibid. p. 21. 
539 Arusha Declaration. 
540 Otunnu (2017), pp. 195, 233-235. C.f. Mwakikagile, G. (2010) Nyerere and Africa: end of an era. 




down political strategies for combating internal reactionaries. Undoubtedly, the 
banning of non-state actors in the 1977 Constitution is one of those strategies.   
Photo 1: Third from left (arrow), Putin, Samora and Mnangagwa at Kaole, Bagamoyo - Tanzania 
during the freedom fighters training in 1973541 
 
Source: CCM Archive, Dodoma. 
Apart from diplomatic challenges, there were also worrying signs of disorders 
(separatist movements) and ethnic tensions (Arabs and Africans) in Zanzibar.542 
There were sixteen attempts between 1964 and 1972 to overthrow the government of 
Zanzibar,543 the main two coup attempts made in 1967 and 1971.544 However, the 
political climate became tenser after a foiled coup plot and the assassination of 
President Karume in 1972.545 The official report labelled the incident as an attempt to 
overthrow the semi-autonomous government of Zanzibar and pinned the murder of 
Karume on reactionaries within and outside the country who were against the 
Zanzibar revolution, the union with Tanganyika and the government’s effort to 
decolonise Africa.546 Given this backdrop, it makes sense that by banning non-state 
actors, the government ensured that the security sector remained under political 
control and no separatist group could use violence against the union government 
 
541 The current Russian President Vladimir Putin, the current president of Zimbabwe Emmerson 
Mnangagwa and the first Mozambique President the late Samora Machel. 
542 See, CIA (1972), Ibid. Wilson (2007), p. 13. Cf. Ahearne, R. (2017), Ibid.   
543 Newton, M. (2014) Famous assassinations in world history: an encyclopaedia. 2 Volumes. 
California, ABC-CLIO LLC, p. 256. 
544 Chase (1976), pp. 19-21; Bakari, A.M. (2001) The democratisation process in Zanzibar: a retarded 
transition. Hamburg, Institute of African Affairs, p. 111; and Murison, Eds., at al. (2003) Regional 
surveys of the world: Africa South of the Sahara 2003. 32nd Ed. London, Europa Publications, p. 1062. 
545 Ibid, Chase (1976), pp. 14-33. 
546 ASP (1974) The Afro-Shirazi party revolution: 1964-1974. Zanzibar, ASP, pp. 210-215. Cf. Bakari 




(Tanzania) or the semi-autonomous state of Zanzibar. This is so because the 
government and state of Tanganyika ceased to exist in April 1964. Hence, the ban on 
non-state policing could have allowed the government and the party to manoeuvre 
both state and non-state actors for political gains. Further, before the 1964 revolution, 
the Arab minority (sultanate)547 controlled armed forces and vital sectors of the 
economy.548 Hence, the ban prevented them from regrouping and creating armed 
organisations and regaining control of Zanzibar.549 On this issue, Ramadhani claims:  
…Karume never felt secure and feared retaliation from the overthrown forces 
that could easily regroup. Pemba, for instance, remained lukewarm to the 
Revolution. Being geographically isolated from Unguja with the largest Arab 
population in the Islands, it posed a genuine political threat. There were also 
within the ASP intragroup squabbles and radical elements that Karume needed 
to neutralize.550 
I will now turn my attention to the role played by the political ideology (socialism 
alias ‘ujamaa’551 and party-state system) and charismatic leaders in engraining the 
ban in the Constitution. Socialism and self-reliance policy (Arusha Declaration) was 
the cornerstone in shaping the government policies in all spheres of life from 1967 to 
1991.552 The Arusha Declaration was the most important political and policy 
document in the history of Tanzania.553 It provided a guiding ideology and 
programmes in detaching the state from capitalistic path of development to 
socialism.554 Regarding security, the banning of non-state actors might have intended 
to give more voice to the Arusha Declaration that stressed on collective rather than 
individual efforts in addressing defence and security problems facing the nation.555  
 
547 See, chapter 3 about Arab migration.   
548 Ghai, Ibid. p. 258-259. Mwakikagile (2008), Ibid. pp. 62-75. 
549 Arabs are Tanzanian citizens by birth.  
550 Ramadhani. Ibid. On radical elements in Zanzibar, see, Sanders (2018), Ibid. 
551 According to Nyerere, Socialism means African Socialism (i.e. family-hood or brotherhood) as 
opposed to European Socialism. Tanzania was also a state party to the ‘Non-Alignment Movement’ 
(NAM) since 1964 as a way of avoiding tensions (maintaining neutrality) with both East (Socialists) 
and West (Capitalists) blocks. 
552 TANU Constitution (revised in January 1962). Nyerere, J.K. (1962) Ujamaa: the basis of African 
socialism. Dar es Salaam, April 1962. Cf. Pratt (1976) Ibid., pp. 172-174, and the Zanzibar Declaration 
(Maamuzi ya Zanzibar) of 1991 (as reflected in President Mwinyi’s Speech at Diamond Jubilee Hall, 
Dar es Salaam, 25/02/1991). 
553 Crouch, S.C. (1987) Western responses to Tanzanian socialism, 1967-83. Aldershot, Avebury 
Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., p. 39. 
554 Nyerere, J.K. (1970) Arusha Declaration Parliament. Address to the National Assembly, 6th July 
1970, Dar es Salaam. See also, Nyerere’s Speech to the Parliament, 18th July 1975, and Nyerere, J.K. 
(1977) The Arusha declaration: ten years after. Dar es Salaam, Government Printer. 




Carrying out successful nation-building, it required the existence of powerful and 
dynamic coercive institutions to spearhead and coordinate the revolutionary ideas and 
actions of the working class.556 From 1967 to 1977, the government embarked on 
centralisation of power and massive government takeover of private businesses and 
organisations.557 The nationalisation policy angered not only the British who had left 
behind some of their investments and nationals in 1961 but also some local leaders 
who had amassed wealth or wanted to amass wealth.558 The assassination of Karume, 
for example, is partly associated with the implementation of socialist policies and 
‘economic sufferings’ of the people of Zanzibar.559 Therefore, the ban served two 
purposes, that is, to explicitly declare that the ‘executive branch’ of government had 
unfettered control of the means of violence, and to deny bourgeoisies and counter-
revolutionaries access to legitimate means of violence via the parliament.  
In a socialist country, public officials tend to associate the notion of sharing coercive 
powers between the government and private individuals with a capitalistic idea and 
does not go well with the party-state policy. Further, the recognition of TANU and 
ASP (later CCM) as the only political parties on either side of the union had the effect 
of limiting the role of private organisations in state affairs. Every institution and 
organisation in the country became ‘state-owned’ or ‘controlled by the party’. As 
such, the ban on private security service providers was another face of party 
supremacy560 that denied private individuals’ access to the means of violence outside 
the party and government. On the other hand, charismatic leaders within the party 
played a big role in banning non-state actors. History has proven that political 
reasoning in constructing security policies and restructuring of a state depend much 
on the exposure, personal belief and conviction of a few individuals who assume 
leadership positions.561 This is true regarding Tanzania under Nyerere, who was 
 
556 One of the principles of the Arusha Declaration was ‘consolidating state power and independence.’ 
557 Nyerere (1977), Ibid. See also, Dias, C. (1970) Tanzanian nationalizations: 1967-1970. Cornell 
International Law Journal, 4(1), pp. 59-79. 
558 Great Britain. House of Lords (1967) Tanzania: nationalisation of British assets. Official Report: 
Parliamentary Debates [Hansard], HL Deb 22 February 1967. Vol. 280, pp (cc). 705-707. London: The 
Stationery Office. 
559 Ahearne, R. (2017), Ibid.   
560 Cf. Pratt (1976) Ibid. pp. 184-8. In 1971-1982, the government abolished the local government 
authorities. 




known as ‘Baba wa Taifa’ (the father of the nation).562 Nyerere used his charismatic 
authority to influence people’s opinion on matters of national importance such as 
national security policy and constitutional change.563 People respected and obeyed his 
views and actions and gave him a special status. The slogan ‘zidumu fikra za 
mwenyekiti’ (long live ideas of the chairperson) transformed him into some sort of 
‘African Mao.’564 Nyerere was a political thinker who believed in powerful 
government and public institutions as accelerators of development and subduing 
resistance. Shivji posits: 
Nyerere perceived the state as the agency both for nation-building and 
economic development as well as a unifier and organiser of society…such 
conceptualisation of the state logically led to the suppression of any 
independent initiative of the people to organise themselves, independent of, 
and opposed to the state…The result was that Nyerere’s politics became 
typically authoritarian on the one hand, and destructive of people’s 
organisational capacity, on the other.565 
 
This conception of the state appeared as one of the basic principles of the Proposals 
of the Tanganyika Government for the Republic (1962), “the executive must have the 
necessary powers to carry out the functions of a modern state”.566 The 1981 CCM 
Guidelines explained the above view of the government in the following words: 
Serikali kwa maumbile yake ni chombo cha madaraka ya mabavu, serikali ni 
sheria, ni majeshi, ni Mahakama, ni jela.567 [The government by its nature is an 
institution that possesses authoritative/coercive power, the government is the 
law, is the armed forces, is the Court, and is the prison].   
Indeed, Nyerere influenced this kind of state-centric view of coercive institutions. 
Besides Nyerere, the party had other Marxist leaders,568 namely Kingunge 
 
562 General views in Tanzania. See also, Chachage, C. and Cassam, A., (eds.) (2010) Africa's liberation: 
the legacy of Nyerere. Pambazuka Press.  
563 Ibid.  
564 Mao Zedong (Former leader of China). 
565 Shivji (2012), Ibid. p. 104.  
566 GN. No. 1 of 1962, p. 3. 
567 P. 47. This conception of the state follows Weber’s notion that the government of the state is the one 
that effectively and completely controls the instruments of physical force. 
568 For an exhaustive list of Marxist leaders and detailed discussion, see Tordoff, W. and Mazrui, A.A. 





Ngombale–Mwiru and Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu569 who authored several policy 
documents including the 1971 TANU Guidelines.570 Kingunge, for example, went on 
a study tour in the Republic of Guinea to learn how the country succeeded to ward off 
the Portuguese invasion in 1971.571 Therefore, it is no surprise that the government 
banned non-state actors to push for political control of security and unified leadership, 
the notion that occupied an upper hand in both writings and speeches of statesmen in 
the 1960s and 1970s.572  
 
The 1977 ban on non-state actors was a formal declaration of the government and 
party policy that was discreetly enforced since the adoption of a party-state system in 
1965. This was so because one-party and ujamaa policy had the effect of co-opting 
and absorbing every social group and institution into the state machinery. Indeed, 
there was a de facto ban on non-state actors in 1965 when Tanzania became a party-
state, whereby the party and the government ‘ruthlessly suppressed or coercively co-
opted’573 all civil and political organisations to create a ‘state-controlled plural 
policing’. Hence, the government, through the ban attempted to abolish institutions 
and individuals who could not be controlled and scrutinised by the party through 
political means or failed to operate under the auspices or aegis of the party. The 
intention of the government was not to outlaw private institutions formed or endorsed 
by the party or surrendered themselves to the party’s control and direction, even when 
it became clear that such private groups operated outside the framework of the law. 
Indeed, the government and the party continued to train and involve people in state 
policing.574 Paragraphs 26 of the 1971 Guidelines made it clear that: 
 
569 A.M. Babu was implicated in the coup plot and assassination of President Karume in Zanzibar. The 
Zanzibar authority tried and convicted him, in absentia, for treason. See, Chase (1976), Ibid. p.14, 
Sanders (2014), Ibid. pp. 53-55, and Wilson (2007), p. 16. 
570 Shivji (2012), Ibid. p. 109. See also Ally, B. et al. (eds.) Miongozo miwili kupaa na kutunguliwa 
kwa Azimio la Arusha, Kigoda cha Taaluma cha Mwalimu Nyerere, University of Dar es Salaam. 
[Accessed on 06 July 2018]. Available from:  
<https://www.udsm.ac.tz/sites/default/files/Miongozo_bk.pdf>.   
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572 Undoubtedly, Max Weber’s definition of the state inspired the wording of Article 89 (now 147) of 
the 1977 constitution. Weber claims, “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. See, Weber (1946), Ibid. p. 
78. 
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In order that they are able to oppose our enemies, the people must know that it 
is they who are the nation’s shield. This means that defence and security matters 
must be placed in the hands of the people themselves. We do not have the means 
to establish large permanent armies to guard the whole country. Our army must 
be the peoples’ army, used in teaching the people how to defend themselves in 
their localities and to enable them to report on matters of national security. 
Therefore, it is imperative to start training a militia for the whole country. Since 
the militia will spread through the country, in co-operation with the regular army, 
they will have the duty to defend our territorial borders, our airspace and to 
expose traitors and enemies, all in co-operation with our regular Army.  
In summary, the context and factors that might have been considered by the 
government to tighten its grip on coercive powers relate to political ideology, the 
Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, cold war politics and anti-colonial 
movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. The next part explains and connects the above 
discussion and factors to the questions of hybrid policing and politics of security. 
4.5 What was the Implication of the Ban on Plural Policing and Politics of 
National Security?  
The idea that the governance of security should be transferred from the people to the 
state institutions has never worked in Tanzania. Despite the ban, the government has 
always appreciated its own limitations in providing security for the whole country 
without the involvement of the local communities. The practice of engaging the 
grassroots in defence and security prove the fact that the power to maintain law and 
order has never been removed from the people and entrusted exclusively to the police. 
Neither the presence of the public police nor the ban did take away the capacity of the 
ordinary people to participate in the governance of security, but under the state 
control. Nonetheless, the same factors that laid the groundwork for the ban also drove 
plural policing in a reverse direction. This is so because the act of policing drifted 
even further towards the state, with very minimal police accountability and civilian 
oversight. The dominant view being that only the government should be responsible 
for public security because of historical roots, traditions, continuities, and legality. As 
such, the implementers of the national security policy have always believed in a strict 
distinction between private and public, with limited efforts to civilise and localise the 
police system because of the special trust attributed to state police with their positions 
of general interest. It was also pointless in the 1960s and 1970s to define the public 




client-base because the private sector was somewhat non-existence. The act of 
policing became ‘state-controlled’ in such a way that the local authorities had no 
power to conduct any democratic oversight in the operation of the state policing or to 
have a say in the appointment of police officers in their localities. This form of 
centralised control of civic order prevented not only the development of local 
autonomy of the police but also a democratic governance of security.575  
Any form of ‘hybridisation’ whereby the police force could be responsible for 
‘steering’ while the private ones take care of ‘rowing’ was prohibited. The role of the 
state was not only that of a regulator and facilitator of the governing activities of 
others but also the competitor, producer, supplier, and consumer of the public good 
of security to create a ‘state-controlled plural’ policing.576 In this setting, it was almost 
impossible to separate individuals and agencies that authorise policing from those, 
which ‘actually’ perform policing. This also translated into the increased budget for 
the state security actors while weakening the private sector and the bond of attachment 
between the government and community. Therefore, the police force, one in a broad 
family of state and party sponsored security providers, retained a special position in 
the maintenance of civic order. This was so due to the political ideology of the state 
(ujamaa) and counterinsurgency operations, which limited the participation of the 
private sector and non-governmental institutions in policing. Through the ujamaa 
ideology and related political manoeuvres, the government advocated for social 
organisations based on self-governing communities that emphasised the responsibility 
of the individual to the state, party, and community rather than private interests. This 
implies that large interest groups and corporations did not control and run the 
government but the masses of workers and peasants. Following the ban, the state 
experienced a partial pluralisation of policing, with fragments of voluntary groups 
(youth league and people’s militias) and night watchmen that operated through the 
state and along political interests. The national service trained these voluntary groups 
of workers and peasants to serve the interests of the party and the government while 
a small fraction of well-off households and businesses relied on night watchmen as 
opposed to professional security officers.  
 
575 The government abolished local authorities between 1972 and 1982.  




At its inception, the ban enabled volunteers in the local communities to control 
policing while disabling commercial ones. The lack of participation of the market 
actors in the policing activity may be linked to the fact that in a socialist state, whether 
by accident or design, official crime statistics were very low.577 According to Modic 
and others,578 “state socialist ideology held that crime was by definition a capitalist 
phenomenon that was supposed to disappear with the achievement of communism, a 
lower ‘recorded’ crime rate confirmed the superiority of the communist system over 
the capitalist system”. As political necessities, voluntary groups counterbalanced the 
state security agencies and provided security under state patronage, a policing model 
developed in the Soviet Union.579 Therefore, plural policing was characterised by the 
interactions between state and party actors and the blurring of distinctions between 
defence and security functions as opposed to private and public actors, or state and 
non-state policing.580 On the other hand, the need to control external and internal 
counterrevolutionaries forced the government and the party to train and turn civilians 
into militias who performed both defence and security functions. As a result, the 
police force lost part (not all) of its predominant position to civilian groups, which 
were not the automatic creation of private interests and local communities but the 
state and the party along political interests. Another partial pluralisation of policing 
could be seen in Zanzibar in the late 1970s. The semi-autonomous government of 
Zanzibar rebuilt its armed organisations to authorise policing and control secession 
movements in the Isles.581 By forming security groups, the government of Zanzibar 
 
577 Cf. Arthur, J.A. (1996) Crime and penal policy in the socialist African republic of Tanzania. 
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regions. New York, Routledge, pp. 144-164. Cf. Caprini, M. and Marenin, O. (2005) Crime, insecurity 
and police reform in post-socialist CEE [online]. Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, 
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Development Force) Act, No. 6 of 2003; Kikosi cha Valantia (Volunteers Force) Act, No. 5 of 2004 
(formerly, Voluntary Special Brigade Act, No. 8 of 1982); Kikosi Maalum cha Kuzuia Magendo 
(Special Force for Prevention of Smuggling) Act, No. 1 of 2003 (formerly, Kikosi Maalum cha Kuzuia 
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acted in defiance of the Union Constitution and Articles of the Union that placed 
defence and security matters in the union government.582 Nonetheless, this form of 
plural policing, whether in Mainland Tanzania or Zanzibar, was taking place within 
the state, not outside or beyond it and working alongside state actors. 
Therefore, neither did the state privatise the public spaces nor did it allow an open 
market for the provision of policing services in which various security providers 
compete for businesses. Also, the state policy did not promote flexibility and 
consumer choice whereby security networks would comprise state, civil society, and 
market actors. Consequently, policing laws could only be enforced against state police 
whose governance and accountability structures stood inside the existing political 
structures. The act of governing security did not link service providers with the 
institutional structures of the democratic polity and ensure coordination across actors. 
The government did not conceive policing as a business-like activity or a marketable 
product. Neither did it outsource policing services nor depart from the traditional 
hierarchical public service structures. It was the government that established, co-
opted, shaped, and sponsored a wide range of civilian volunteers (militiamen) who 
acted as state informers or produced and distributed the public good of security. As a 
result, the government eradicated or forcefully co-opted or brought back community-
led security groups into the state and mainstream policing. Hence, the conditions that 
led to the ban of non-state actors in the 1977 Constitution, have had an adverse effect 
on the national security and created what I call ‘state-controlled’ plural policing, a 
theme to which I will develop further in the next chapter.  
4.6 Conclusion  
The chapter examined the country’s specific factors for the adoption of a laxer stance 
towards non-state actors in the 1962 and 1965 Constitutions, respectively. It also 
discussed how the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and single-party autocrats have 
influenced the government policies on security, especially tightening the control on 
coercive powers. Further, the chapter analysed the official statement given by the 
government in the constituent assembly and the historical context for the 1977 ban. 
Lastly, the chapter showed the implication of and connected the context for the ban 
of non-state actors to the question of plural policing. Therefore, there is more to the 
 




government’s claim that it revised Article 80 of the 1965 Constitution in 1977 to 
remove the impression that even individuals could raise and maintain security groups. 
A study of socio-political conditions points us to a different direction including 
political ideology, the structure of the union, fear of external aggression and internal 
counterrevolutionaries and subsiding secession movements in Zanzibar. The 
government adopted a reactive policy towards actual experiences and future 
projections, as such, the ban was an indication of ideology consolidation rather than 
a turning point in real security policies. This is so because non-state actors (broadly 
defined) neither emerged as a formidable force and independent of the government 
supervision in the developments leading up to the 1977 ban nor did they disappear 
after 1977. The contexts for the ban have had a multifaced effect on the national 
security and created a ‘state-controlled’ plural policing. As such, the Tanzanian 
government’s security policy was as much about political necessities. The next 
chapter look at the transformation of policing vis-à-vis politics of security and the 



















Chapter 5: Transformation of the Plural Policing Landscape or Transition and 
Continuity?   
5.1 Introduction  
The government has never formally reversed the constitutional ban since its inception 
in 1977. However, hardly, three years after the ban, both commercial and community-
led security groups that were organised independent of the state, emerged as adjuncts 
to the state police and people’s militia. Prior literature identifies cutback programmes 
(downsizing of public sector or slimming the state), the rise in police budgets, and the 
high demands in security services as key drivers of a shift in public policy to embrace 
plural policing. This chapter builds on the existing studies by looking at the 
transformation of policing vis-à-vis politics of security and the lessons learnt from the 
Tanzanian plural policing case in the post-ban period. It identifies three complex and 
overlapping reasons linked to the politics of security in the post-ban period, namely 
legacy issues (rural-urban divide and regime policing), internal agency or risk factors 
(ujamaa ideology and Kagera war583) and external contingency aspects (neoliberal 
reforms). As Hills584 and Potholm585 suggest, variables, such as the nature and control 
of the force, crime trends, zoning law, political orientation, people’s perception and 
police-population ratio are included in looking at the capabilities and dynamics of the 
public policing vis-à-vis political interests. This chapter shows that the proximate 
cause for the departure from the state-centric policy to plural policing lies completely 
within the TANU guidelines and daily politics and the Constitution itself, framed in 
the socialist path of development. The government has interpreted the two political 
documents loosely to accommodate and engage the very actors it sought to ban in 
policing the public or to repel insurgences and steer nation-building efforts. I argue in 
this chapter that to every public policy, there is generally a moral duty to obey it. By 
forming private security groups, people obeyed the party policies and ethos, thus any 
attempt to restrict non-state actors, not only contradicted party policy but also 
undermined the collective interests or ujamaa way of life and the underlying 
commitments of citizens to perform their public duty. In other words, it would be 
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politically risky for the government not to accommodate the grassroots into state 
policing. I argue further that even though the state made a political move to transfer 
some responsibilities to enforce law and order to the local communities, the new 
providers did not generate a ‘privately defined orders’ in conflict with the state. This 
is so because these civic organisations were ‘state-controlled’ but stood between the 
public and private divide to create partial sovereignties. 
5.2 Factors for Hybrid Forms of Security Arrangements 
Private armed and security organisations blossom in a setting where the government 
is dysfunctional and cannot deliver public goods.586 In a weak state, the government 
may lack the will or the demand for public security may exceed its capacity to provide 
for it.587 The Tanzanian case adds five overlapping political dimensions to the 
pluralisation of policing activity in a postcolonial state context, namely rural-urban 
divide, regime policing, ujamaa ideology and party guidelines, Kagera war and 
neoliberal policy.   
5.2.1 Rural-Urban Divide 
The division of a population into rural and urban was a basic tenet of governance in 
the colonial period. As a political necessity, the regime ruled the rural area indirectly 
through local chiefs and agents while it placed the urban population under proper 
colonial institutions and administrators.588 It is from this classification of the 
population that the key security arrangements associated with each group have 
developed to date in the forms of formal and informal providers.589 Whether historical 
or contemporary, the governmental settlements, mostly urban areas, determine the 
police structure and their presence.590 At independence (1961), the population of 
Tanganyika stood at 10,373,380, policed by 6,143 police officers.591 The then state 
capital, Dar es Salaam, with an area of 1,393 km², had about 633 police officers.592 
Each police officer was in-charge of 1,689 people countrywide, thus about 5,510 
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officers policed an area of about 879,207 km2, outside Dar es Salaam.593 Today, 
commercial and administrative cities and towns (e.g. Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Tanga, 
Mbeya, Mwanza, Unguja, Morogoro and Arusha) have a high concentration of police 
officers. In 2016, for example, there were more than 673 police officers in every 100 
square kilometres in Dar es Salaam, almost three times higher than semi-urban areas, 
e.g. Shinyanga, Simiyu, Tabora, Manyara, Kagera, Geita, Rukwa, Ruvuma, Mtwara, 
Kigoma, Iringa, Singida, Lindi, and Katavi.594 This means that the country has more 
police presence in urban areas and administrative centres than in peri-urban areas and 
villages. The population in the former areas tends to be politically conscious, thus 
higher police presence is deemed necessary to contain grievances and protect the 
regime.  
Moreover, politically motivated and ‘state-controlled’ programmes such as 
villagisation pursued between 1968 and 1983 deepened the police-population ratio 
and resentment towards state policing.595 Villagisation programme was the largest-
ever resettlement program in independent Africa596 that relocated people throughout 
the country into villages.597 It created centralised planned settlements where people 
would live and work together for the good of all598 known as ujamaa villages (also 
development villages or permanent villages).599 Each registered ujamaa village was a 
replica of a communal village in the precolonial period600 that had a minimum of 250 
families.601 On average, there were about 360 to 1,260 families per village by 1975.602 
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Between 1973 and 1975, about 5,628 ujamaa villages with 2.5 million people were 
registered603 and over 9 million people moved in ujamaa villages.604 Over 14.9 
people, about 87% to 95% of the population lived in 8,299 ujamaa villages by 1979605 
and an additional of 470,000 people relocated to the villages under the Human 
Resources Deployment Act of 1983.606 Since the policy was resisted by the local 
population, law enforcers were central to the implementation of the ujamaa village 
scheme.607 The government deployed the police, army, national service corps, youth 
league and paramilitaries to move people into villages and enforce the party’s political 
agenda in the newly-established villages.608 The use of force became a constant 
feature of the implementation, as typified by ‘operations’ Dodoma, Chunya, Kigoma, 
and Rufiji (1969-73) and operation Tanzania (1973-76),609 thus deepening hostility 
between the state security agencies and the people.610 The murder of Wilbert Klerruu 
(the then Iringa Regional Commissioner) by Saudi Abdallah Mwamwindi (a farmer 
whose land was confiscated for ujamaa village) is one of the notable incidents of such 
opposition.611  
By the mid-1980s, part of the repatriated population abandoned their villages and 
returned to urban areas to establish informal settlements.612 This is partly due to the 
failure of ujamaa policy and the emergence of the petty bourgeoisie class 
(mabepari/makabaila) and transnational companies that not only attracted labourers 
(vibarua) from the villages but also pushed for the free movement of people.613 
Moreover, there were no meaningful activities in ujamaa villages for the resettled 
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population to undertake.614 The government presence in terms of social services like 
state policing was negligible, thus the people found it hard to settle in villages.615 
Today, about 70% of the population live in rural areas, that is, townships and village 
centres because of the political decisions taken between 1967 and 1983.616 The 
proportion of urban dwellers has grown from 5.7% in 1967 to 29.1% in 2012 and 
expected to increase by 50% in 2050 because of rural-urban migration,617 thus 
stretching more the capacity of the police to meet both political and security needs. 
Despite accounting for 70% of the population, it is not common to find a police station 
in rural areas, save for sparsely located police posts with fragment number of police 
officers.618 The survey conducted by Twaweza (NGO) in 2017619 reveals that: 
One out of five citizens (17%) in urban areas would spend 30 minutes or more 
to get to their nearest police post while one out of four (27%) have no police 
post at all in their ward. The situation is worse in rural areas where half of 
citizens (50%) report having no police post in their ward and 27% spend more 
than 30 minutes getting to the nearest post.  
By December 2016, the TPF had 47,806 police officers while the population of 
Tanzania stood at 50,142,938.620 On average, five police officers policed an area of 
100 square kilometres.621 This implies that one police officer served about 1,049.67 
persons, covering an area of 20 square kilometres and investigate 13 cases per year.622 
In a developing country like Tanzania, the recommended standard is one police officer 
to serve between 400 and 700 people.623 To have the required standard for the police-
population ratio, the TPF needs to employ twice as much as the currently employed 
officers.624 As Neild suggests,625 the police suffer the most in a nation-building and 
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counterinsurgency operations context because they are marginalised in terms of 
budget and status and become mere complement to the military. This situation leads 
to unacceptable police to civilian ratio as the police force fails to recruit more officers 
to match the yearly population growth.626  
Consequently, non-state actors become statised and counterparts to the police and fill 
a policing gap created by weak service delivery capacity of the public security 
agencies whose main mission is to protect the government in the capital and 
administrative centres. As revealed by the victim survey in Dar es Salaam region in 
2000, where about 36% of participants said that they never saw a police officer on 
duty, and 17% only saw an officer in their neighbourhood once a month. In new and 
established suburbs, the police presence stood at 62% and 48% respectively.627 In 
Mwanza region, for example, the police patrols tend to focus on the main roads and 
richest suburbs rather than areas where most crimes are committed such as narrow 
footpaths (vichochoro) and residences of ordinary people.628 Other common 
complaints from the people in semi-urban and rural areas include: the police do not 
respond to crime alerts on time,629 the police are ignorant of their task and use more 
force than tact,630 and the police stations and posts are far away from where many 
people live or work.631  
The absence of police officers in human settlements is partly because they are more 
socially isolated from the public.632 Like the military personnel, the police and their 
families reside in special houses and barracks (kota/kambi).633 Because of partial 
police presence in rural areas, any sight of police officers usually sparks fear, tension 
and some villagers even go into hiding.634 This makes it harder for people to report 
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crimes or even the police to involve villagers in crime control programmes.635 The 
sentiment among the rural population is that a police officer cannot be trusted or 
befriended. Like in the colonial period, we may need to teach children in informal 
settlements and villages about what a police officer looks like.636 As a result, the 
contribution of the state policing is “minimal compared with informal and traditional 
sanctioning processes (the hue and cry after the thief) or personal attempts to recover 
property (finding one's stolen goods in the "thieves' corner" of the local market)”.637 
This is so because the police are highly politicised and “they are not very visible, even 
in cities, and far less so in rural areas, which tend not to be policed”638 and mostly 
preoccupied with ‘regime policing’, hence drifting the population away from public 
police.    
5.2.2 Regime Policing – remnant of autocracy  
To the ordinary people, the police force is the most visible arm of government, which 
is expected in any democratic society to protect and serve the people by combating 
crimes and abuse of power, among others.639 In an autocratic state, the mission of the 
police force is fundamentally different, it intimidate and suppress opposition to 
protect the regime640 and the police manage the political process and the government’s 
relations with its populace.641 In a regime policing context, the act of policing is ‘state-
controlled’ and the police force is primarily concerned with regime survival. As such, 
it undermines its relevance and the capacity of the government to control violence and 
take away the distinctive nature of the state as an organisation.642 Given the 
conservative nature of the police, even the reforms undertaken by the postcolonial 
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governments have not been able to transform them into something distinctly different 
from their colonial manifestation.643 To quote Mukhopadhyay:644 
The colonial legacy is an ideological baggage as well as a structural reality for 
the independent states. Certain aspects of the colonial rule, especially the 
bureaucracy, the police and the army have survived intact, as de-colonisation has 
failed to transform them into something distinctly different from their colonial 
manifestation. It may be argued that the police as a force tend to be conservative 
rather than revolutionary, and therefore the effects of de-colonisation felt in other 
areas of the newly independent state would not be reflected equally well. 
Regarding the TPF, Scher645 adds: 
The police service suffered from decades of financial neglect and a poor 
reputation. Its initial mandate emphasized regime policing, which oriented the 
police toward maintaining law and order for the protection of the state rather 
than the protection of the citizenry. 
Political influence in the police manifested itself in terms of interference with the 
daily operations, recruitment, promotion, and dismissal practices to suit political 
purposes.646 It also involves the control of the TPF by the ruling party that uses it to 
serve political agenda, i.e. to restrict the rights of individuals to participate in the civil 
and political life of society and the state.647 In Tanzania, politicians (President, the 
Minister for Home Affairs and their appointees) have the power to appoint, discipline, 
promote and confirm, transfer and removal of police officers.648 For instance, the 
President appoints the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) who, in turn, controls the 
junior officers, that is, all officers below the rank of Assistant Inspector, subject to the 
directions of the minister.649 Further, the District and Regional Commissioners, who 
are party cadres (as photo 2 below illustrates) and appointees of the President, direct 
and control the police in their jurisdiction through the District and Regional Security 
Committees.650 State law places the command of the TPF under the party cadres, 
without a clear line that separates party control from civilian control. This implies that 
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although the TPF is part of the civil service, the government and the ruling party, 
which are two sides of the same coin, continue to impose their political priorities on 
the police.651 It also suggests that the ruling elites have direct control over the police 
in terms of operations and distribution of security services, thus prioritise political 
repression and enforcement of the order on behalf of a regime over crime 
prevention.652 By retaining the colonial ethos, structures, and political interests, the 
police force has saliently reproduced similar problems of maintenance of order in the 
postcolonial period.653  
Photo 2: Regional Commissioner and police officers celebrating after the ruling party’s contestant 
won a by-election 
 
Source: IPP Media, Dar es Salaam 
Since its inception in 1919, the TPF has had a paramilitary character while the 
government has failed in its effort to remodel it along the lines of a civic force.654 The 
TPF has a centralised command and central political structure, with specialised units, 
police zones, police special zones, police regions and police districts while the police 
officers are armed and have the capability of a military unit.655 As politically run  
organisation, the police are more often than not deployed by politicians to arrest, 
detain, harass and torture civilians and disperse political rallies.656 They issue public 
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warnings, conduct countrywide public parades and physical exercises (drilling and 
marching), display of security equipment on public roads and organise intensive street 
patrols to intimidate or discourage public protests and demonstrations.657 As the next 
paragraph shows, the TPF operates as a civil law-enforcement agency, secret service 
and a quasi-military organisation supporting those in power and suppressing civil 
disorder.658  
Within the police structure, there is a Field Force Unit (FFU),659 a paramilitary unit 
and the most notorious and highly politicised and indoctrinated police unit dubbed 
‘Fanya Fujo Uone’ (cause trouble and you will pay dearly).660 It is responsible for 
controlling and subsiding civil riots,661 handling security at police stations662 and 
sometimes protecting the borders.663 FFU has also been used to suppress workers and 
students’ protests and to crackdown tax defaulters.664 FFU officers are located in 
strategic areas, mainly district and region capitals665 and some of their operations have 
ended in a loss of lives and serious injuries.666 The Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID) complements the FFU activities. The CID is a quasi-secret organisation 
policing political opinion and responsible for collecting information on citizens’ 
behaviour and attitudes.667  
The police force has not adapted to mirror the change from party-state to multiparty 
politics668 as the opposition accuses the police of manipulating political processes and 
rigging election results in favour of the party in power. This is possible because the 
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police have discretion over arrest and detention and regulate public meetings and 
demonstrations, thus they can automatically determine who participate in politics.669 
For instance, they have restricted political rallies and protests,670 and arrested and 
prosecuted over 13 outspoken opposition legislators between 2016 and 2018.671 As a 
result, the opposition parties have coined the word ‘Poli-CCM’ to refer to the special 
relations between the police and the ruling party (CCM).672  Presence and dominance 
of the party in all spheres of life worked under a slogan ‘chama kushika hatamu’ 
(party supremacy), where the party ‘accumulated almost unchecked status’.673 
Therefore, during the three decades of a party-state, some police officers became 
executive and administrative personnel while the IGP was the chief party commissar 
of the force.674 Besides, most officers who joined the police in the late 1980s and early 
1990s are now the senior and commanding officers. In recent years, senior state and 
party officials have openly influenced the police’s decision and mode of operating.675 
In one case, the then Prime Minister, Mizengo Pinda remarked that:  
Sasa kama wewe umekaidi, hutaki unaona kwamba ni imara zaidi... wewe 
ndiyo jeuri zaidi watakupiga tu.... Mimi nasema muwapige tu, kwa sababu 
hakuna namna nyingine... maana tumechoka (All those who are breaking the 
law will be beaten, and I insist that they should be beaten, there is no other way 
out… we are tired).676 
At some point, President Nyerere677 claimed that the Constitution had given him 
enormous powers to make him a dictator.678 Those were not empty words, among 
other things, they reflect how the government and party officials deployed the police 
to enforce the Deportation Ordinance (1921), Preventive Detention Act (1962) and 
 
669 Cf. Igbinovia (1981), Ibid. p. 151. 
670 Kabendera, E. (2016) Magufuli criticised as Tanzania bans rallies. The East African, 11 June 2016. 
671 Yamola, I. (2018) Wabunge wengine 13 wana kesi mahakamani. Mwananchi Newspaper. 27 
February 2018. Cf. Mpangala, M. (2018) Je wapinzani Tanzania wamejipanga kutatua changamoto 
zinazowakabili? BBC Swahili. 06 November 2018.  
672 Chahali, E. (2017) Tathmini ya miaka miwili ya urais wa magufuli: safari ya matumaini au nyota 
iliyofifia? Unpublished, Chapter 3. 
673 Werrema, I.J. (2012) After 50 years: the promised land is still too far!, 1961-2011. Dar es Salaam, 
Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, p. 21. 
674 Okema (2006), Ibid. 
675 Waandishi Wetu (2013) Mizengo Pinda: wapigwe tu, tumechoka. Mwananchi Newspaper. 20 June 
2013. 
676 Ibid.  
677 President of Tanzania from 1962 to 1985. 
678 Shivji (1990), Ibid. p. 12, CHRI (2006), Ibid. p. 22, and Hartmann, J. (1987) President Nyerere and 





Resettlement of Offenders Act (1969) to stifle dissent and protect the interests of the 
elites.679 In 1977, for example, multiple sources from Kenya and the US estimated the 
number of political detainees in Tanzania to be 1000-4000.680 The LHRC has recorded 
over 1000 politically motivated disappearances, extortions, killings, and detentions 
from 1995 to 2018.681 Further, LHRC reported about 38 incidents perpetuated by 
unknown assailants (watu wasiojulikana) in 2017 alone.682 The report suggests that 
both civilians and law enforcers from special departments and the police are involved 
in such incidents, thus drawing people away from state policing.683  
The victimization surveys and safety audits reveal that 60% to 70% of victims and 
witnesses of crime do not report them (dark figure crime) to the police.684 
Furthermore, the Twaweza Survey shows that only 26% of poor people in rural and 
urban areas are likely to seek help first from the police if they were victims of a crime, 
compared to 66% who prefer the village and street leaders.685 Twaweza survey 
concludes that people do not consider the police as the best option even when the 
police post is a few yards from a crime scene.686 It is also widely documented that the 
police officers solicit bribes and collude with criminals, leading to a vicious circle of 
crimes.687 Among the government departments, the police continue to occupy the first 
spot in the corruption perception index.688 This reflects the common saying in 
Tanzania that ‘kuingia polisi ni bure ila kutoka ni pesa’ (it is free to enter a police 
station, but you must pay on/to exit).689 This may take the form of an accused person 
bribing his or her way out of police custody (police bail and evidence tempering) and 
facilitating the police to make an arrest.690 
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In 2003, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) placed the TPF 
at the top of the table for the number of corruption allegations against it. About 25% 
of the surveyed local traders admitted that the police asked them for bribes in 2004. 
The 2006 Afrobarometer survey showed that about 72% of respondents believed that 
some, most or all police are corrupt.691 The BMI Research (2016) reports that the 
police accumulate the largest number of bribes and that ‘an estimated 87% of 
respondents in a recent Transparency International survey deemed the Tanzanian 
police force to be either 'corrupt' or 'very corrupt', only slightly above the judiciary.’ 
On overage, the TI rate the value of police bribes at USD 36.692 The corrupt practices 
within the police are associated with a meagre salary and poor working and living 
conditions. CHRI (2006) report, for example, reveals that a police constable who 
joined the TPF in 2003 earned Tshs. 1,087,440 (about USD 820) annually, while some 
of the police quarters are in poor conditions with no access to toilets or water.693 In 
BMI Research index (2016), the country scored 35.6% for crime and security risk and 
occupied 22nd position out of 48 surveyed states in Africa.694 BMI Research (2016) 
concludes that: 
The competence of the TPF is limited due to its inadequate human and physical 
resources, which translates into restrictions in the efficacy of policing and low 
pay, incentivising corrupt practices among many segments of the police 
force.695 
Other indicators of the public dissatisfaction with the police and avoiding state 
policing includes an increase in incidents of mob and gang violence, angry civilians 
attacking or killing police officers and burning police posts.696 In 2015 and 2016, for 
example, the TPF recorded 18 incidents of civilians attacking police stations and 1909 
cases of mob violence.697 Apart from mob injustice (jungle justice), criminal gangs 
that terrorise and rob people are on the increase since 2000, they are involved in extra-
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judicial killings, burglary, abductions, maiming and inter and intra-clan conflicts.698 
Other than declaring troubled areas as special ‘police zones’, ‘police districts’ and 
‘police regions’, the TPF’s response to violence has been highly ineffective.   
According to Baker,699 inefficiency and regime policing provoke alienation from the 
official law and the development of informal legal orders that bypass and neutralise 
it. Thus, the marginalised population lives on the margins of illegality that is 
characterised by unlawful security arrangements, among other things.700 In justifying 
party militias, for example, CHADEMA’s chairperson, Mr. Freeman Mbowe701 cited 
‘wapigwe tu’ directive and claimed that:  
Ni wajibu wa chama kutafuta njia za kujilinda, hatulindwi na Jeshi la Polisi, 
Jeshi la Wananchi wa Tanzania (JWTZ) wala Usalama wa Taifa, watu wetu 
wanapigwa na wanauawa hata tukienda polisi hatupati haki yetu. Ni bora 
tuanzishe mafunzo na tujilinde wenyewe kwani tukiendelea kupiga magoti na 
kulia tutakuwa wajinga. (It is the responsibility of the party to find ways to 
protect ourselves. The Police Force, the Army (TPDF) and Intelligence and 
Security Service neither protect us. Our people are being beaten and killed, 
even when we seek police’s assistance, we do not get our rights. It is better to 
train and protect ourselves. We will be stupid if we keep on kneeling and 
crying). 
Several policing surveys conducted in Tanzania suggest that many people prefer 
informal security arrangements to the TPF.702 The Household Survey (1996) 
concluded that people were more satisfied with non-state policing than with the 
TPF.703 Safer Cities survey revealed that non-state actors are “recognised by most of 
the residents as the only system workable and affordable to the marginalised people 
who are most affected by the consequences of crime and violence (or the fear 
thereof)”.704 In the UN-Habitat’s City Victim Survey (2000), about 53% of the 
participants in Dar es Salaam, supported community initiatives such as security 
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guards and neighbourhood watch groups to improve safety.705 Around 80% of the 
surveyed population in 2000 used burglar-proofing, fences, dogs and weapons to 
prevent crimes.706 In a more recent survey by Twaweza (2017), 47% of people 
proposed contracting more local militia to reduce crime that happens at night 
compared to 44% who preferred police patrols.707  As discussed in the third chapter, 
the next part adds that the lack of trust in the police force and overreliance on non-
state policing is not something new in Tanzania, it is a phenomenon that dates to the 
colonial period but became more pronounced in the ujamaa politics and one-party 
state era. 
5.2.3 Legacy of Ujamaa Ideology and Party Guidelines 
The ujamaa policy underpins the way non-state policing developed and justified as a 
political necessity by the state and party officials and the local communities post-1977 
ban. As noted earlier, villagisation programme is one of the by-products of ujamaa 
politics. The newly formed villages created alternative security arrangements because 
the state police were absent and highly mistrusted, partly due to their involvement in 
‘operationi vijiji’ and inability to protect the people. As such, the dynamics of security 
in Tanzania corresponds with the existence of one-party system of politics and ujamaa 
ideology708 implemented under a strategy of self-reliance.709 Village socialism pushed 
people into communal way of life, self-organisation and encouraged them to develop 
parallel security institutions that ‘somehow’ replaced the formal police in rural 
areas.710 The discussion below looks into the role played by ujamaa and party-state 
policies to the pluralisation of policing at the village and national levels.   
The Constitution of Tanzania declares ujamaa na kujitegemea (socialism and self-
reliance) as the state political ideology.711 Under the ujamaa politics, the government 
introduced a communal mode of life and ‘forced’ people to live in the ujamaa 
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villages.712 The ujamaa way of life insists on state control and collective or group 
obligation (brotherhood/unity) in discharging public functions. The involvement in 
national defence and security is the most sacred or supreme duty and the greatest 
honour of every citizen in a socialist state. This is so because people at the grassroots 
organise security collectively as a public good that is freely available and enjoyed by 
everyone. Therefore, the use of alternative security arrangements to combat crimes 
became more pronounced at the height of ujamaa politics and one-party rule that 
advocated for social solidarity, community service/volunteering, national unity, and 
self-reliance. The TANU Guidelines (1971)713 provides that:  
Para 11 
The responsibility of the party is to lead the masses, and their various institutions, 
in the effort to safeguard national independence and to advance the liberation of 
the African.714 
Para 21 
Tanzania's defence and security depend on Tanzanians themselves - every 
Tanzanian, in particular, each patriot, each socialist. 
Para 26 
Our army must be the people's army, used in teaching the people how to defend 
themselves in their localities and to enable them to report on matters of national 
security. 
The CCM Guidelines (1981)715 agreed with the 1971 Guidelines on national defence 
and security and added that: 
… chimbuko la majeshi ni Umma wa wakulima na wafanyakazi ambao pia 
wanashiriki katika ulinzi na usalama wa nchi yao kwa kupitia ulinzi wa 
mgambo na kwa kuwa macho katika sehemu zao za kazi na za kuishi, viwandani 
na maofisini, vijijini na mijini.716 (The foundation of our armed forces is the 
farmers/peasants and workers who are involved in defence and national 
security through the people’s militia and by being vigilant at their workplaces 
and houses, factories and offices, in the rural and urban areas). 
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The then Prime Minister, Mizengo Pinda, echoed the same words in his 2016 speech 
to the National Assembly: 
Nitumie fursa hii kuwakumbusha wananchi wote kwamba msingi wa usalama 
wa Raia na Mali zao nchini Tanzania ni wa Watanzania wenyewe. (Let me use 
this opportunity to remind all citizens that the duty to secure people and their 
properties in Tanzania rests on Tanzanian themselves).717 
Policing groups such as mgambo and sungusungu are justified under the ujamaa 
politics because they represent both revolutionary movement and frontline force in 
implementing state policy on defence and security.718 Therefore, alternative security 
arrangements are not only tools of the people in carrying out the state’s directives on 
security, but also, they are people’s initiatives envisaged by the party policies and 
directive principles of the state719 that insist on self-reliance. I argue in this study that 
to every public policy, there is generally a moral duty to obey. By forming private 
security groups, people obeyed the party policies and ethos, thus any attempt to 
restrict non-state actors, not only contradicted party policy but also undermined the 
party’s political interests, ujamaa way of life, and the underlying commitments of 
citizens to perform their public duty.720 This has somehow pushed the government to 
reform the law to accommodate some aspects of community participation in the 
governance of security.  
Initially, the 1977 Constitution and its predecessors (1961, 1962 and 1965 
Constitutions), did not have the Bill of Rights. The introduction of the Bill of Rights 
in 1984 under Part II of the Constitution somehow watered-down the 1977 ban on 
private security service providers.721 This is so because the Bill of Rights, among other 
things, guarantees the security of person and property that includes the right to be free 
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from all forms of violence from either public or private sources.722 Articles 27 and 28 
of the Constitution impose a duty to every citizen to defend the nation against external 
aggression and maintain civic order. An individual has a civic duty (political 
obligation) to safeguard public property and natural resources, and defend the 
independence, sovereignty, territory and unity of the nation (territorial integrity).723 
Like the 1962 and 1965 Constitutions, the 1984 constitutional amendments empower 
the parliament to make laws to facilitate and regulate the defence of the nation by the 
people.724 The National Ethic of 1965 partly inspired the constitutional clauses on 
collective security that require individuals to assist those responsible for law 
enforcement.725 Hence, the most viable way to realise collective security and to 
protect state sovereignty is for the citizens to form civic groups and equip themselves 
with the necessary self-defence abilities.726  
By forming security groups, the people are enjoying their organisational right as 
provided to them by the Bill of Rights.727 Collective security can as well be achieved 
through political programmes of the party, such as compulsory national service 
(military training and service),728 conscription during a war, and allowing citizens to 
bear arms.729 During the Kagera war of 1978-9, for example, some civilian groups 
volunteered (and others forced) to fight on the frontline and some groups were in 
charge of the civic order.730 Therefore, the 1977 ban curtails people’s freedom to 
enjoy or uphold their constitutional rights and duties, considering that the 
maintenance of internal security is both the basic right and moral duty of every 
citizen.731 It is highly inconceivable that the Constitution could impose a civic duty to 
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maintain law and order at the same time restricting the available means (non-state 
actors) to fulfil such obligation.   
Apart from the Bill of Rights, the devolution of power to local government authorities 
(LGAs) in 1982 allowed them to govern security at the grassroots levels. The district 
and urban authorities’ laws732 radically modified the nature of state power by ceding 
much of the central government’s functions to local communities.733 The 1982 
political reforms revived the indirect rule in more unified local structures,734 with an 
additional duty of facilitating the maintenance of peace and order in their localities.735 
The laws empower LGAs to take all necessary measures for the suppression of crime, 
the maintenance of peace and good order and the protection of public and private 
property lawfully acquired.736 The Fourth Constitutional Amendment of 1984737 
cemented the LGAs’ role by obligating them to ensure the enforcement of law and 
public safety of the people.738 The government officials cite LGAs’ laws to justify 
and integrate non-state actors in administrative or political structures of LGAs, thus 
compelling security groups to work with LGAs and allowing LGAs to make and 
enforce their laws to govern security matters.739 Non-state actors become entrenched 
in local structures of governance as the most viable solution to crimes. 
Another tactic used to create a plural security landscape is to incorporate community-
led security groups like sungusungu into existing policing structures such as mgambo 
(people’s militia).740 Like the 1973 and 1975 militia laws, the People’s Militia Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendment) Act (1989)741 do not establish non-state actors as 
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distinct law enforcement agencies but it extends the policing power of a police 
constable to members of these security groups.742 Heald claims,743 “by amending the 
People's Militia laws, in both 1989 and 1997, the government did find an instrument 
to give some official recognition to these groups, bestowing upon them a quasi-legal 
status”. Like mgambo, sungusungu can arrest, conduct search and seize stolen 
property or instruments used in committing crimes, turning them into some sort of 
auxiliary police officers.744 Further, the militia law also requires the government to 
compensate mgambo and sungusungu for death or injuries sustained in a course of 
discharging their duties.745 The Ministry of Home Affairs is empowered under the 
1989 amendments to make rules for the regulation of non-state actors’ activities in 
the country.746   
As shown in chapter three, LGAs and the practice of deputising civilians were key to 
the enforcement of law at the grassroots during the British colonial rule.   By reviving 
LGAs in 1982,747 the government restored the earlier model of state-society relations, 
in which, the LGAs rather than being competitors or enemies to the central 
government’s authority, serve as its agents, carrying out acts on the state's behalf.748 
By assimilating non-state actors in administrative structure, the LGAs and traditions 
(jadi) have successfully co-opted and regained political powers that they had 
previously possessed before the abolishment of traditional chieftainships and 
customary criminal law in 1963.749 This is so because of a thin line that separates the 
LGAs and non-state actors, thus ordinary people (through community-led security 
groups) can enforce customary criminal law and adapt norms and sanctions to meet 
their local needs. Despite the 1989 amendments placing non-state actors under the 
Minister of Home Affairs, the ruling party has occasionally and out of political 
interest issued regulations to supervise them. The party in Mara Region in the mid-
1980s, for example, issued the ‘Code for the Operation of the Traditional Army’ that 
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established non-state security groups in the region and gave them police and judicial 
powers.750 As a result, members of non-state security groups worked under the wrong 
assumption that the legal base for undertaking policing activity is the Party 
Guidelines.751 The ruling party has had a strong link with the communities, making it 
harder for the government to succeed in excluding non-state actors in organising 
security. Equally, the government has relied on community-led institutions such as 
ten-cell leaders, mgambo, national service corps and the youth league to teach the 
people about politics, patriotism, self-defence, and mobilise them against external 
aggressions like the Uganda invasion of Tanzania in 1978 (Kagera War).752    
5.2.4 Kagera war  
The Tanzania-Uganda war (Kagera war)753 left the country’s economy in crisis and 
turned the law defenders into lawbreakers, that is to say, the disbanded soldiers and 
militias, with war weapons and military training, became career criminals. In Heald’s 
words, they had “learned of the value of arms in banditry and raiding. Rather than 
returning to a life of toil and poverty in their home areas, many, it now appears, took 
to the freebooting life of the gangster”.754 The country faced an unprecedented wave 
of violence including extra-judicial killings, banditry, burglary, and armed raiding.755 
This was a time when the thieves ruled,756 targeting shops, bars, banks, and residential 
buildings in towns while it took the form of cattle theft in rural areas,757 which is still 
a common problem even today.758 Campbell759 reports: 
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…there were over 11,453 cattle thefts and 15 murders, in Shinyanga, Maswa, 
Kahama and Bariadi districts in 1981. In 1982, there were 21,922 cattle thefts 
and 8 murders related to cattle thefts in the same districts. A total of 52,876 
cattle were [was] reported stolen from the country in 1982. This meant that at 
1982 prices the state was losing over US $66 million from cattle thefts. 
Other illegal activities that contributed to insecurities included trades in contraband 
goods, gold mining, and smuggling in Mwanza, Tabora, and Shinyanga regions. The 
amount of gold smuggled out of Tanzania or sold in a black market every week was 
worth over half a billion shillings.760 The press reported an alarming death figure of 
up to 11 persons per week in Geita district alone.761 The population, mostly affected 
by the increase in crimes, lost confidence in the ability of the police to combat 
crimes.762 The police officers, largely regarded as citizens in uniforms763 and who 
took part in the Kagera war,764 were very few and largely absent in villages and 
informal settlements.765 In an interview with the BBC in 2006,766 the former Minister 
for Home Affairs, Augustine Mrema explained:  
The crime rate had reached alarming levels. We did not have enough police 
officers to cover the whole country, and the few we had were posted in urban 
areas. People were being robbed at gunpoint and living under constant fear. 
In 1978, the army had about 51,700 officers while the TPF had between 10,000 to 
14,000 personnel, both augmented by around 35,000 volunteers (paramilitary).767 
Therefore, because of the geopolitics, the country had more army officers than the 
police and paramilitary combined.768 With a population of around 17.5 million people, 
one police officer served around 1,250 to 1,750 people.769 The police were 
increasingly dealing with state matters and ‘wait[ed for] people to bring their 
problems to them through the few police posts which [were] ill-equipped and sparsely 
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located.’770 This provided an opportunity for police officers to accept bribes or collude 
with suspects. The public ethics in the civil service degenerated and accelerated the 
general loss of respect for authority, law and order, therefore, came under attack.771 
Due to financial constraints and politicisation, the people's militias ‘mgambo’, youth 
groups (CCM Youth League) and national service corps who were responsible for 
rural defence and security went into a general decline.772 The rural population was 
also tired of daily interferences and tactless policing by the youth groups.773 The youth 
groups that once represented community effort was at that time a de facto state police, 
thus losing their initial purpose of serving the poor villagers.774 
The government did not respond immediately to the ensuing violence partly because 
the TPF’s Stock Theft Prevention Regiment was highly ineffectual, thus the constant 
loss of lives and properties. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal claims that ‘the state 
monopoly of violence’ collapsed completely or existed only on paper.775 Due to an 
upsurge in crimes or perceived fear of crimes and the absence of adequate police 
protection,776 the people saw a solution in the tribal security system that had existed 
in the precolonial village (nzengo/kijiji) in the form of traditional army ‘sungusungu’ 
(also ruga ruga and wasalama).777 According to Campbell:778 
Sungusungu initially emerged as a response by the middle and poor peasants 
who had been harassed by increasing armed cattle rustling, highway brigand 
(known as Kodi ya Milembe or Masanja) and housebreaking. In Kahama, they 
considered themselves as Jeshi la Ukombozi against the much richer peasants, 
who had created their own organisation known as Chama cha kumi.   
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The sungusungu developed not as an imposition from the top, but as part of the culture 
and social organisations dating back to the pre-colonial period.779 As Van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal780 concludes, “they show a connection to the modern state as they are 
'neo-traditional' services, but on the other hand, they are also founded on 'tradition'.” 
As discussed in the next chapter, Sungusungu became a political necessity and a 
common form of self-organisation and self-mobilisation that bypassed the court and 
the police structures of governance.781 The existence of sungusungu also implies that 
the people were not satisfied with the fundamental aspects of the supply side of their 
relationship with the state.782 While low-income neighbourhoods relied and continue 
to rely on community efforts to protect themselves, the affluent areas have had a wide 
range of choices, that is, police protection, salaried guards and commercial security 
services brought about by neoliberal policy.783   
5.2.5 Neoliberal Reforms – Recession and Political Ideological Shift 
The emergence of commercial security services in Tanzania is associated with the 
economic recession in the late 1970s and the ensuing period of free-market reforms 
in the early 1980s. The economic stagnation was a result of recurring droughts, oil 
crisis, and a decline in trade between 1973 and 1980 at the rate of 1.7 percent per 
annum.784 The world market prices for the country’s largest export commodities 
dropped by 36 percent between 1977 and 1978 respectively.785 Within this period, the 
trade deficit reached $599 million in 1981 and increased to $682 million in 1982.786 
By 1986, the deficit was 167.6% of the exported merchandise compared to 93.3% 
margin in 1981.787 It is the same period that the country was recovering from the 
Kagera war that costed it around $500 million.788 In addition, the dissolution of the 
 
779 Also known as Sungusungu or Busalama. See, Bukurura (1994) The maintenance of order in rural 
Tanzania 
the case of sungusungu. Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 26(34), pp. 1 and 2. 
780 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1996), Ibid. p. 67. 
781 Campbell, H. (1989), Ibid. p. 32.  
782 Abrahams, R. (1989) Law and order and the state in the Nyamwezi and Sukuma area of Tanzania. 
Journal of the International African Institute, 59(3), p. 367. 
783 Walwa (2017), Ibid. 
784 Tripp, A.M. (1997) Changing the rules: the politics of liberalization and the urban informal 
economy in Tanzania, California, University of California Press, p. 64. 
785 Tripp (1997), Ibid. 64. 
786 Biermann, W. and Wagao, J. (1986) The quest for adjustment: Tanzania and the IMF, 1980-1986. 
African Studies Review, 29(4), p. 90. 
787Ibid. 




East African Community in 1977 meant that the country had to use its limited foreign-
exchange reserves to replace formerly shared services such as aviation and 
telecommunication.789  
The budget shortfalls were common throughout the government during this period, 
reflecting the country’s weak economy.790 The government's budget deficit jumped 
from 10 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1976–1977 to 20 percent in 
1978–1979.791 Half of the USD 4,000 million development budget for 1977 to 1982 
had to come from outside.792 The foreign aids averaged around USD 100 million in 
1973 but increased to USD 800 million in 1978. The external public debt increased 
substantially from USD 248 million (19.4% of the GDP) in 1970 to USD 1,646 
million (32.7% of the GDP) in 1982 and about USD 3,181 million (67.0% of the GDP) 
in 1985.793 The country also became dependent on expatriates while the aid schemes 
alone brought in over 8,000 expatriates by 1980.794 In 1977, the UN listed Tanzania 
as one of 29 least developed countries in the world with a per capita gross national 
domestic product (GNP) estimated at USD 180.795 It dropped from the 14th poorest 
country in 1982, with a gross GNP per capita of USD 280, to the second poorest in 
1990, with a GNP per capita of USD 110.796 It was during this period that the 
government negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
thus adopted and implemented the structural adjustment and economic recovery 
programmes.797  
The effort to save the economy ranged from the revival of the private sector by 
denationalising the major means of production to the introduction of national 
development programmes. The government started to modify its socialist policies, 
that is, slowed down its ujamaa village’s campaign, supported small-scale private 
enterprises, created regional industrial estates, and invited local and foreign-based 
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investors.798 The political ideological shift allowed the government to initiate 
neoliberal programmes, namely the National Economic Survival Programme (1980); 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (1982), Economic Recovery Program (1986), 
the Economic and Social Action Programme (1988), and the Presidential Parastatal 
Sector Reform Commission (1992).799  The Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAPs), which coincided with the end of Cold War have been implemented in three 
phases namely liberalization (1982–95), foreign direct investments and structural 
reform (1996–2006) and consolidation of reforms and policy support (2006 to 
date).800 Among other things, the neoliberal reforms pushed the government to 
downsize its workforce,801 cut its expenditure on social services, and abandon the 
command economy.802 Therefore, the expansion of the private security industry in 
Tanzania, especially for-profit policing firms is a by-product of neoliberal policies.803  
The SAPs, as a political necessity, opened the Tanzanian economy to private 
investments in the form of private properties and transnational entities.804 Today, the 
private sector includes profit-making entities, non-profit making institutions and co-
operative unions that altogether account for over 80% of all formal establishments.805 
Before 2000, Mainland Tanzania had nearly 21,637 establishments, increased to 
around 69,142 in 2012806 and grew to 154,618 in 2015.807 Mining and quarrying 
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sector, which is the key driver of commercial security actors, had 551 establishments 
in 2015.808  After the revival of the private sector, the capital flows tripled from USD 
50 billion in 1987 to about USD 150 billion in 1997 while the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) shoot from USD 12 million in 1992 to USD 183 million in 1999.809 
In 2009, the FDI inflows stood at USD 953.1 million and doubled to 2,130.9 in 
2013.810 As a result, the private formal sector employed over 1,748,695 people 
compared to only 850,616 workers in the public sector in 2016.811  
The expansion of the commercial security sector, in particular, had a direct link with 
FDI inflows and the increased awareness of security risks and crimes in the private 
sector in general.812 The private investors internalised the value of security and 
perception of risk as an important aspect of service delivery, thus organised own 
security in the form of in-house security departments and hired traditional night 
watchmen or professional security guards.813 The underlying assumption is that it is 
feasible to hire a private security firm than to depend on the police officers who are 
few and ineffective.814 The SAPs also involved cutting government expenditure in the 
provision of social services,815 thus an acute shortage of funds, equipment and 
personnel in respective state departments.816 By 1985, the public sector laid off more 
than 25,000 workers, almost 10% of the entire workforce at the time.817 The public 
workforce, in general, shrank from 355,000 in 1992 to 264,000 in 1998.818 There is 
no evidence to suggest the retrenchment of police officers in the TPF but rather a lack 
of new or enough recruitments in the force, as such, the ratio of police officers to the 
population in May 1989 stood at 1:10,000.819 Regarding funding, the TPF received 
less than 50% on average of its financial requirements from 1993 to 2003. By 2001, 
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the TPF had an outstanding debt of more than 20 billion Tanzanian shillings (USD 30 
million).820 The state’s capacity to fund the TPF decreased and the country endured a 
brunt of deficient public security mechanism,821 thus the private sector expanded as a 
political necessity to become an alternative forms of security provision, which 
complement the state policing. In Lwaitama’s words: 
…as funding for government agencies that traditionally provided security 
services, such as the police, were severely cut, as part of so-called government 
austerity measures, one has witnessed the phenomenal rise in the establishment 
of private security agencies, including traditional defence groups called 
sungusungu.822 
Tanzania joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) in 1995. Since the GATS include commercial security, 
Tanzania is required to allow free and fair competition in the provision of security 
services.823 By 2015, there were over 1939 foreign-owned investments in Mainland 
Tanzania.824 Therefore, the GATs enable countries with the largest investments in the 
country, such as South Africa, Kenya, China, and the UK to attract and hire PSCs 
from their own countries. South Africa has the biggest private security industry in the 
region allowing it to export security services to other African countries. South African 
leading role in the sector was “reinforced by the fall of apartheid when large numbers 
of ex-military and ex-police personnel entered the private security sector”.825 
Further, the SAPs opened the market to both formal and informal private sector 
through measures such as privatisation, public-private partnerships, downsizing the 
armed forces, outsourcing, deregulation, delegating some administrative powers to 
LGAs and political parties.826 Neoliberal policies have not only attracted local and 
global private security companies, but also they have partly contributed to the revival 
of party militias, ten-cell leaders, and Sungusungu as key political players. As 
discussed in the next chapter, the transnational institutions (corporations, aid agencies 
and NGOs) take over the role of organising security from the government to protect 
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their interests, employees and the integrity of their operations.827 The availability of 
private security to the rich also signal an increase in insecurity to the low-income 
communities, thus informal security actors became the only practical choices for low 
earners in the villages and peri-urban areas.828 In the foregoing discussion, I identified 
three complex and overlapping reasons for pluralisation linked to the politics of 
security in the post-ban period, namely legacy issues (rural-urban divide and regime 
policing), internal agency or risk factors (ujamaa ideology and Kagera war) and 
external contingency aspects (neoliberal reforms). Each socio-political factor is 
associated with the main four non-state actors namely youth league, militia, 
sungusungu, and PSCs. The next part focuses on the implication of the socio-political 
factors discussed above on hybrid policing.  
5.3 The Lessons Learnt from the Tanzanian Plural Policing Case 
The Tanzanian case proves that plural policing is context-specific that needs to be 
examined in the light of historical circumstances and political choices made. Simply 
put, the pluralisation process in the country and its opposite are interconnected and 
have developed more suited to the socio-political context. As opposed to some 
western literature that sees colonial legacies and socialist ideology as 
‘counterincentive’ to pluralisation, these aspects have played a vital role in 
‘populating’ the policing landscape in Tanzania. As a direct descendant of the colonial 
forces, the police force retains traditions and elements of regime policing as part of 
institutional culture. This creates a close bond between the police and the ruling class 
whereby the public police are more apt to focus on the threats to the government and 
a few elites rather than ordinary citizens. The marginalised population is forced to 
‘club’ together and depend on non-state and illegal security arrangements as the best 
alternative to the public police. As opposed to liberal societies where these diverse 
social and economic groups are organised independently of the state and politics but 
operate within the law, the Tanzanian government has always found a way to  
politicise them and take a ‘centre stage’ by annexing itself to and mobilise such groups 
further without even changing the law. This creates a ‘state-controlled’ hybrid forms 
of security arrangements whereby social groups and private individuals are not only 
immersed in politics but also become quasi-police organisations and act as auspices 
 
827 Dupont (2003), Ibid. p. 337. 




of policing in their localities. Nonetheless, security remained a free public good in a 
socialist state because market actors in the form of privately-owned and commercial-
driven security firms were virtually inexistence. The most prominent security 
networks were the police force, auxiliary police, and volunteers – youth league, 
national service corps, militiamen, and community-led groups, all of which served the 
political  interests of a single-party state.  
Like other socialist states in the 1970s, the party or political influence in the police 
force, which is a key instrument in protecting the status quo, securing access to 
resources, and linking the government with the people, remained pervasive. In this 
sense, the police are no different from politicians who articulate political interests. In 
addition to the police force and auxiliary police, the government relied heavily on the 
armed forces and party proxies such as mgambo, youth league, and national service 
corps to deliver security services. The emergent civil groups were closely monitored 
and slowly tied to the party that used them to maintain law and order in the local 
communities where the police were relatively absent and mistrusted because of their 
corrupt practices and impunities. The volunteer groups were preferred in enforcing 
law and orders because they were relatively cheap to maintain, largely unaccountable, 
aligned with the prevailing political interests, and operated outside the framework of 
the law. According to Favarel‐Garrigues and Le Huérou,829 the mixture of state, party, 
and social groups in policing, underlines how difficult it is to draw a line between 
public and private spheres in a socialist state. This is so because the government 
controls property rights and political powers are gained and maintained through 
overlapping public, private and community interests.830 Consequently, the 
government and the party adopt an instrumental use of these social groups in 
furtherance of political or social objectives and executing illegal orders.  
On the other hand, the devolution of power to LGAs (including the ujamaa villages) 
has been the major driver in shaping policing as one aspect of state-society relations. 
LGAs have the mandate to design and implement local security strategies and 
mobilise civilians to participate in policing, thus opening a new window for 
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pluralisation and increased community participation in policing. The main challenge 
was that security networks in local environments whether state or community-led 
operated through security committees. Political appointees like the District and 
Regional Commissioners, who are party cadres and loyalists,831 represent the 
President and interior minister in their jurisdictions, oversee security committees and 
policing activity at the district or regional levels. This setup exists even today and 
renders the role of LGAs in organising security a façade as local authorities are neither 
autonomous nor in-charge of the public police. Besides, LGAs need the approval of 
the District and Regional Commissioners as well as the police to mobilise and 
establish security groups in villages, towns, and cities. The implication of the above 
setup is that security committees and state policing are brought under the party’s 
control to create ‘a parallel power-structure to the Constitution’ that avoid public 
accountability and allows those in power to advance their own political agenda.832 In 
other instances, the central government takes initiatives of transforming militias from 
army reserves to quasi-police (mgambo/askari wa jiji) operating under respective 
LGAs. As a result, the relationship between the political structure and security 
networks remain much closer, allowing the party to close the gap and politicise them.  
Therefore, the plural policing landscape in the post-1977 period was not a product of 
the government’s deliberate efforts to deregulate the security sector but incidental to 
the socio-political context and local needs. Often, a plurality of sponsors and 
providers of security emerged independent of the state, but the state almost always 
have found a way to adapt to, control and justify them under the political ideology 
and local needs. The Tanzanian case presented a situation where the continuum of 
plural policing providers met development needs, reflected state ideology, and did not 
transform the nature and functions of policing without the involvement of the 
government. The state security actors interacted and found a way to work with social 
groups who became state agents and served party-state interests. The Tanzanian case 
also presents a ‘hybrid sector’ where state police and judicial bodies withdraw in rural 
areas and delegate the role of administering the criminal justice system to community-
based groups. These groups are not legal and “break state laws to achieve their goals 
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of protection and investigation (or even trials and sentencing)”833 but survive because 
they operate under the patronage of the party-state. Even though the government tend 
to transfer some responsibilities to enforce law and order to the local communities, 
the new providers do not generate a ‘privately defined orders’ in conflict with the 
state.834 This is so because these civic organisations stand between the public and 
private divide to create partial sovereignties.  
The post-ban era proves that the emphasis on a ‘proper’ plural policing landscape 
arises from interests of foreign donors, which makes it even harder to adopt a fully-
fledged private security industry. In a party-state context, the commercial security 
arrangements that emerges are not the result of market forces but part of how politics, 
power and resources are contested. As such, the country’s transition from state 
socialism to neoliberal policy added new economic actors (mainly PSCs) to the plural 
policing landscape but did not trigger important structural changes in the provision of 
security. Like other non-state actors, these profit-driven firms have sprung from, 
maintain links with and absorbed mentality and traditions of state security agencies. 
The Tanzanian private security sector is institutionally linked to the party-state, 
politics, public police and other security agencies.835 Not only PSCs absorbed low-
ranked former army, police and intelligence and security service officers but also 
high-profile public officials and powerful figures in the field of civilian security and 
military intelligence. With party-state resources and information at their disposal, the 
ruling elites and foreign business partners became the main beneficiaries of the drive 
to deregulate the security sector. Here the public resources are channelled into the 
emerging PSCs managed and staffed by serving or retired state officials, who gain a 
share of a very competitive market, not on merit but because they are politically 
connected to those in power.836 For instance, they own a larger stake in government’s 
outsourced security services and have earned lucrative contract deals with foreign 
interests, resource extraction sites and bourgeoning private properties. It is because of 
this intimate relationship between the government and market actors that any effort 
to introduce a legal and regulatory framework to govern hybrid policing has failed.  
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Therefore, the ban was imposed while the state and policing were transforming. As 
such, three years after the ban, Tanzania moved from all-state policing to a period of 
transition where society-driven policing practices, and later PSCs gained a more 
proactive role in policing. The hybrid sector emerged to produce and distribute 
security services in both public and privately-owned spaces after the police failed to 
guarantee security to all. The plural policing landscape was partly prompted by the 
lack of human and financial resources to support state policing, low rate of public 
confidence in the police due to corrupt practices and excessive use of force, the lack 
of civilian police oversight, and growth in public fear of crime. As such, the auspices 
of policing grew exponentially to include the police force, auxiliary police, 
community policing, mgambo and sungusungu, youth league, national security corps, 
ten-cell leaders, PSCs, and in-house security units. These multiple actors form 
security networks that relate to the state, the market, the voluntary sector to constitute 
a complex realm of ‘state-controlled’ regulation, prevention, and enforcement of 
security. In the whole security setup, the state police retained a central role of ‘rowing’ 
and ‘steering’ within the plural policing landscape as depicted under the idea of 
anchored pluralism. This is to say, the state police not only took part in policing but 
also partnered with, sponsored, coordinated, and supervised other policing actors - a 
theme to which I will return to later in the next chapter.   
Therefore, even though economic crisis in the 1980s and attendant changes did not 
end instrumental alliances between the government cum the party and policing 
groups, it generated important legal and institutional changes that devolved power 
and resources to LGAs and market actors, thus broadening the space for socio-
political contestation and plural policing. Despite these changes, the act of policing 
has been largely a ‘state-driven’ project and not a network of independent but 
interconnected public, private and voluntary security groups. The ban has been merely 
symbolic and the tool for controlling non-state actors as it did not rationalise and 
transform the maintenance of order into the responsibility of the government alone. 
On the part of the people, there have been no real struggle to return policing power to 
them as they never lost the right and power to self-preservation. The country has had 
several informal and formal institutions that accommodate the will of the people to 
police themselves. Some of these institutions are neither professional law enforcers 




policing for decades. The popular participation in law enforcement did not replace the 
statutory agencies as these formal agencies have been instrumental in setting up 
informal institutions or encouraging communities to do so to create a ‘state-
controlled’ plural policing. This also makes policing a shared activity between the 
public and private sectors while the former sector entrenching itself in the latter sector. 
This proves that communities have always sought to maintain order and the 
government has never withdrawn from its privileged position in the provision of 
security. It has added and assumed more role of working and competing with and co-
ordinating activities of commercial and community-led security providers. 
5.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have discussed how the historical drivers for the ‘state-controlled’ 
pluralisation created conditions for contestation of power, resources, and specific 
forms of policing at both local and national levels. The factors that contributed to such 
hybrid forms of security arrangements in Tanzania range from the country’s colonial 
past to the present socio-political and economic context. I have shown that the 
traditional ways of life, colonial legacies, ujamaa ideology, Kagera war, and 
neoliberal reforms are key factors in understanding the politics behind the plural 
security landscape despite the 1977 ban. I have shown further that the police force 
mediates the broader policing system to fulfil a political role and protects the current 
order. In addition, the TANU guidelines and the Constitution of Tanzania not only 
advocated for the bans of non-state to control insurgencies but also called upon the 
people to form armed bands to protect territorial sovereignty and restore law and 
orders in their areas. In uncertain times, the government and the people did take a 
familiar path and accommodate security groups and policies that guarantee basic 
security services to all. Some of the chosen security groups, although unlawful, gained 
popular acceptance because of their ability to supplement state institutions. People 
embrace non-state actors for lack of better alternatives, that is, non-state actors 
continue to provide effective security services compared with the public institutions. 
This is so because police officers are perceived as partisan, brutal, and unaccountable 
and lacking investigative skills to combat simple crimes. As such, the government has 
allowed and presided over commercial and community-led security groups. The next 
chapter looks at how security networks made up of statutory, voluntary, private and 
semi-private agencies maintain order, interests served and the meanings these 
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Chapter 6: The State of Plural Policing in Tanzania Today 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on different theoretical and empirical aspects together to answer 
the research question. As such, I look at the current typology of policing groups and 
the meanings they generate to security. The first part of this chapter classifies and 
analyses policing groups both state and non-state in terms of their composition, 
functions, interactions, and client base. The last two parts examine the interactions 
and linkages between the state and non-state actors in the domestic space as well as 
how these developments inform the plural policing literature. The chapter concludes 
that in Tanzania, policing is sponsored by civilians, government agencies, political 
parties and international agencies that reflect different paradigms of plural policing. 
Although organisations that sponsor and perform the act of policing may emerge 
independent of the state, they are ultimately ‘statised’ through a wide range of 
politically motivated mechanisms such as co-optation, replication, sponsorship, 
patronage, and presidential pardons to create a ‘state-controlled’ plural policing.  
6.2 Typology of Policing Groups  
6.2.1 The Tanzania Police Force ‘Polisi’ 
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has the ultimate responsibility to ensure public 
safety and security. The MHA implements this responsibility through the TPF that 
forms part of the MHA’s departments. The TPF, a politically run organisation, is a 
nation-wide unified and vertical body, controlled and coordinated from the top. Its 
divisional and administrative units are divided into national, regional, district, station 
and substation or post.837 The TPF units include Airports, air wing, anti-drug, anti-
robbery, anti-terrorism, central railway, Tanzania-Zambia Railway, criminal 
investigation, the traffic control, cybercrime, dogs and horses, FFU, marine, stock 
theft prevention and CP department.838 It has recently introduced a special police 
station for tourists and diplomats (Diplomatic and Tourism Unit).839   
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The TPF is a ‘state-controlled’ body that has a group of full-time employed officers 
who have the right to use necessary force to maintain civil order.840 As the regular 
and traditional policing body, the TPF receives and handle arrests and seizures made 
by other policing groups both state and non-state alike. Like non-state actors, the TPF 
provides both free and commercial security services to the public namely maintenance 
of law and order, paramilitary operations, regulatory activities and regime 
representation.841 In enforcing civil order, the TPF is responsible for peacekeeping, 
protecting public leaders, ordinary citizens, and their properties, detecting crime 
before being committed, investigating and arresting criminals and bringing them to 
court and overseeing the implementation of laws and regulations.842 The police also 
prevent crimes, manage traffic congestion, maintain criminal and identification 
records, protect life and property and recover lost or stolen property and missing 
persons.  
In protecting the ruling class and upholding the political agenda, the TPF handles a 
variety of paramilitary duties and intelligence operations such as intelligence 
gathering, riot control, containment and eradication of local hostile groups.843 The 
police also handles tasks that are ‘traditionally’ assigned to specialised agencies, such 
as licensing of commercial enterprises, supervision of trade, currency and exchange 
controls as well as immigration and passport inspection, border patrol, and refugee 
settlement.844 Before 2007, the TPF also prosecuted cases and transported criminals 
to and from prisons. Currently, the Prisons Service is responsible for transportation 
of offenders while the National Prosecution Service and the Office of the Attorney 
General are in-charge of prosecution of criminal, civil and arbitration matters.845 The 
Police work closely with other governmental organizations like customs, 
immigration, food and drug body, copyright, social welfare, anti-graft body, and the 
army in crime prevention and control.846 In representing the regime, the TPF acts as 
 
840 Marenin (1982), Ibid. p. 384, and Haki na Usalama (2016), Ibid. 
841 TPF (2014), Ibid. p. 2; Hills (1996), Ibid. pp. 273, 275-6; Igbinovia (1981), Ibid. pp. 134-5; Potholm 
(1969), Ibid. pp. 142-150; Scher (2010), Ibid, and US State Department Report on Human Rights in 
Tanzania for 2006. US State Department. 6 March 2007. See also, Kwach and Adam (2015), Ibid. pp. 
1-4; Mwandishi wetu (2017), Ibid; Office of the Attorney General (Re-structure) Order, G.N. No. 48 
of 2018 and National Prosecution Service Act, No. 27 of 2008. 
842 Ibid.  
843 Ibid.  
844 Ibid.  
845 Ibid.  




both a political and socialising agent that links the government and its people, for 
example, the government deployed the police to help in village development.847 
Within the geopolitical dynamics, the TPF participates in Interpol operations and in 
six UN peacekeeping operations (UNAMID, UNMISS, UNIFSA, MONUSCO, 
MINUSCA, and UNIFIL) who help in maintaining peace and order in warring 
countries.848 
The TPF has added business objective to its core functions. The commercial role of 
the TPF became official via the Government Notice No. 66 of 29th March 2013 issued 
by the President. TPF today is partly a corporate sole per the Corporations Sole 
(Establishment) Act of 1974.849 Through the Police Force Corporate Sole Board,850 
the TPF can “carry on the commercial or industrial enterprise” and “enter into any 
transaction which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the proper and efficient 
carrying on of its activities and the proper exercise of its functions.”851 Therefore, the 
TPF provides consultancy services on security issues and personal defence.852 In its 
mandate as a corporation sole or ‘state-controlled’ PSC, the TPF sells security 
services, such as escorts, night patrols and guarding services to private businesses, 
especially financial institutions853 and extractive industry.854 For example, there are 
security arrangements between the TPF and African Barrick Gold (Acacia Mining) at 
Buzwagi and North Mara Gold Mine Ltd.855 I argue in this study that the TPF is ‘state-
controlled’ but part of the neoliberal order that protects political interests and large 
foreign investments just like in the colonial period. The TPF has not only redefined 
its traditional role in producing and delivering security as a public good but also is 
increasingly redirecting the public resources in policing private corporations.  
 
847 Ibid. 
848 Hotuba ya waziri wa mambo ya ndani ya nchi Mhe. Dkt. Mwigulu Lameck Nchemba (MB.), 
akiwasilisha bungeni makadirio ya mapato na matumizi kwa mwaka 2018/19, para 33 and 34. 
849 Section 3(1) 
850 See, the Police Corporation Sole Board (Establishment) Order, G.N. No. 67 of 20 I 3. 
851 Section 4(1)(a) 
852 Para 5 and 6 of the Schedule to G.N. 66 of 2003 allows the TPF to engage in the “business of public 
security services” and “training and provision of range grounds for public and private security for 
purposes of safety and legitimate handling of firearms.” 
853 CRDB, NMB, and NBC. 
854 Acacia Mining Plc. 
855 See, the Memorandum of Understanding between RPC (Tarime-Rorya Special Zone) and Successors 
Tanzania Police Force, Community Policing Unit (PHQ), and North Mara Gold Mine Limited, signed 
on 08 July 2010 [online]. [Accessed on 04 January 2019]. Available from:   
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6.2.2 Auxiliary Police ‘Polisi Wasaidizi’ 
The Auxiliary Police Unit (APU) is a supplementary force to the TPF, thus ‘state-
controlled.’ As special police, APU offers non-profit services to the public and 
operates under the general command and supervision of the IGP, a political 
appointee.856 There are at least one police post and one APU post in areas where the 
APU operates857 under a commissioner of police.858 The APUs use insignia and rank 
system like the TPF, namely corporal, sergeant, staff sergeant, assistant inspector, 
inspector, assistant superintendent, superintendent and senior superintendent.859 
Auxiliary police qualify as semi-public security actors because of their restricted areas 
of operation. In protecting the regime’s interests, the APU primarily guards state 
business or parastatal properties and other sensitive public properties.860 It also 
enforces the by-laws of respective institutions and works in cooperation with the TPF 
in investigating crimes, patrolling, traffic and parking control and enforcing state 
laws.861 They make search and arrest and prevent crimes through visible policing and 
targeted or visible patrols.862 For political reasons, they have also been teaming up 
with the police to suppress workers and students’ unrests in declared areas.863  
In short, the APU maintains order in declared or specialised areas (such as harbour, 
industry, port, public universities, municipal councils and mines) where development 
activities like trade, manufacturing, agriculture, construction and mining are taking 
place.864 Currently, Auxiliary police are stationed at the University of Dar es Salaam, 
Ardhi University, Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences (National 
Hospital), Tanzania Harbours Authority, Tanzania National Parks, Tanzania 
Petroleum Development Corporation, Mtera and Kidatu Dams, Kilombero Sugar 
 
856 Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act 
857 Personal Experience at the University of Dar es Salaam (2005 to date). See also, the University of 
Dar es Salaam (2017) Undergraduate prospectus, 2017/2018. Dar es Salaam, DUP. p. ix, and TPA 
(2019) Tanzania ports authority’s handbook 2019-20. Dar es Salaam, TPA, p. 18. 
858 See, the Citizen Newspaper (2015) Crime rate high at TZ’s oldest varsity. The Citizen Newspaper. 
14 March 2015. 
859 The Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences (2012) The scheme of service for 
administrative and technical staff. July 2012, pp. 109-111. 
860 Van der Spuy and Röntsch (2008), Ibid. pp. 63 and 64. 
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863 Personal Experience at the University of Dar es Salaam (2005 to date). See also, Omari, I.M. and 
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Company, Williamson Diamonds Ltd. (Shinyanga), the Bank of Tanzania, 
Tanganyika Wattle Company, Polyester Company (Morogoro), and Grammack (T) 
Gemstones Company.865 The undertaking that requests the declaration of that special 
area pay the APU officers appointed to that area, for example, the University of Dar 
es Salaam pays the APU stationed at the university.  
6.2.3 The Tanzania People’s Defence Forces ‘Jeshi’  
The Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) is the regular ‘state-controlled’ army 
under the Ministry of Defence. The TPDF is primarily responsible for external 
security, i.e. defending national borders.866 Unlike the TPF, the TPDF enjoys a very 
limited role in enforcing a civil order, mainly through the Military Police Unit (MPU). 
The MPU controls criminal activities by army officers, police officers and civilian 
population accessing military areas. Although the MPU’s jurisdiction is limited to the 
TPDF’s property and camps, these police soldiers have the same powers as the TPF 
officers, i.e. enforce laws, protect property, conduct search, arrest, patrols, and 
regulate traffic. As opposed to the police, the MPU has extensive paramilitary 
capabilities, thus used as a ready-reactive force in any national crisis.867 In serving 
political interests, the army tends to intervene directly or indirectly as a supplementary 
repressive force in the last instance, when the events overrun the police and its 
specialised auxiliary corps.868 In several occasions, the government has involved the 
TPDF in policing duties outside of their barracks,869 thus blurring the distinction 
between security/civilian and defence functions.870 For instance, several army officers 
since 2016 have been appointed to head key government departments such as medical 
stores, prisons service, and anti-graft agency. The army cooperates with the TPF in 
 
865 CHRI (2006), Ibid. p. 18; Van der Spuy and Röntsch (2008), Ibid. pp. 63 and 64; and TPF (2016) 
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866 US State Department Report on Human Rights in Tanzania for 2006. US State Department. 6 March 
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867 Cf. Potholm (1969), Ibid. p. 145. 
868 Althusser (1971), Ibid. pp. 98 and 137. See, Luanda, N. (2005) A changing conception of defence: 
a historical perspective of the military in Tanzania. In: Rupiya, M. (ed.) Evolutions and revolutions: a 
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(2015) Operesheni tokomeza ujangili report 2014. LHRC [online]. [Accessed on 17 November 2018]. 
Available from: <https://www.humanrights.or.tz/assets/attachments/1504098622.pdf>. Cf. Marenin 
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security operations (operesheni).871 The Minister of Defence and National Service, 
Hussein Mwinyi,872 has stressed that:  
Hakuna wakati au mazingira yatakayolifanya Jeshi la Ulinzi la Wananchi wa 
Tanzania kufanya kazi za ndani badala ya Jeshi la Polisi isipokuwa Jeshi la 
Ulinzi la Wananchi wa Tanzania linaweza kusaidia pale Jeshi la Polisi 
linapoelemewa na kuoombwa kufanya hivyo. (There is no fixed time or 
circumstances that compel the TPDF to enforce internal order instead of the 
police. The TPDF can assist the police if the police are overwhelmed or the 
relevant authority ask them to do so). 
 
In its ‘political’ or ‘operesheni’ mandate, the TPDF soldiers have been deployed to 
move civilians to ujamaa villages (operesheni vijiji), clampdown poachers 
(operesheni tokomeza)873 and illegal immigrants (operesheni kimbunga),874 
suppressing Mtwara gas riots,875 Amboni Caves’ terrorist acts,876 and Pwani violence 
(Kibiti, Rufiji and Mkuranga),877 money launderer878 and buying cashew nuts from 
farmers (operesheni korosho).879 The army continues to work with local and 
international civilian agencies to combat emerging security threats, such as terrorism, 
piracy, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and human trafficking.880 The army officers 
have worked with sungusungu to enforce immigration laws, thus round-up and 
 
871 Mkutu (2017), Ibid. p. 127. 
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877 Taylor (2017), Ibid. See also, Jamhuri Newspaper, Issue No. 298 of 13th June 2017 (JWTZ waingia 
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apprehend foreigners in villages that surround refugee camps.881 The army officers 
also acted as police backups and reinforcements in patrolling Dar es Salaam and 
Zanzibar streets during the 2000-2002 and 2012 political and religious violence.882 
Currently, some soldiers guard and patrol Mererani Tanzanite mines in Manyara 
Region.883 
The provision of commercial security services to the public is another area that the 
TPDF is heavily involved in. Like the TPF, the TPDF has taken advantage of the 
booming private security business and registered SUMA JKT Guard LTD (SGL) on 
20th October 2008 as a ‘state-controlled’ PSC. SGL is a subsidiary firm of the National 
Service Corporation Sole (SUMA JKT) under the TPDF. The government issued an 
order to establish SUMA JKT in 1982 under the Corporation Sole (Establishment) 
Act of 1974. The order requires it to nurture the national youth and engage in 
economic activities. The SGL provides security and guard services for residential 
houses, and public and private institutions, such as power generation plants at Kihansi 
and Mtera, University of Dodoma, Ministry of Finance, Banks (UBA, TPB and 
CRDB), mining sites (STAMIGOLD), Tanzania Revenue Authority, Medical Store 
Department and Kigamboni and Busisi ferry terminals.884 The main services provided 
by the SGL include home and office guard, patrol and cash transit, escort and 
bodyguard services, surveillance, and electronic security. It is estimated that the SGL 
has more than 15,000 workforces most of them recruited in 2015 (3,576 people), 2016 
(4,150 people) and 2017 (5,063 people).885 The company is also investing in fire and 
rescue services, paramedics (ambulance service), riot control and cash transit.886 
 
881 Human Rights Watch (1999) Tanzania: in the name of security forced roundups in Tanzania. HRW, 
11(4). [Accessed on 18 December 2018]. Available from: 
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Human Rights Watch (April), 14(3), pp. 10-11 and 30-31. 
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Some citizens have expressed their anger about the involvement of SGL in security 
services: 
Suma JKT uses taxpayers' money to buy uniforms, receive food rations or eat at 
the barracks and use JKT vehicles which are run by taxpayers' money ... It doesn't 
make sense when public institutions and especially sensitive ones like JKT, 
engage in competition with struggling small private companies.887 
 
6.2.4 People’s Militia ‘Jeshi la Mgambo’ 
The people’s militia ‘mgambo’ is informally structured, but a ‘state-approved and -
controlled’ civil guarding and paramilitary reserve force that provides security 
voluntarily.888 TANU and ASP (now CCM) introduced mgambo all over the country 
in 1965 to end the army’s monopoly on military training and to ensure that the party 
was on an equal security footing with the government in controlling the political 
space.889 The day-to-day management of the mgambo is under the mgambo Advisors 
in the Regional and District Commissioners’ offices, thus ‘state-controlled’. The 
mgambo are answerable to the TPF in their daily activities and to the TPDF in 
wartime.890 Every year, the TPDF officers in their localities train volunteers in warfare 
and the use of weapons for local defence for 30 days to six months.891 The mgambo 
training mainly attracts the uneducated or unemployed youths with the motive of 
securing a job with LGAs, APUs and PSCs.892 Mgambo receive civic education, 
among other trainings, to inculcate a sense of nationalism and patriotism in defending 
political independence and restoring order.  
Under the National Defence Act (1966), mgambo train and work with civil authorities 
in maintaining security, law and order in their respective areas, to aid the civil power 
in national emergencies, to work as volunteers or army reserves of the TPDF and to 
guard sensitive installations in their respective areas. For political reasons, mgambo 
became de facto law enforcers in urban areas aiding the police officers in their 
 
887 Wa Simbeye, F. (2014) Private security firms downplay JKT entry. Daily News/TSN. 25 July 2014. 
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888 See, Section 13 of the National Defence Act (1966), CHRI (2006), Ibid. p. 20, Mkutu (2017), Ibid. 
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889 Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 46. 
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operations in the late 1970s.893 It was common for a police patrol group to comprise 
one police officer assisted by two National Service recruits and two heavily armed 
mgambo.894 Like the TPF and TPDF, the mgambo enforced participation in 
community development efforts, implementation of villagisation campaigns and 
policing of ujamaa villages and schools.895  
Today, the mgambo fall largely under the mandate of, and are managed by LGAs who 
use them to protect property and enforce by-laws.896 For example, in 2015 alone, the 
local authorities deployed about 580 mgambo countrywide.897 Like the police 
Mgambo have the power to conduct searches and arrest suspected criminals.898 As 
‘state-controlled’ security groups, mgambo can carry and use firearms when they are 
under the supervision of the police.899 Mgambo cooperate with the police on the case-
to-case basis and are used as auxiliary and deputised officers in police operations that 
include guarding voting centres during elections and political rallies and suppressing 
violence.900 Like in the 1970s and 1980s, today almost every police post has one or 
two mgambo who assist police officers on a part-time basis. Mgambo assume the 
status of special police constable when the police co-opt them or LGAs employ them. 
6.2.5 Sungusungu 
Sungusungu groups are  community-led but ‘state-approved and -controlled’ security 
groups901 that are involved in crime prevention and solving local conflicts and 
preventing them from escalating.902 They are, in a way, voluntary neighbourhood civil 
defence forces that exist in hamlets as political necessities.903 Some parts of the 
country equate sungusungu groups to mgambo904 whereas similar security groups to 
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897 TPF (2016), Ibid. p. 65. 
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sungusungu (such as basumba batale, mchapi movements, ndemwa, mshitu, and tata 
kabwera/foola union) existed in the past.905 A sungusungu regiment is usually a group 
of ten to thirty persons carrying traditional weapons (wooden clubs, bows and arrows, 
and short swords) and homemade guns (gobore).906 All men between the ages of 18 
and 50 are required to perform sungusungu duties.907 Unlike other policing groups, 
the community at a village or neighbourhood meeting elect sungusungu officers who 
normally receive no formal training from the TPF or TPDF.908 A resident may choose 
to donate a small sum or membership fee to the group’s cause or provide one person 
from their household to participate in patrols.909 
According to Walwa,910 sungusungu have ceased to operate since 2006 in many areas 
and communities have moved from sungusungu groups as the most prominent forms 
of local security organisations to the CP scheme. However, in the survey conducted 
by Twaweza in 2017, four out of ten people (41%) reported having sungusungu 
groups in their neighbourhood. The groups were more common in rural (42%) than 
in urban areas (32%).911 They are still popular among poor people because they 
represent an alternative to commercial security guards, which are comparatively more 
expensive.912 Sungusungu groups are also common in regions with high levels of 
Sukuma and Nyamwezi people, particularly in the Lake Zone (Tabora, Shinyanga, 
Simiyu, Geita, Mara, and Mwanza regions) and other regions like Dar es Salaam 
where local and global organisations sponsor them.913 The TPF Annual report shows 
that regions that had many sungusungu groups also had low police presence as 
follows: Tabora (1:2,124), Simiyu (1:2,090), Geita (1:1,909), Kagera (1:1,860) and 
Kigoma (1:1,817).914  
Concerning organisation of sungusungu groups, they have a clear chain of command 
from a village to a regional level. The key posts include neighbourhood commander 
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(kamanda wa mtaa), a village (kijiji) commander, a ward (kata) commander, a 
divisional (tarafa) commander, a district (wilaya) commander, and regional (mkoa) 
commander. To ensure political control, the District and Regional Commissioners act 
as sungusungu’s patrons in their areas.915 Because of multiparty politics, the 
sungusungu monitoring officers now include the village chairpersons, and ward and 
divisional secretaries who have a dual role, that is, they represent the government and 
their respective political parties and interests at the grassroots.916 The village 
sungusungu assembly or council (baraza) is another important component of the 
group. The baraza hold ad hoc trials that include instant interrogation, extraction of 
confession and execution of sentences in the form of fines, corporal punishment, and 
banishment from the village.917  
The government tends to hijack and politicise popular movements and turn them into 
instruments of state coercion enforced from the top.918  It then urges the police to work 
with sungusungu groups as a political capital and temporary solution to low police 
presence in some part of the country.919 However, the police have to a certain extent 
used sungusungu groups as an excuse not to engage actively in public policing. 
According to Omar Mapuri, the then Minister for Home Affairs: 
Katika maeneno ambapo kuna Vituo Vidogo vya Polisi huko Vijijini, tumetoa 
maelekezo ya kwamba Sungusungu wanapokwenda katika ulinzi wao basi 
waungane na polisi wenye silaha katika kufanya doria. (We have instructed all 
villages that have police posts to ensure that the Sungusungu on guard 
accompany armed police officers in organising patrols).920  
Although the TPF is responsible for overseeing sungusungu groups, they mostly work 
with LGAs and sometimes accountable to the party, municipal solicitor, ward tribunal 
and village or street authorities.921 In my view, sungusungu groups are not 
‘vigilante’922 because they have quasi-legal status and enjoy the same powers as 
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916 Safer Cities: Dar es Salaam (2000), Ibid. p. 46. 
917 CHRI (2006), Ibid. p. 21 and Fleisher (2000), Ibid. p. 216 and 217. 
918 Cf. Mwaikusa (1995), Ibid. p. 170, and Cross (2014), Ibid. p. 523. 
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mgambo, a police constable and auxiliary police.923 The jurisdiction of sungusungu 
groups has expanded from combating cattle thefts to combating highway robbery, 
hunting out individuals suspected to engage in witchcraft, and violent crimes, theft, 
desertion, illegal possession of arms, management of natural resources (water and 
forest), night patrols, and community surveillance.924 Sungusungu members have the 
authority to arrest persons and conduct searches, but they do not have the authority to 
carry firearms. Usually, they conduct their operations and patrols separately from the 
TPF but hand over criminals to the police or alert the police before a crime is 
committed.925 In the past, sungusungu groups were deputised and deployed as 
political necessities to collect development levy, control public corruption and 
bribery, foreign currency violations, pursue tax defaulters, police public meetings, and 
enforce participation in communal work initiatives and nation-building projects, and 
to implement the national campaign against racketeers, loiters, economic saboteurs.926  
The government continues to deploy sungusungu groups alongside the state police to 
crack down illegal fishing,927 truancy and loitering,928 teen pregnancy,929 parents who 
keep children off schools,930 killers of albinos931 and to enforce attendance in public 
meetings.932 On the other hand, transnational companies, such as African Barrick 
Gold and Geita Gold Mining Limited (AngloGold Ashanti) have included 
sungusungu groups into their security strategies to provide patrols for the outer 
perimeter of the mining sites.933 The mining companies liaise with local leaders from 
 
923 See, the 1989 militia law. 
924 Shivji (1990), Ibid. pp. 90-98, and Abrahams (1987), Ibid. p. 191, Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 56, and 
Cross (2014), Ibid. p. 522. See also, Ahram (2006), Ibid. pp. 69-70. 
925 Mkutu (2017), Ibid. p. 127 and Ntetema (2006), Ibid. 
926 Cross (2013), Ibid. pp. 53 and 54, and Cross (2014), Ibid. p. 522. See also, Ahram (2006), Ibid. pp. 
69-70, and Abrahams (1987), Ibid. p. 191. 
927 Fabian, P. (2016) Sungusungu kutumika kukabili uvuvi haramu. Mtanzania Newspaper. 26 October 
2016. 
928 Magashi, E. (2017) Sungusungu kusaka watoto wazururaji. Mwananchi Newspaper. 03 April 2017. 
929 Kayanda, F. (2016) Sungusungu Shinyanga kupambana na wanaowapa mimba wanafunzi. 
Muungwana Blog. 04 July 2016. [Accessed on 26 December 2018]. Available from: 
<http://www.muungwana.co.tz/2016/07/sungusungu-shinyanga-kupambana-na.html> The campaign 
involves the government and NGO (Agape Aids Control Program - AACP). 
930 Ng’oko, J. (2017) Sungusungu kushiriki operesheni ya kuwabana wazazi kusomesha watoto. 
Mwananchi Newspaper. 07 January 2017. 
931 Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 57, and Mwandishi Wetu (2014) Mama na mwanawe wauwawa kikatili. Habari 
Leo Newspaper. 19 January 2014. 
932 HakiElimu (2011) Kudai haki ya kupata elimu kwa njia ya mahakama nchini tanzania: mazingatio 
ya kisheria, kisiasa na kijamii na uwezekano wa matumizi. Dar es Salaam, HakiElimu, p. 40. 
933 Abrahamsen and Williams (2017), Ibid. pp. 24 and 27, and Magomba, L. (2013) Illegal Tanzania 




the surrounding villages who take turns in organising sungusungu groups while the 
company organise security training and compensate them.934 Despite noticeable 
success in restoring law and order, the involvement of sungusungu groups in policing 
has raised some concerns linked to human rights violations, false accusations and 
usurpation of police and court powers.935 It is widely reported that sungusungu 
commanders extort money from fellow villagers who seek justice and collude with 
criminals by ‘capitalising on the knowledge of people's sleeping habits and sentry 
routines acquired in the course of their nightly patrols.’936 Sometimes, the baraza 
collect fines from family members or close relatives instead of the actual culprit to 
discharge the penalty.937 There are also reports of sungusungu members shielding 
fellow villagers and criminals against police arrest and criminal prosecution.938 
Nonetheless, as a bottom-up initiative that evokes traditions and use local knowledge 
to produce security,939 sungusungu groups have been preferred for decades and 
deployed to suppress vigilantes, such as ubaya-ubaya, panya-road and watoto wa 
mbwa.940 They are widespread and effective security groups to the extent that 
whenever people face insecurities, they revive or call for the revival of sungusungu 
and ten-cell system as discussed below.941 This is so because they are familiar groups 
that assume familiar roles, are cheap to maintain, require minimal training, work with 
local authorities and have somehow succeeded to address criminal element in the 
sungusungu structure and hierarchy.942 To sum up, the leading politicians have 
heavily ‘statised’ sungusungu groups to become a politically salient symbol and 
promoted to the status of quasi-police and replicated all over the country.  
6.2.6 Ten/Fifty-cell system ‘Mabalozi’ 
The ten-cell system originates in ancient China whereby residents were clustered in a 
group of ten people or houses under an elected leader (balozi/mjumbe wa nyumba 
 
934 Ibid. 
935 Njozi, H.M. (2000) Mwembechai killings and the political future of Tanzania. Ottawa, Globalink 
Communications, p. 8. 
936 Fleisher (2000), Ibid. pp. 223 and 234. 
937 Ibid. p. 217. 
938 Ibid. p. 218. 
939 Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 3. 
940 Reisman (2013), Ibid. p. 59. 
941 The Guardian’s Editorial (2016), Ibid. See also, Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 57 and Ng’oko, J. (2016) 
Sungusungu kurejeshwa Mwanza. Mwananchi Newspaper. 26 October 2016. 




kumi), thus responsible for peacekeeping and security and good behaviour of their 
members.943 The government and the party introduced and statised the ten-cell system 
in Tanzania in 1964.944 The mabalozi have been heavily politicised to become the 
‘eyes’ of the nation and the party, that is, they perform security, intelligence, and 
dispute resolution functions.945 They liaise with the TPF and the judiciary, thus it is 
common for a resident to first report a crime to a ten-cell leader before reporting it to 
the police.946 In the past, the party’s ten-cell leaders provided information about 
residents eligible to participate in sungusungu groups.947 They organised and 
maintained patrol roasters and reported slackers to the police.948 As a political 
necessity, the ten-cell leaders collected taxes, summoned people to work on 
development projects, gathered intelligence information about suspicious characters 
or activities, crimes, residents, guests, births, marriages, and deaths.949  
Further, they aided the government to control hooliganism, idleness, lawlessness, and 
delinquency, and explain and defend the party and government’s political agenda to 
the residents of the ten houses.950 Today, the ten-cell leaders (now fifty-cell system) 
still stand at the middle of security networks and navigates between the state and non-
state policing groups.951 They keep registers of residents in the ten/fifty-house radius, 
issue introduction letters to job applicants in the armed forces, PSCs and mgambo, 
mobilise people for local meetings and cleanliness, identify volunteers, and collect 
monthly contributions for the CP schemes. In addition, as members of security 
committees in their areas, they help the state security agencies in apprehending 
criminals, serving summonses and reporting suspicious activities.952  In many areas 
 
943 Cf. Abrahams (1987), Ibid. p. 181. 
944 Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 45. 
945 Mushi, D. (2015) Insecurity calls for need to intensify ten-cell system. Daily News/TSN. 8 February 
2015; Mhariri (2017) Maoni ya mhariri: mabalozi wa nyumba kumi ni muhimu. Mwananchi 
Newspaper. 26 May 207; and Nyamenohi, S. (2015) Mabalozi wafichueni wauwaji wa Albino-CCM. 
Habari Leo. 25 June 2005. Cf. Cross (2013), Ibid. pp. 45 and 46; and Kaplan (1978), Ibid. pp. 296 and 
297. 
946 Ibid. 
947 Cross (2013), Ibid. p. 54. 
948 Cross (2014), Ibid. p. 522. 
949 Ibid.  
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like Arusha and Mwanza, the TPF uses the ten/fifty-cell system to organise and 
structure neighbourhood watch groups.953 
6.2.7 Private Security Companies ‘Kampuni za Ulinzi’ 
PSCs are formal commercial security firms registered like other business entities 
under the Companies Act of 2002.954 Before the issuance of a certificate of 
incorporation, the registrar of companies is required to consult the TPF to provide a 
permit as to the suitability of the firm to provide security services.955 This consultation 
and approval process ensures that PSCs are ‘state-controlled’, i.e. they accept the role 
of the state police in organising and directing security networks. The PSCs came with 
SAPs in the early 1980s protecting private investments that allowed mine owners and 
their managers to exercise total control over their migrant workers.956 Today, there 
are more than 350 PSCs with around five new companies registered every month and 
have a workforce of over one million security guards, thus outnumbering the police 
by twenty to one.957 The role and mandate of PSCs in policing, as political necessities 
of the neoliberal era, have changed from guarding mining sites, individuals and their 
premises to operations that are more sophisticated like surveillance.958 In particular, 
PSCs are involved in private investigation, patrols, escorts, cash transit, use of sniffer 
dogs, armed guards, fire and rescue services, CCTV surveillance, paramedic services 
and radio alarm services. Other services provided by PSCs include front desk 
management, risk control, security training for staff, the transport and protection of 
resources and emergency aid and keeping the elite safe from crimes.959  
PSCs have expanded their client base to include government institutions, embassies 
and consulates, aid agencies, civil society organisations (CSOs), construction sites 
and refugee camps. They also offer services to private citizens and commercial 
corporations such as real estate businesses,960 gated communities or security 
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villages,961 amusement parks and playgrounds,962 animal parks,963 beach resort and 
hotels,964 nightclubs,965 modern sports facilities966 and large shopping complexes.967 
In the gated communities and richest neighbourhoods, PSCs are exclusively 
responsible for the security of those living within the confines of the protected 
premises.968 In these communities, there is a combination of walls, gates, security 
devices, PSC guards and police officers. The aim is to prevent outsiders from gaining 
entrance.969 This culture of exclusion is a result of fear and perceptions of crime, the 
desire for comfort and legacy of colonial zoning laws.970  
Unlike the colonial period, today’s exclusion is based on the ‘ability to pay’ for the 
service rather than race, thus creating two classes of ‘the have’ residing in low density 
areas (geti-kali) and the ‘have not’ living in high density zones and informal 
settlements (uswazi/uswahilini). The Msasani peninsula in Dar es Salaam, for 
example, is an expatriate enclave inhabited by individuals who work with embassies, 
private companies, international organizations, NGOs, and the social service 
sector.971 According to Smiley’s972 survey at Msasani suburb: 
All fifty expatriates surveyed employed security guards; forty-five of these 
households have guards stationed every hour of the day and night. This rate of 
guard usage is much higher than that of the city’s population as a whole. Only 
7 percent of Africans use a security guard; other forms of protection, such as 
walls and dogs, are utilized more frequently.   
 
The wide use of PSCs shows that the business community and expatriates have 
internalised the value of security and perception of risk as an important aspect of 
 
961 E.g. Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation Estates in Mikocheni, National Insurance 
Corporation Housing Estates in Mikocheni B, Bank of Tanzania Housing Quarters in Mbezi Beach, 
NASACO Housing Estates in Mtoni Kijichi and the Mlimani City Business Park at the University of 
Dar es Salaam. Gated houses and gated housing schemes are found in Masaki, Mbezi beach, Kunduchi, 
Osterbay, Posta, and Kigamboni. See, Bulamile (2009), Ibid. pp. 63-67. 
962 Water world, Totoville, Fun-city Kigamboni and Kunduchi Water Park. 
963 Dar es Salaam Zoo and Bahari Zoo. 
964 Mbalamwezi Beach Club, Royal Palm/Serena Hotel and Kunduchi Beach Hotel and Resort. 
965 New Maisha Club, San Siro, and Club Bilicanas. 
966 National Stadium and Gymkhana club. 
967 Mlimani City, Quality Centre, Tanzanite Dream, and City Mall. 
968 Cf. Schuberth (2018), Ibid. p. 390. 
969 Smiley, S.L. (2010) Exclusionary space in Dar es Salaam: fear and difference in expatriate 
communities. Africa Today (Special Issue: Africa's Spaces of Exclusion), 56(3), pp. 29 and 32. 
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doing business and working in Tanzania. For political reasons, many PSCs found in 
Tanzania are local, owned by the state (i.e. corporations sole) and ex-TPF and TPDF 
officers and operate mainly in a single or several towns and cities, with work base in 
very few villages where extractive activities are undertaken.973 The largest PSCs in 
the country are also part of global companies headquartered in South Africa, Kenya 
and the UK.974 However, since 2018, the local content laws require investors in the 
extractive sector to engage local security service providers or hire Tanzanians in their 
in-house security departments.975 A mining firm can avoid the local content 
requirements by asking a foreign security company to incorporate its business in, or 
register a branch in Tanzania, and then hire them. In another dimension, the local 
content law violates the GATS that require state parties to allow free and fair 
competition in the provision of security services.    
To ensure political influence in the private security sector, the TPF is mandated to 
regulates activities of PSCs and has published sectoral guidelines from time to time 
on issues such as weapons, training, and uniforms.976 For example, the TPF set a 
January 2019 deadline for all PSCs to dress their security guards in ‘dark blue’ and 
‘black’ uniform and an option of a ‘white’ shirt.977 PSCs employ full-time trained 
guards who carry and use small arms like any other civilians978 and cooperate with 
the police informally and on ad hoc basis.979 According to Mussa Alli Mussa 
(Commissioner of CP Department), PSCs’ guards discharge police functions in their 
contracted areas,980 seek assistance from the police and handle suspects, or report all 
crimes, to the TPF like other civilians.981 Reisman observes that:982  
There is a lack of clarity regarding their communication with the police and 
responsibilities of each sector. For example, sometimes both the police and 
 
973 Shadrack (2011), Ibid. 
974 See, Mkutu (2017), Ibid; and Shadrack (2011), Ibid. 
975 See, the First Schedule to the Mining (Local Content) Regulations, GN. No. 3 of 2018 and the 
Mining Commission (Guideline for Submission of Local Content Plan), GN. No. 305 of 2018. 
976 Tibasana, L.M. (2002) Effective administration of the police and prosecution in criminal justice: the 
practice and experience of the united republic of Tanzania, 120th international senior seminar 
participants. Resource Material Series No. 60, p. 168. 
977 Wambura, B. (2018) Kampuni binafsi za ulinzi kuvaa sare moja. Mtanzania Newspaper. 13 March 
2018. See also, Azam TV News bulletin. Azam Media - YouTube. 28 July 2018 (08:00-09:00 pm). 
978 Mkutu (2017), Ibid. pp. 127-130 
979 Shadrack (2011), Ibid, and Mkutu (2017), Ibid. p. 130. 
980 Wambura (2018), Ibid. 
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private security guards are guarding the same premises, but receive command 
from different authorities, which do not communicate. 
The oldest industry of night watchmen,983 who are hired and salaried by private 
individuals and organisations to provide protection, supplement PSCs in respective 
localities.984 In extraction sites and financial institutions, the TPF, in-house security 
departments and, sometimes, sungusungu support PSCs in policing the area.985 PSCs 
are like the colonial chartered companies and in-house security units that had both 
coercive and administrative powers.986 They also relate to private armed bands and 
personal bodyguards maintained by traders and commoners in feudal Tanzania aimed 
at protecting trade caravans and commercial interests.987  
6.2.8 Party Militias and Radicalised Groups 
The party militia and radicalised groups (PMRGs) are well-trained bodies of 
unemployed people who are loyal to a political ideology.988 These groups are active  
during the general elections, LGAs’ elections989 and other national campaigns like 
constitutional reform processes but become dormant afterwards.990 PMRGs, in their 
current form, are a product of the 1992 political reforms (mageuzi) that became 
vibrant in the early 2000s as ‘politicised’ youth groups.991 The ruling party (CCM) 
was the first to revive its youth league, now ‘green guards’ after it went into a general 
decline in the 1990s.992  
The green guards owe their origin to the TANU (now CCM) youth wing that dates to 
1956.993 During the one-party rule, the government and the party sponsored and 
politicised the youth division of the party (youth league), ten-cell leaders and national 
 
983 E.g. Maasai, Ngoni, Makonde, Digo and Gogo people. 
984 Bulamile (2009), Ibid. p. 191, and Mkutu (2017), Ibid. p. 128. 
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986 Cf. Ortiz (2007), Ibid. 
987 Chapter 2, infra. 
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990 Burchard, S.M. (2015) Violent extremist organizations and the electoral cycle in Africa: a framework 
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violent extremism in Tanzania. Africa Watch, IDA, 17 (October 12, 2017). Cf. Kweka (2015a), Ibid, 
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service corps to augment the TPF.994 Apart from policing party rallies, members of 
the youth association organised night patrols, conducted searches, made arrests for 
petty crimes, enforced an order to boycott foreign goods, harassed political 
opposition, gathered intelligence, collected taxes, guarded borders, manned 
roadblocks and were ‘statised’ and recruited by all armed forces or deputised as 
special constables.995 Like the state police, the youth league was involved in 
suppressing radical students’ clandestine group such as ‘punch’ at the University of 
Dar es Salaam in 1990.996 Aside from CCM, other parties also have militias modelled 
on the green guards namely CHADEMA’s red brigade and CUF’s blue guards.997 
According to Mr. Mbowe,998 CHADEMA established its youth wing: 
Ili kukabiliana na fujo zinazofanywa na vijana wa CCM ‘Green Guards’, sisi 
tuna kikosi cha ‘Red Brigade’ ambacho ni kikosi kilichoundwa kwa mujibu wa 
katiba ya chama kwa ajili ya kulinda mali za chama… Tutafanya mafunzo 
maalumu ya vijana wetu nchi nzima, tutawafundisha namna ya kujilinda, 
tutaweka kambi kama CCM wanavyoweka kambi kufundisha vijana wao 
namna ya kushambulia. Hatuwezi kuendelea kuwa mbuzi wa kafara. (We have 
the 'Red Brigade' squad recognised under the party Constitution to deal with 
violence caused by CCM youths’ ‘Green Guards’ and to guard the party’s 
property… We will conduct special training for our youth all over the country, 
we will teach them how to protect themselves, we will set camps as CCM is 
camping to teach their young people how to attack others. We cannot continue 
to be sacrificial goats). 
The unhealthy competition between the youth wings is not new in Tanzania. Before 
the party-state Constitution of 1965, the alliance of TANU and the ASP Youth 
Leagues faced a similar standoff with those of ANC and ZNP.999  
PMRGs have been widely involved in all national elections from 2000 to 2015 and 
the 2012-2014 constitutional reform processes.1000 Before the 2010 elections, for 
example, some CCM politicians in Unguja (Zanzibar) mobilised about 1000-2000 
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youths to vote twice in exchange for jobs.1001 After the elected politicians failed to 
fulfil their promises, the youths grouped themselves into several criminal gangs such 
as ubaya-ubaya (evil for evil) that operated in urban and rural Zanzibar.1002 Ubaya-
ubaya are well organised, use traditional weapons, and operate in a group of 10 to 20 
people1003 and sponsored by party officials, thus making it difficult for the police to 
suppress them.1004 In addition, before the 2015 election, the National Election 
Commission announced that political parties were preparing to give military training 
to more than 1500 youths to cause trouble during elections.1005  
Although all eight security actors discussed above are ‘state-controlled’ and 
‘politicised’, the linkage and collaboration between and among them remain by far 
informal. Policing groups have signed memoranda of understanding, issued 
guidelines, formed associations1006 and held regular networking meetings. In these 
efforts, the police force has occupied a central position to realise effective policing by 
collaborating with internal and external partners in mobilising resources and building 
capacity of non-state actors.1007 The donors’ role is limited to giving cash grants and 
equipment, capacity building, creating a formal linkage between actors and ensuring 
that security remains by far a public good. Thus, because of the state and political 
influence in policing, it is becoming harder to differentiate between the state and non-
state actors in the formal collective arrangement.1008 The non-state actors are available 
in the public and semi-public domains through joint operations and serving 
government offices while the state actors are increasingly providing services in the 
private and semi-private spaces. As shown in the discussion below, the government 
support to non-state actors has turned them into some sort of quasi-police 
organisations.  
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6.3 The Government and the Private Policing  
The Tanzanian case of plural policing reveals state and political influence, major 
overlaps, and a complex web of interactions among different security providers. As a 
result, non-state actors are usually mistaken for state actors1009 as they are politically 
and institutionally inclined to look and act like police officers and use the indicia of 
official authority to induce compliance from the people.1010 They are ‘state-
controlled’ and bear the imprimatur of the state as the duty to protect people against 
internal and external threats is traditionally associated with sovereignty.1011 For 
political reasons, they receive the same training, perform the same functions, serve 
the same clients, enjoy the same authority, governed by the same culture and ethos, 
follow similar protocols and share the same public and private spaces.  
In most of the banks today, for example, police officers are standing outside 
accompanied by PSCs’ guards inside. In mines, there is an assemblage of sungusungu, 
police, in-house security personnel, walls, modern security devices and local and 
global PSCs. In government offices and investments, there is also a combination of 
PSCs, mgambo and the police and army officers. At the University of Dar es Salaam, 
in particular:  
Security and Safety Management Systems consist of the National Police Station, 
the University Auxiliary Police Unit and the Private Security Companies; which 
have security contract with the University Management. The National Police 
Station is in charge of providing security to both University residence and its 
surrounding neighbouring community, while the Auxiliary Police Unit and the 
Private Security Companies are making reasonable provision to provide general 
security within the University workplaces and its students and staff 
residences.1012 
In addition, the university community (staff and students) are also involved in 
neighbourhood watch groups while some staff residing on camps team up and opt for 
PSCs’ services.1013 In a ‘state-controlled’ plural security landscape, it is possible to 
encounter several security actors both formal and informal or state and non-state in a 
day. The uniformed guards of PSCs can be seen at a local shopping mall and in the 
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1011 Ibid. 
1012 University of Dar es Salaam (2017), Ibid. p. ix.  




richest neighbourhoods (dubbed, geti-kali).1014 Barbed wires, electric fences, grills 
and metal bars on doors and windows and surveillance devices complement PSCs 
guards in gated communities and rich suburbs.1015 There is also warning signs like 
‘this house is protected by XYZ Company’, ‘CCTV camera in operation’, and 
‘beware of dogs’ everywhere in urban areas.1016 Sungusungu, auxiliary police and 
police officers who patrol the public spaces are likely to stop a passer-by at night1017 
while one may visit a friend and find a traditional night watchman (often, maasai 
people) at a gate.1018  
There is ample evidence in news outlets about mgambo evicting and arresting street 
vendors (wamachinga) or reading social media feeds and police report about mob 
justice.1019 For those who live in poor neighbourhoods (dubbed, uswazi/uswahilini), 
a local leader may as well wake them up in the morning collecting fees or asking 
volunteers for sungusungu groups or CP scheme.1020 In some occasions, a public 
meeting or school board may resolve to hire guards from a company run by the 
military (e.g. SGL) or owned by retired or in-service TPF or TPDF officers. During 
elections, political rallies are policed by both TPF personnel and uniformed party 
militias,1021 while at a bus station or stop, it is normal to come across bus touts ‘wapiga 
debe’ who control transit buses ‘daladala.’1022 In diplomatic or consular premises, 
resource extraction sites, Airports, and luxury tourist enclaves, there is a mixture of 
in-house security officers, commercial security personnel, TPF officers and 
sungusungu complemented by sophisticated security devices.1023  
Despite the increase in, and visibility of, security providers in neighbourhoods and 
streets, crimes continue to claim people’s lives and properties.1024 The lack of 
regulatory law and formal cooperation between and among security providers 
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contribute to a trend whereby crimes are committed in the midst of security actors.1025 
There are instances where properties worthy a fortune burn to ashes in the presence 
of private firefighters who refuse to intervene for lack of a prior contract or guarantee 
to receive payment afterwards.1026 At the same time, the people and external donors 
can hardly figure out who is responsible for which tasks and where1027 while other 
commentators are concerned about the sustainability of plural policing networks.1028 
This is so because of the costs associated with organising security in poor 
communities without access to the state resources.1029 The organisers of these 
community-based security groups demands a compulsory monthly contribution from 
every household in the respective locality. There is also a tendency among politicians 
to use non-state actors to pursue private or political gains, thus creating an unequal 
distribution of public policing benefits.1030 The next part analyses the Tanzanian case 
in relation to the existing frameworks and builds from there to advocates for the ‘state-
controlled plural policing’ as a new approach in understanding policing in a 
developing country.  
6.4 How does the Tanzanian case Inform the Plural Policing Literature? 
The policing function in Tanzania has never been the sole domain of state institutions. 
Although commercial private policing died out immediately after independence and 
revived in the mid-1980s, a ‘state-controlled’ communal policing has never 
disappeared. Today, the plural policing landscape is constituted of state organisations 
(police and army), semi-state organisations (auxiliary police and mgambo), state and 
private-owned commercial security companies, state-authorised forms of communal 
and community policing (sungusungu and CP groups) and ‘statised’ vigilantes (youth 
league or party militias). Each private policing group is linked to and serves a specific 
interest, i.e. police (all social classes), militias (LGAs), youth league (party), 
commercial security firms (private investors and upper and middle classes) and 
 
1025 James, B. (2013) Inside bodaboda crime syndicates. The Citizen Newspaper. 17 August 2013. 
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crime-syndicates/1840340-1958102-v5hip2/index.html>. 
1026 Dean, R. (2001) Tanzania's Private Firefight. BBC News Africa. 23 May 2001. [Accessed on 10 
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sungusungu (poor villagers and urban neighbourhoods). However, these actors tend 
to overlap in terms of functions and customer base, thus available to the communities, 
public, semi-public, and private sectors and most importantly, all of them are 
‘statised’, ‘politicised’ and engage in both commercial and non-commercial policing 
activities.  
For perspective, sungusungu and CP groups that are expected to be free communal 
security arrangements have been increasingly commercialised by mining firms and 
salaried by international organisations while militias (mgambo) that started as a self-
help scheme are now in the full employment of and salaried by LGAs. As a result, 
one policing framework alone cannot explain the Tanzanian plural policing case. The 
Tanzanian case reveals a ‘state-controlled’ plural policing that build on and relate to 
several models of policing as highlighted in the literature discussed in chapter two of 
this thesis. The act of policing is ‘statised’ and ‘politicised’, yet it continues to be 
authorised, sponsored, and delivered by various socio-political and economic groups 
that strive to control the public, semi-public, private and community spaces. As such, 
policing is more than an act of enforcing law and order, it is a totality of state-society 
relations, actors and set of practices that regulate a geographical area (a 
neighbourhood, a village, a city or a country), social relations (family affairs, crimes, 
witchcraft or morality) and interests (regime or businesses). Therefore, the 
governance of security in Tanzania is not only a struggle over political power and 
interests but also a socio-political and economic question about the nature of the 
relationship between the state, public authorities, the private sector, citizens, and 
communities.  
In Baker’s multi-choice framework,1031 the Tanzanian case presents a typical African 
plural policing experience with hybrid political orders whereby non-state actors forge 
a realm of de facto sovereignty. In this form of fragmented sovereignty, the 
distinctions between the state and non-state security actors as well as between banned 
(illegal) and unbanned (legal) ones are blurred. Thus, policing not only encompasses 
a set of formal and informal actors and practices but also legal and illegal ones. In 
Baker’s analysis, the ban and the involvement of the banned actors in policing does 
 




not lead to the question of legality or anarchy because local forms of order are rooted 
in the country’s traditions respected by the people as alternative security 
arrangements. Non-state policing gives the communities a wider room to ‘choose’ 
security providers and services depending on their needs, interests, and station in life. 
For perspective, the poor people and LGAs choose mgambo, sungusungu and other 
CP schemes while the business community and bureaucrats choose the police force 
and commercial security firms. Nonetheless, the wide use of non-state actors in 
policing is not an indication of state failure or weakness because alternative security 
arrangements predate the modern state institutions, which are alien and linked to the 
imposition of colonial rule. Again, the question of informality and illegality brought 
about by the ban is irrelevant because it is the same government that controls, 
endorses, politicise, and co-opt some non-state groups or calls for their replication 
throughout the country. The result of endorsing or co-opting non-state actors is to 
‘integrate’ the various forms of policing available on the ground into state machinery 
regardless of their informality or illegality. This avoids a conflict between the state 
and non-state, circumvent the ban and brings private policing under state control. 
Further, the government adopts various citizen-centred policy such as Ulinzi 
Shirikishi (community or participatory policing) to formalise state-society relations in 
policing, i.e. it incorporates both formal and informal groups into the national security 
strategy. Hence, the act of policing in Tanzania is somehow beyond the ‘choices’ that 
people make daily but what the government deems fit or ‘statise’ (i.e. embrace, 
dictate, replicate or politicise).  
The Tanzanian case also relates to the anchored pluralism framework in the sense that 
the state-society relation is vertical, with the state and state institutions at the centre 
of a plural security landscape.1032 Therefore, the production and provision of policing 
are anchored by the police force, which retains a privileged or central role in the 
authorisation of the common good of security. As discussed by Walwa1033 and Killian 
and Pastory,1034 policing in Tanzania has a socio-political connotation that goes 
beyond enforcing law and order, as such, the government, through the police force, 
finds a way to be part of security arrangements that emerge. It hijacks and controls 
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citizen-driven policing arrangements through reform programmes, such as 
democratisation and decentralisation of policing functions to sub-national tiers of 
government and transform them into state-like institutions. The ban creates several 
‘anchoring points’ that enable the government to ‘row’ and ‘steer’ security networks 
namely the ability of the state police to oversee the private security sector under the 
Community Policing Department and mobilise funds and human resources for public 
and community security. In addition, unlike civilian policing groups, the state police 
possess enormous coercive power and enjoy statutory immunity and privilege. 
However, like other regulatory states, the Tanzanian police do not do all the policing 
works, it enrols non-state actors. These forms of state-led partnerships in policing are 
made possible by the ban, which acts as a regulatory tool that forces non-state actors 
to surrender to state control and direction. The Tanzania case imposes state authority 
over policing, thus reflecting the classical republican view of the security as a public 
good regardless of who produces and delivers it to the people. It is some sort of a 
‘state-controlled’ approach to policing that maintains the centrality of the government 
within the security networks. This is so because policing remains something that 
citizens prioritise and pursue in common through both state and non-state agencies. 
Hence, the anchored pluralism view partly underlines the state-centred or top-down 
security scheme (Ulinzi Shirikishi) and donor-driven security reforms and 
arrangements in Tanzania. Nonetheless, the Tanzanian case goes beyond ‘anchored 
pluralistic’ view because the ‘centrality’ of the state institutions has allowed the state 
and the party to maintain and exert more political influence and control of security 
networks. 
Moreover, the Tanzanian plural policing case presents some elements of nodal 
governance of security, with a slight departure from the state-centred view of policing 
towards making both public and private security services available to the poor.1035 
The Tanzanian security networks operate through the CP schemes, UN Habitat’s 
Safer City Project and UNHCR’s security package in refugee camps.1036 These 
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security arrangements are society-centred whereby various nodes in the forms of 
community, governmental and non-governmental entities (commercial, media, 
CBOs, FBOs and community groups) are involved in policing.1037 The Tanzanian 
case also agrees with the nodal view that the history of a country plays a vital role in 
the development of security groups and the fragmentation of policing. As noted in the 
previous chapter, pluralisation of policing owes its origin to the socio-political 
struggles for power and resources during the Tanzania-Uganda war (1978-9) and the 
shift in economic structures following the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 
1980s. This led to the spread of communal policing and neoliberal modes of 
governance security due to cost-cutting measures. During this period, the government 
allowed more space for PSCs, society-centred and donor-sponsored policing groups. 
Yet, the Tanzanian pluralisation case disapproves the nodal view that a node needs 
not to be a formally constituted or legally recognised entity. Non-state actors have 
been able to operate effectively even though they are informal and illegal (banned) 
under the 1977 Constitution and other public order laws. Therefore, whether a node 
is formal or illegal, it only needs a stable organisational structure, works with state 
authorities, submit under the control of the state, seek and obtain political approval, 
and put in place an effective mechanism of mobilising human and financial resources 
to sustain its operations. The Tanzanian case agrees with the nodal view that policing 
is somehow a bottom-up affair, policing power comes from the grassroots (e.g. ten-
cell leaders, youth league, sungusungu, militias, CP scheme and Safer City Project) 
and the police alone cannot win the war against crimes.  
Furthermore, the Tanzanian case reveals ample examples of Abrahamsen and 
Williams’ global security assemblage view.1038 The massive private properties in Dar 
es Salaam and mining sites in Mwanza, Geita, Shinyanga and Manyara regions 
assembles public, private, global and local security providers in one place to blur not 
only the public-private divide but also the defence and security functions. Here, 
policing is not a free public good paid through taxes, but a commodity controlled by 
the vagaries of demand and supply and entrenched into investment activities. The act 
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of policing is ‘privatised’ and ‘delegated’ to private actors, which develop capacities 
that allow them to act at a global level but in national settings. Home-grown policing 
actors (state police, community-led groups, or PSCs) are assisted by and develop 
capacities to service the security needs of multinational firms and integrated into the 
capitalist economy as legitimate security providers. As a result, commercial security 
firms acquire context-specific forms of symbolic and cultural capital that were 
previously the domain of the state. At the same time, the state and community-led 
security agencies are going private (commercial), thus discharging public and 
communal functions in the private domain/space. This trend leads to new forms of 
arrangements and practices biased against the poor and available to the highest bidder. 
The policing groups are somehow affected by globalisation and assume a new role of 
protecting resource extraction sites and private investors who pay them handsomely. 
Community-led security groups like sungusungu evolve and develop the capacities 
that allow them to operate globally from national settings, their role is shaped by local 
interests and politics. On the other hand, the police and auxiliary police officers are 
also assembled and concentrated in state-owned projects and tourist enclaves. For the 
‘assembled’ security groups to survive the ban and thrive, we have learnt from the 
Tanzanian case that such arrangements need to be either politicised or ‘state-
controlled’, with the police leading them.    
Lastly, the Tanzanian case reflects Kyed and Albrecht’s view1039 of policing as an 
order-making activity in the wider socio-political and economic arenas that combines 
the daily practices of ordinary people or community organisations. The exercise of 
public authority is evident from below and at the top, thus creating some sort of a 
‘multi-choice policing’ that incorporates formal, informal, legal and illegal security 
actors and practices chosen by the people themselves depending on how they conceive 
security and insecurity. The order-making approach to policing in Tanzania is a 
political affair, which is participatory, ‘state-controlled’ and donor-driven 
development agenda. As such, the act of policing presents another form of fragmented 
or contested sovereignty whereby the state institution matters but they are ineffective 
or unavailable, thus giving a room for the non-state institutions (militias, sungusungu 
and PSCs) that operate on the margins of the law to exercise state-like roles in rural 
 




areas. Non-state groups not only gain similar power to the police and act as agents of 
security and insecurity but also work hand in hand with state actors in the local 
environment, thus eroding the public-private divide. As such, the question of the ban 
(legality or illegality of non-state policing) is of less importance so long as private 
actors remain popular and contribute to state formation and shape sovereign and 
public authority. In the order-making perspective, the Tanzanian case creates ‘partial 
sovereignty’, which is de jure, horizontal, fragmented shaped by everyday practices 
of both state and non-state policing as opposed to the vertical or hierarchical order. 
Some policing groups like sungusungu and mgambo, which emerged as temporary 
security measures to the low presence of the police officers, they have since then 
assumed a permanent status as well as partial sovereignty to become ‘parallel powers’ 
from below.1040  
The Tanzanian case presents a diversified act of policing that remain largely under 
the state control and political influence. Hence, the access to security services may 
not necessarily depend on the daily choices that people make or creation of security 
networks with an accountable body to oversee them. Further, it is not entirely true that 
the act of policing is an order-making exercise, but it aligns more with political 
interests to symbolise the state control of the security sector. As such, the plural 
networks or horizontal security arrangements do not replace the vertical policing 
structures. The police force is not only involved in rowing and steering but also 
compete in the market and enrol other actors in the production and distribution of 
security services. The wide use of community-led security groups gives an excuse to 
the police to not attend to their public duties properly and focus more on protecting 
the elites (regime) and selling their services to the business community, especially 
commercial banks and mining firms. Accordingly, non-state actors have moved away 
from unrestrained violence to become more state-like by adopting a territorial form 
of organisation and emulating state institutions in terms of membership, training, fee, 
seals, parade, inspection, and uniforms. Like the case of Mbhuleni (eSwatini), the 
Tanzanian civilian community policing groups (e.g. sungusungu) have embraced 
state-like attributes to gain informal sovereignty in their areas, i.e. they manage and 
influence how people perceive security and insecurity (e.g. meeting attendance, 
 




witchcraft, and cattle raiding). By virtue of their role within the ‘state-controlled’ 
policing landscape, non-state actors have emerged from below to struggle for power 
and resources, define state-society relations and acquire a state-like status. Power 
struggles between the state police and non-state actors have been settled through 
negotiations or by the government or party extending quasi-police status to these 
security groups. By far, the relationship between state and non-state actors are often 
characterised by formal and informal cooperation due to competing interests.  
As noted earlier, hybrid policing in Tanzania entails a multitude of tangled networks 
that enjoy partial state sovereignty in their endeavour to produce and distribute 
security services. The most striking attribute of the Tanzanian plural policing 
landscape is that the state security actors are going private while community groups 
and market actors are becoming public, i.e. they are politicised, involved, empowered 
and deputised alongside formal central and local government bodies in the governance 
of security. The country has several competing security actors, which have different 
powers and liabilities and operate at different tiers and spheres of governance. The 
state is more fragmented and governed through both formal and informal social 
groups that have gained a political voice through the process of democratization and 
decentralisation. Security arrangements are sponsored by the central government, 
LGAs or geographical entities, local and international companies, local and 
international NGOs, political parties, business communities, the grassroots, and 
police force. These sponsors of security relate, oppose, and enrol each other through 
a complex and fluid network of formal, informal, legal, and illegal relations.   
Generally, the mixture of legal and illegal providers of security pushes the 
government to unevenly implement the law (ban) through a system of exemptions that 
do not affect the ‘state-controlled’ plural security landscape. The poor enforcement of 
the ban does not suggest state weakness or lawlessness, but an important practice that 
allows the government to politicise, control, relate, compete, enlist, and oppose non-
state security actors. Therefore, the ban enables the government to control security 
networks whereby state security agencies become part of public, private and 
community policing. This form of state control is important because despite using 
weapons, surveillance equipment and access to sensitive information, PSCs, for 




screening. The first attempt to establish a form of oversight over private policing came 
in 1989, with the amendments to the militia laws. However, the amendment granted 
supervisory power to the Interior Ministry over community-led security groups and 
not security companies. It was until 2006 when the police established the CP 
Department that is responsible for overseeing activities of all private security service 
providers. Then, it was followed by screening and licensing procedures for both 
companies and their staff whereby the district and regional police chiefs were 
authorised to use their discretion.   
The current security setup, embroiled in politics, allows the police to be an 
unaccountable body that support sungusungu, ten-cell leaders, army units and 
mgambo, compete with PSCs and oppose party militias, but enlist, supervise, and 
coordinate all of them under the CP scheme. Not only that sungusungu, ten-cell 
leaders and mgambo have gained a proactive role in policing at the local level, thus 
involved in police-led operations, but also, they are somehow protected from 
prosecution for violation of human rights. As such, non-state actors grab a role in 
plural policing dependently and independently of the state’s demand for their 
participation. Moreover, non-state actors whether acting independently or assuming 
the role of local subsidiaries, play an important role in policing foreign interests and 
private investments. Mining sites, for instance, are one of the most militarised areas, 
i.e. they harbour a mixture of police officers, military personnel, and domestic and 
global PSCs that guard resource extraction areas. These private investments and the 
global economy have compelled community-led groups operating in the proximity of 
mining sites to adapt to market forces and become part of these dynamics, thus 
blurring the distinction between commercial and community security arrangements. 
As a result, policing becomes order-making and income-generating activity and a 
means through which the dominant elite pursue state control and a vehicle for 
increasing political capital. The police force has not diverged fundamentally to its 
statutory role and remains the most sought-after partner for both consumers of 
security services and other providers of security. Thus, policing as a task is more than 
forging special relationships between policing actors and local politicians (regime 
maintenance), it also involves building international alliances and taking part in the 




On the other hand, the state and the market are interlocking and mutually dependent, 
thus respond and adapt to each other. The government is investing heavily in the 
commercial security sector through state-run firms (corporations’ sole). This 
transforms policing into a site of struggle in which the police and the army use public 
resources to compete with market actors, thus pushing some actors to close their 
businesses and forcing the poor communities into the margins of illegal or informal 
security arrangements. The state security agencies take over the private security sector 
by registering PSCs or transforming and commercialising defence and security 
services (partial privatisation) and focus on providing security services to private 
investors, government offices and parastatals for rent. These police and military-
owned security businesses could be linked to the ban in the sense that the Constitution 
recognise the two institutions as the sole providers of defence and security services in 
both the public and private spaces/domains. Hence, adding a price tag to some of their 
services could be another way of supplementing meagrely government budget and 
sustaining the delivery of security services. After all, the Constitution does not say 
security is a public good available for free nor does it prohibit state agencies to 
commercialise the same. On the contrary, the government has almost always 
encouraged state institutions to compete with the private sector or adding a 
‘commercial aspect’ to the services meant for public consumption. Therefore, as 
corporations sole, the army and police can engage in local income-generating 
activities and contributes to the national coffers. To put this into perspective, in 2019 
alone SUMA JKT paid Tshs, 1.012 billion as dividend to the government.1041 
From the foregoing, one may conclude that the act of policing in Tanzania has unique 
features and account how the governance of security is first and foremost political. 
As such, ‘state-controlled’ plural policing is a concept that put a different emphasis 
on multichoice policing, anchored pluralism, nodal governance, global security 
assemblages, and policing as order-making. In a ‘state-controlled’ policing context, 
security is more than an account of multichoice policing offered to the people; more 
than anchored pluralism with an accountable legal body that oversees such diversity, 
more than a network of state and non-state actors in nodal governance; more than a 
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global security assemblage where the international organisation is dominant; more 
than an analysis of policing as order-making. In a ‘state-controlled’ policing context, 
the state directs, manipulates, and prompts a whole array of actors according primarily 
to political interests than security needs.   
As constantly presented throughout this chapter, ‘state-controlled’ plural policing 
reveals a diverse and highly competitive security sector that the government seeks 
with varying degrees of success to manipulate for political reasons. State 
manipulation uses the tools of statutory and constitutional bans, exemptions from 
these bans, police and electoral body’s directives, and forceful co-optation of the 
‘illegal’ actors. It also protects the unlawful actors from prosecution, creates state 
commercial enterprises into the illegal sector, and patronage of access to ‘illegal’ 
markets. The implication of a ‘state-controlled’ plural policing is that it first and 
foremost enables the government to shape the emergence, evolution, practices, and 
party loyalty of security actors. Secondly, it ensures that the act of policing is not 
primarily aimed at improving the security of the people but to guarantee regime 
survival and the prosperity of its leadership. Thirdly, despite its lack of resources and 
reach, it enables the government to seek and maintain its centrality across the entire 
sector, formal and informal, communal, and commercial. Finally, it enables the 
government to relate, compete, enlist, oppose, and control security networks whereby 
state security agencies become part of public, private, and community policing. 
6.5 Conclusion  
The chapter drew on different theoretical and empirical aspects together to answer the 
research question. As such, I have looked at the current typology of policing groups 
and the meanings they generate to security. The first part of this chapter analysed 
policing groups in terms of their composition, functions, areas of operation and client 
base. It has also examined the interactions and linkages between the TPF and non-
state actors. The last two parts examined the interactions and linkages between the 
state and non-state actors in the domestic space as well as how the developments in 
Tanzanian inform the plural policing literature. The chapter concludes that in 
Tanzania, policing is a province of both state and non-state actors, sponsored by 
civilians, government agencies, political parties, and international agencies, thus 




that sponsor and perform the act of policing may emerge independent of the state, 
they are ultimately ‘statised’ through a wide range of politically motivated processes 
such as co-optation, replication, sponsorship, patronage, and presidential pardons to 
create a ‘state-controlled’ plural policing. The next chapter presents the summary, 






















Chapter 7: Conclusion  
7.1 Summary of the Main Idea and Arguments  
This thesis has sought to examine plural policing in Tanzania against the backdrop of 
statutory and constitutional bans on non-state security actors. The study is the first 
attempt to make sense of how the bans on non-state actors were the defining features 
of plural policing in Tanzania. I have throughout the thesis explained how security is 
multifaced, ‘statised’ (state-controlled) and politicised in the precolonial, colonial, 
and postcolonial Tanzania. I asked why has the Tanzania state not sought to eliminate 
non-state policing when it is banned legally and constitutionally? This question 
allowed the study to examine the mechanisms used by successive governments in 
Tanzania, which are semi-authoritarian in nature, to manipulate the security sector 
through the selective use of the legal and constitutional provisions and their 
implications on plural policing.  
I respond to the question above by making one theoretical claim that underpin the 
thesis as a whole. I claim that the intention of the government has not been to produce 
security through non-state actors but rather to manipulate the security sector along 
political interests. In other words, non-state policing has thrived in Tanzania despite 
being illegal because it is politics (not law) that drives the governance of security. I 
have revealed that the existence of a ban offers the possibility of choosing selectively 
when to use (or threaten to use) the ban; when to make an exemption and enrol the 
nonstate actor; or when to ignore the ban and unofficially grant immunity from 
prosecution to the illegal actors. The government has had absolute control over the 
distribution but not the production of security services and that non-state actors are 
indirect and effective means of state control of violence. Today, the government of 
Tanzania generates, controls and is part of the commercial security sector and is 
imbedded in community-based security groups in a domestic space. As such, the ban 
on private security service providers was not a turning point in real security policies 
rather it has allowed the government to tighten the control on coercive powers and 
organise security along the state political ideology. The government has been 
pragmatic in implementing the bans by constantly manipulating the Constitution and 




communally organised security groups operating in the country within a plural 
security landscape proves that the bans have had little weight in practice.    
The main argument is reflected in the key findings of the study regarding plural 
policing and the bans. In particular, the study has problematised and captured state-
run commercial security companies and services in the definition of ‘private policing’ 
and made the case of focusing not on ownership but on functions, client base and 
market element; it has lifted a ‘vigilante’ tag on quasi-police groups like sungusungu; 
it has shown policing as an act that creates the nexus between public and private 
sectors, community and commercial, and global and local efforts; it has enhanced the 
understanding of how community policing is seen very differently by developing 
states to donors from the developing world; it has pointed out and explained a 
complex set of laws and policies that embrace both state-centric and liberal 
approaches to policing (i.e. the entanglements of new and old laws and policies); it 
has offered a study on how statutory and constitutional bans on non-state policing can 
be exploited; it has demonstrated the centrality of a semi-autocratic form of 
government and geopolitics in organising security; it has enlarged understanding of 
how both public and private security providers can be part of, subordinate to and 
operate within the state; and it has explored the exact contours and intricate web of 
security actors from the precolonial to postcolonial periods.  
7.2 Conclusion and Implications of the Study  
I conclude that the Tanzanian case provides another account of how governance of 
security is first and foremost political to create a ‘state-controlled’ plural policing. In 
a ‘state-controlled’ policing context, the government directs, manipulates, and 
prompts a whole array of actors according to political interests rather than security 
needs.  As such, the Tanzanian plural policing landscape offers unique features that 
allows this study to be more than an account of multichoice policing offered to the 
people; more than anchored pluralism with an accountable legal body to oversee the 
diversity; more than a network of state and non-state actors in nodal governance; more 
than a global security assemblage where the international organisation is dominant; 
more than an analysis of policing as order-making. That said, I now turn my attention 





(a) Improved definition of private policing 
The study establishes that although policing literature uses and mentions the term 
‘private policing,’1042 it has not been sufficiently explained. As a result, some key 
aspects and differences between state and non-state actors and functions have not been 
noted and discussed. In the literature, private policing is restricted to privately owned 
entities. The Tanzanian case presents a more complex array of state-led corporations 
that compete with privately owned security firms and provide security services to the 
public for a fee and profits generation. Conceptually, I have interrogated the location 
of the line between public and private, thus suggest an alternative definition of the 
private, which is central to the public-private divide. This study looked at the 
functions, client base and market element rather than ownership of the respective 
security actors to categorise state-run security firms1043 such as SUMA JKT Guard 
Limited (army), JKU Security Guard Agency (army) and for-profit/hire police 
services (police force)1044 as private security actors.  
The Tanzanian case shows that privatisation of policing does not only occur when the 
state delegates policing to private sectors but also when the state itself takes on private 
features such as transferring the provision of policing services from the civil service 
to state enterprises. This analysis is conceptually important because it combines the 
attributes of public and private institutions. The state-led PSCs somehow enable the 
government to regain its competitive advantage and remain relevant in a plural 
security landscape. However, this phenomenon creates an exchange relationship that 
serves private party interests rather than the general public. Four parties are involved 
in the privatisation of security: the government, corporations, societal groups, and 
individuals. As opposed to the last three parties whose role in the privatisation process 
is limited to creating security actors, the government plays triple roles, that is, it enacts 
laws, enforce them, and establish or own private security services. It follows, 
therefore, that even community-based security groups such as sungusungu have lost 
a ‘vigilante’ tag and assumed a quasi-police status. This is so because the government 
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has reinvented them, recognised them under the law, extended constabulary powers 
to them and replicated them throughout the country. Since these groups are ‘state-
controlled’ and enjoy the government’s support, they are increasingly operating 
within the framework of the law and subsumed in the police-led CP schemes.1045  
(b) Plural Policing 
The existing studies shed lights on how security is part of donor-funded police 
reforms,1046 influenced by the community security groups and linked to the local 
structures of governance.1047 What the literature does not tell us is that policing is a 
strategy to pool together, politicise, and co-opt non-state actors rather than to 
institutionalise them and decentralise police powers. Both state and non-state actors 
are involved in policing besides their traditional functions, thus making the Tanzanian 
case a typical example of pluralisation of security in a more systematic way. Through 
ward police, security committees and local authorities, the act of policing bridge the 
gap between public and private security actors and harness personnel, equipment and 
funds from private individuals, communities, corporations, and international 
organisations. As such, public policing becomes a shared duty between the public and 
private actors while embedding state police culture and ethos to non-state actors, 
which enjoy partial sovereignty.  
The findings also provide a different dimension to the ‘commercial-community’ 
entanglement thesis, that is to say, the idea that PSCs are becoming communal while 
community-led security groups are now private.1048 In Tanzania, PSCs continue to 
serve the affluent consumers, the business community and government offices. It is 
through the ideas of global security assemblages in larger mining sites that somehow 
the poor communities get a limited access to PSC personnel and technologies. In rare 
cases, PSC personnel are as well deputised to work together with the police and the 
communities, thus assuming both community and commercial attributes. The 
 
1045 Cf. Fleisher (2000), Ibid. pp. 209 and 210; Abrahams (1987), Ibid; Paciotti and Hadley (2004), Ibid; 
and Cross (2013), Ibid. 
1046 Wisler and Onwudiwe (2008), Ibid; Marks (2011), Ibid; Diphoorn and Kyed (2016), Ibid; Bagayoko 
(2016), Ibid, and Bagayoko (2012), Ibid. 
1047 Cross (2013), Ibid; Wisler and Onwudiwe (2008), Ibid; Walwa (2017), Ibid; and Killian and Pastory 
(2018), Ibid. 




community-based security arrangements are largely funded by the people themselves 
through voluntary monthly contributions and donations. This mode of funding creates 
two problems.1049 One, it may offset the benefits and add the costs of organising 
security to the low-income communities. Two,  policing groups are politicised and 
hijacked by politicians, the rich people and businesses who usually have the voice. I 
add to the previous literature that community-based institutions are not fully in the 
public interest and do not always meet everyone’s expectations. Some members of 
the community especially the weak and vulnerable may as well be excluded because 
of social bias and power hierarchies. Even though, the Tanzanian case presents a 
mixture of paradigms namely multichoice policing, nodal governance, anchored 
pluralism, order-making, and the global security assemblages,1050 it remains by far 
above them and offers unique features that converge on a ‘state-controlled’ plural 
policing. 
(c) The bans and the entanglements of new and old laws 
Previous research has demonstrated the circumstances that pushed the state-builders 
in Africa to adopt a state-centric policing paradigm. Despite many structural reforms, 
the current policy and legal framework follow the traditional view of the state and 
security. The present work is the first to consider the implication of the statutory and 
constitutional bans imposed on armed non-state actors to the plural security landscape 
both historically and in present times. I have used the bans as key components in 
understanding how successive governments in Tanzania have conceived hybrid 
policing. I have shown that the government adopted bans to control insurgencies and 
spur state-building projects since the government was somehow apprehensive of 
hybrid policing. This thesis introduces the idea that the bans are political means 
employed by the state to force non-state actors to align themselves with the 
government and the party. As such, the Constitution has been constantly manipulated 
through other government policies to justify and co-opt non-state actors in policing. 
This practise has reduced the 1977 Constitution into a sham.  
 
1049 Cross (2013), Ibid. 




The findings show that the administration has used the bans to bring non-state actors 
under the government and ruling party’s control. The government tends to invoke the 
bans occasionally and selectively against party militias during elections. The Political 
Parties (Amendment) Act 2019, for example, outlaw all party militias, thus making 
them a good example of the use of a statutory ban as both controlling and organising 
tools of security. The 2019 law is a precautionary measure towards the LGAs and 
national or general elections in 2019 and 2020, respectively. One can as well reason 
that the 2019 change is a typical example of duplication of effort as it reiterates the 
position taken by the 1977 Constitution, Public Order Act, and the Societies Act. It is 
not by accident that the government has kept the bans intact and added new ones 
despite the current plural security landscape. In my view, the intention of the 
government has not been to produce security through non-state actors but rather to 
manipulate, regulate, and discipline them along political interests. One may rightly 
claim that the government has had absolute control over the distribution but not the 
production of security services and that non-state actors are indirect and effective 
means of state control of violence.   
(d) The government and non-state security providers 
The Tanzanian case adds to the previous debates that both public and private security 
providers are part of, subordinate to and operate within the state. This is so because 
the government derives all its power and authority from the people.1051 Even where 
the government prohibits armed non-state actors, the people have a constitutional 
duty, either through public or private means, to safeguard both personal and state 
property and to preserve and maintain the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and unity of the nation.1052 The government is not powerful, thus it generates, depends 
on and extends security and defence powers to non-state actors during peaceful and 
war periods. Although the public police and privately and communally organised 
security groups are characterised by ambivalent relationships, I find no evidence to 
suggest that a plural security landscape affects the central role of state institutions in 
the provision of security. To the contrary, the non-state actors are politicised and 
statised, thus they have somehow strengthened the government’s position in 
 
1051 Article 8 of the 1977 Constitution.  




protecting the people and their properties. The Tanzanian case proves that non-state 
actors have been able to supplement justice and security institutions in the villages 
and low-income neighbourhoods. As Abrahamsen and Williams explain, private 
actors do not take away the centrality of public institutions.1053 Consequently, the 
government is increasingly helping the communities to set up security groups while 
the police, who act as patrons and regulators, are empowered to institutionalise and 
keep them in check. I also establish that there is no substantial distinction between 
top-down and bottom-up security initiatives as the government tends to hijack, 
manipulate, and control these arrangements along political interests.1054  
(e) Conditions for hybrid forms of security arrangements 
As Baker shows,1055 plural policing in Africa is not a new phenomenon brought about 
by neoliberal policies in the post-cold war era. Nonetheless, I dispute Baker’s view 
that non-state actors are the oldest forms of security arrangements that predate and 
never totally replaced by state actors. This is so because it is hard to distinguish 
between state and non-state actors or to establish which between the two came first in 
the Tanzanian setting. As I have shown in chapter three, before the colonial rule, there 
was no distinction between public and private sectors and precolonial societies were 
mainly communal and stateless. The colonial regime defined and set criteria for a 
public security actor as opposed to a private one. Yet, the suspicious relationship 
between the government and non-state security actors is fading, thus creating new 
organisational forms and the circulation of personnel between the public and private 
sectors. As Bagayoko presents,1056 public security agencies in Africa tend to be 
virtually informal while the civil society is weak or divided and the distinction 
between state and non-state security actors is fluid and, in some instances, non-
existent.  
 
1053 Abrahamsen and Williams (2017), Ibid. 
1054 Cf. Cross (2013), Ibid. 
1055 Baker (2008), Ibid. 




7.3 Future Policy Action 
The 2014 Draft Constitution made substantial reform on the governance of security, 
among other things. Unfortunately, the government has shelved the draft Constitution 
indefinitely for want of national consensus and political will. To capture the hybrid 
forms of security arrangements, the government is urged to follow the process of 
amending the Constitution listed under Article 98, thus repeal and replace Article 147 
of the 1977 Constitution with Articles 266 and 274 of the 2014 Draft Constitution. 
The government needs also to develop a holistic, inter-agency and people-centred 
security policy. The policy must consider the law, complexity and demands of 
security and recognise the existence of a variety of actors, clients, donors, and 
practices. Lastly, there is a need to harmonise conflicting laws namely the 
Constitution, the Public Order Act, the Societies Act, the Political Parties 
(Amendment) Act, Local Government (District Authorities) Act, Local Government 
(Urban Authorities) Act, the People’s Militia Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, 
Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. This is so because of Judge Mwalusanya’s 
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